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ABSTRACT 
The relationship between response time and safety margin of CANadian Deuterium 
Uranium (CANDU) nuclear power plant (NPP) is investigated in this thesis. 
Implementation of safety shutdown system using Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) 
is explored. The fast data processing capability of FPGAs shortens the response time of 
CANDU shutdown systems (SDS) such that the impact of accident transient can be 
reduced. The safety margin, which is closely related to the reactor behavior in the event 
of an accident, is improved as a result of such a faster shutdown process.  
Theoretical analysis based on neutron dynamic theory is carried out to establish the fact 
that a faster shutdown process can mitigate accidental consequences. To provide more 
realistic test cases from a thermalhydraulic perspective, an industry grade simulation tool 
known as CATHENA is used to generate comparable accident-shutdown transients for 
different SDS response times. Results from both verification methods explicitly prove the 
feasibility of improving the safety margin via faster shutdown process. 
To demonstrate this concept, a prototype of the proposed faster SDS is constructed. The 
trip logic of CANDU shutdown system No.1 (SDS1) is converted into a digital hardware 
design and implemented within chosen FPGA platform. The functionality of the FPGA-
based SDS1 is implemented, and the response times are tested and compared to those of 
the existing CANDU SDS1. The achieved 10.5 ms response time of the FPGA-based 
SDS1 is again applied to the CATHENA simulation process to quantitatively present the 
26.98% improvement in the safety margin. 
To investigate potential improvement in safety margin by using FPGA technology, 
hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulation is performed by connecting the FPGA-based 
SDS1 to an NPP training simulator. The 6.26% improvement in safety margin has been 
verified, based on which a 10% potential power upgrade is discussed as another benefit 
of applying FPGA technology to CANDU NPPs. 
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A nuclear power plant (NPP) is a complicated system which utilizes nuclear fission 
energy to generate electricity. It has been proved to be an effective and clean way to 
provide energy to human society. However, both the fuel and the fission products are 
radioactive and could harm human health, if handled inappropriately. Thus, safety is 
always the top priority during the design, construction, and operation of an NPP. 
Nowadays, more and more technologies have the potential of improving NPP safety. This 
thesis focuses on improving the safety margins of NPPs using Field Programmable Gate 
Arrays (FPGAs). A brief introduction is given in this chapter to illustrate NPP safety 
issues, CANadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) NPPs, safety systems in CANDU 
NPPs, FPGA technology, and the motivations, objectives, as well as the research 
approaches taken in this thesis. 
1.1 Safety issues in NPPs 
Nuclear safety refers to managing the operational risk such that the probability of 
releasing radioactive materials or other hazards is kept at an acceptable level. It is always 
the top priority of NPPs since the results of nuclear accidents can cause severe public 
hazards and massive economic loss. More specifically, operational limits and safety 
requirements have to be established with the objective of keeping the risk associated with 
plant operation within the limits prescribed by government appointed independent 
nuclear safety regulators. Satisfaction of these limits and requirements demands reliable 
  
2 
and effective safety systems that are capable of ensuring safe operation, preventing 
severe accidents, and alleviating the accident consequences. Technical specifications are 
also declared for NPP systems and operation status such that the plant operation does 
comply with all the necessary limits and requirements.  
1.1.1 Safety objectives and requirements in NPPs 
According to the documentations released by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), all the requirements for minimizing the risks associated with NPPs are derived 
based upon three fundamental safety objectives [1]: 
(1) General nuclear safety objective: To protect individuals, society and the 
environment from harm by establishing and maintaining in nuclear 
installations effective defences against radiological hazards; 
(2) Radiation protection objective: To ensure that in all operational states 
radiation exposure within the installation or due to any planned release of 
radioactive material from the installation is kept below prescribed limits and 
as low as reasonably achievable, and to ensure mitigation of the radiological 
consequences of any accidents; and 
(3) Technical safety objective: To take all reasonably practicable measures to 
prevent accidents in nuclear installations and to mitigate their consequences 
should they occur; to ensure with a high level of confidence that, for all 
possible accidents taken into account in the design of the installation, 
including those of very low probability, any radiological consequences would 
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be minor and below prescribed limits; and to ensure that the likelihood of 
accidents with serious radiological consequences is extremely low. 
The latter two objectives are indeed complementary support to the general one, which 
indicate specific goals from two different aspects. Measures, like reactor regulating 
system (RRS) and digital control computers (DCCs), are taken to guarantee that these 
objectives are achievable at any of the plant’s operational states. Although the NPP 
design is required to cut down the likelihood of plant states that could lead to radioactive 
releases, it has to be clearly indicated that the probability of an accident does exist. In the 
case of an accident, further measures, such as deployment of safety systems and post-
accident systems, are necessary to keep the level of radioactive exposure as low as 
possible and mitigate subsequent radiological consequences. 
To achieve the above three fundamental objectives, safety requirements are issued and 
applied to every lifecycle stage and every operational state of an NPP. These safety 
requirements cover design, operation, and decommission of an NPP. They are specified 
for each lifecycle stage from risk management, safety defence, principle technology, to 
human factors. These requirements are mandatory and documented as regulations for the 
nuclear industry.   
At the design stage of a new NPP, comprehensive safety analysis is required to identify 
all the possible sources and evaluate the effects that radiation doses could bring to on-site 
workers, the public, and the environment. The design organization is required to ensure 
that the NPP is designed to comply with all the necessary safety regulations. The 
accomplished design should also pass an independent safety assessment before it can be 
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delivered for fabrication/construction. During the design process, a requirement so called 
“defence in depth” [2] shall be incorporated such that the NPP can maintain the integrity 
of physical barriers of radioactive materials. The defence in depth concept includes a 
series of levels of protection with a consideration of both accident and failure of certain 
barrier. It offers NPPs graded safety protection against various possibilities of transients, 
anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs), and accidents. Following such a concept, 
the design is required to be carried out through safety classification, general plant design, 
plant system design, equipment qualification, human factor evaluation, etc. Safety 
systems of NPPs, due to their importance to plant safety, are highly considered with more 
specific requirements. The operating organization, on the other hand, is also required to 
prescribe proper operating procedures and assure their execution.  
1.1.2 Operation limits and safety margins 
With the purpose of meeting the safety requirements, a comprehensive description of 
NPP operating status is provided by defining operational limits. These operational limits 
categorize the plant behavior into several domains and margins. As an example, the limits 
and margins used in CANDU NPPs are illustrated in Figure 1.1 [3]: 
 
Figure 1.1 –Limits and margins of CANDU NPPs 
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As can be seen, the normal operation of a CANDU NPP is restricted within the 
“operating domain” by the trip limit (trip setpoint). While safety limit indicates the 
regulatory acceptance criteria. Violation of the safety limit can lead to severe accident 
such as fuel channel dryout, which may cause catastrophic consequences, say, core 
meltdown. In case of an accident, parameters representing reactor behavior, such as 
reactor power and temperature, will drift out of the operating domain and violate the trip 
limit. NPP safety systems then step in to execute reactor trip functions, preventing the 
safety limit of the reactor from being exceeded. With the consideration that it takes time 
to accomplish the trip process, the trip limit is defined lower than the safety limit. Two 
quantities, margin to trip and margin to dryout, are discussed in [4], giving a clear 
illustration of their relationship.  
According to the official IAEA definition, safety margin is “the difference or ratio in 
physical units between the limiting value of an assigned parameter the surpassing of 
which leads to the failure of a system or component, and the actual value of that 
parameter in the plant” [5]. It plays an important role of transient buffer between the 
operating value and the regulatory acceptance criteria. Because it takes time for the 
accidental transients of operating parameters to overcome this buffer, the existence of 
safety margin allows safety systems to detect accidents, stop the dangerous progress, and 
mitigate major threatening consequences. 
Variables within the reactor can change dramatically in the event of an accident. For 
example, in a large loss of coolant accident (LOCA) in CANDU, the positive reactivity, 
as a result of quick voiding of the primary heat transport (PHT) system, can be as high as 
+4.3 mk at 0.9 second into the accident [6]. As a consequence, the temperature and the 
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reactor power can elevate at an expeditious rate, which poses a serious threat to the 
reactor safety. Various accident analyses have been done to show how CANDU reactors 
mitigate severe accidents within the safety limits [7-11]. Safety margins buffer these 
accident transients and keep the plant safety under such undesired accident conditions. 
Due to its importance to the plant safety, safety margin is often utilized in NPPs for 
modifications and performance improvement [12]. 
1.1.3 NPP safety systems  
It is strictly required that NPPs must be equipped with safety systems such that the plant 
safety is preserved even when an accident happens. Major functionality of the safety 
systems is to prevent the damage of physical barriers and the releasing of radioactive 
substances. Moreover, NPP safety systems have to mitigate the post-accident 
consequences such that the damage or harm caused by the accident is reduced to a level 
as low as possible. 
No matter which reactor type is adopted in an NPP, its safety systems are normally 
categorized into reactor protection system, emergency core cooling system, and 
containment system with respect to their functions. The reactor protection system has the 
responsibility of shutting down the reactor once the reactor is threatened by abnormal 
transients, e.g. rapid increase of reactor power. Methods of shutting down the reactor 
include insertion of control/shutoff rods and injection of neutron poison. Either of them 
introduces rapid neutron absorption that leads to reactor shutdown. The emergency core 
cooling system provides extra coolant supply for both the core and the containment in 
case of undesired loss of coolant. The temperature is then kept at an acceptable level to 
prevent damage such as core melt. Failure of such safety systems can lead to severe 
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consequences, such as what happened in Fukushima NPP, Japan [13]. The containment 
system, including the fuel cladding, reactor vessel, and primary containment, is a group 
of physical barriers that prevent radioactive materials from being released to the 
environment. The containment system also possesses depressurization and exhausting 
equipments to strengthen the seal function. 
1.2 Safety systems in CANDU NPPs 
CANDU is a unique reactor type that were designed and developed by Atomic Energy 
Canada Limited (AECL) and Ontario Hydro since the early 1950s [14]. Its unique 
features, such as heavy water moderator, horizontal calandria, and on-line refueling, 
make it one of the most successful reactor types for commercial production of electricity 
[15]. Safety systems of CANDU are capable of detecting accident situations and 
mitigating the relevant consequences.  
1.2.1 General information 
Safety systems are deployed in CANDU NPPs to prevent catastrophic consequences 
resulting from accidents. Accident scenarios are detected and the reactor is shut down in 
a timely fashion. They are also in charge of dealing with the post-accident situation such 
as removing residual heat, refilling the fuel channel with coolant, preventing release of 
hazardous radioactive particles, etc. 
Four fundamental safety functions are considered in CANDU NPP safety systems, which 
are consistent with international reactor safety design principles and Canadian safety 
requirements [16]. They are: 
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(1) To shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; 
(2) To remove decay heat from the fuel effectively; 
(3) To maintain a barrier to limit radioactive release to the public and plant 
personnel; and 
(4) To supply information necessary for the operator to monitor the status of the 
plant. 
In order to achieve the above functions effectively, CANDU safety systems are 
categorized as shutdown systems, post-shutdown safety systems, and safety support 
systems. 
 
Figure 1.2 – CANDU SDS1 and SDS2 
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Shutdown systems are used to, as indicated by their names, shutdown the reactor before 
an accident causes serious damage to the plant. Figure 1.2 [17], describes the CANDU 
shutdown system No. 1 (SDS1) and shutdown system No. 2 (SDS2), respectively. SDS1 
shuts the reactor down by inserting 28 shutoff rods from the top of the calandria, while 
SDS2 performs the shutdown action in a manner of rapid poison injection. When the 
reactor is shutdown, it is the responsibility of the post-shutdown systems to alleviate the 
consequences that has been caused by the accident, such as decay heat removal. The 
safety support system, which provides power and monitoring information for shutdown 
and post-shutdown purposes, works together with the above mentioned safety systems to 
assure a successful shut down process.  
1.2.2 SDS1 
All CANDU NPPs are required to be equipped with two independent and diverse 
shutdown systems, SDS1 and SDS2. Each shall be able to shutdown the reactor and keep 
the reactor subcritical such that any fuel failure mechanism shall not result in a loss of 
primary heat transport system integrity. 
In CANDU 6 SDS1, there are totally 28 shutoff rods arranged in two banks with 14 rods 
each. They are located right above the top of the reactor so that gravity can be the driving 
force when a drop-down action is required.  
As one of the safety systems in CANDU NPP, SDS1 has to meet strict requirements that 
are stipulated for these safety systems [18]:  
(1) shutdown the reactor and keep it subcritical whenever necessary; 
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(2) have high availability; 
(3) have online testing ability;  
(4) have enough redundancy and independency; and 
(5) perform its function on time whenever necessary.  
According to the requirements documented by regulators, the unavailability of CANDU 
SDS1 is required to be less than 310 −  years per year, which means the fraction of time 
for which SDS1 is not available per year shall be demonstrated to be less than 310−  years. 
The online testing ability is required to ensure the availability of SDS1 such that the 
testing of SDS1 can be carried out without a reduction in the effectiveness of the system. 
Sufficient redundancy and independency allow the SDS1 to remain functional when a 
failure of any single component in the SDS1 happens. On-time actuation of SDS1 is 
critical to plant safety since the consequence could be much worse with a delayed 
shutdown in an accident with rapid transient. The response time of SDS1 is the key factor 
that affects the shutdown speed. The shorter the response time is, the faster the SDS1 can 
shutdown the reactor, resulting in a lower power surge. Thus shortening the response 
time could help improve the safety features in the plant. 
To obtain the mentioned qualifications, the SDS1 control is designed to be a triplicate, 
relay logic applied system [19]. There are a total of three trip channels (D, E, and F) with 
completely independent and physically separated power supplies, trip parameter sensors, 
instrumentation trip logic and annunciation. Each trip channel has exactly the same 
functionality. The reliability and availability criteria are met with the triple redundancy 
  
11 
while the online testing ability is allowed by the independence between each channel. 
Meanwhile spurious trips are also effectively prevented through a two out of three (2oo3) 
vote of the three outputs of the triple redundant trip channels. This majority voting logic 
permits the reactor trip signal to be released only when at least two trip channels are on 
trip status, which reduces the probability of a false trip decision. 
SDS1 is one of the most important safety systems in CANDU NPPs since it provides an 
effective and reversible shutdown process. Due to its importance to the plant safety, there 
have been many efforts for SDS1 improvement, which leads to three evolutions [20]. 
With a purpose of enhancing plant safety, the current thesis work also focuses on 
improving SDS1 using digital hardware technology. 
1.3 Research motivations 
The motivations of using FPGA technology to improve CANDU SDS1 and further the 
NPP safety margin lie in several technical aspects: potential benefits of an improved 
safety margin, the problems that an existing CANDU SDS1 is facing, and FPGA 
advantages for SDS1 improvement. This thesis work is stimulated when FPGA has 
shown its superiority in some non-safety applications of nuclear industry [21]. At the 
same time, conventional safety system in existing CANDU NPPs are facing problems 
ranging from obsolescence resistance to regulatory approval difficulties. Preliminary 
investigations show that applying FPGA technology to CANDU SDS1 not only solve 
current technical problems, but also can lead to safer operation and even performance 
enhancement of the plant. 
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1.3.1 Safety margin improvement 
Safety margin is a buffer between the normal operation and unacceptable system failure 
caused by an accident. A more conservative safety margin ensures higher tolerance to 
accident consequences. If SDS1 reacts to the accident with a shorter response time, the 
trip process will be initiated earlier and the transient surge of reactor parameters will be 
lower.  Moreover, process variables such as temperature and pressure progress rapidly 
during accidents. Hence, the earlier the reactor is shutdown, the lighter the impact of the 
accident would be. For example, less heat is generated when the chain reaction is stopped 
earlier, which alleviates the post-accident recovery. Considering the fact that FPGA 
systems have the potential of faster processing speed than software-based ones for a 
given algorithm/logic, the safety margin improvement can be realized by a faster 
shutdown process via an FPGA-based shutdown system. Detailed validation of such a 
concept will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2 based on neutron dynamics analysis. 
A further idea regarding to a faster shutdown is that the operating power of the plant can 
be upgraded without endangering the plant safety. Since the surge peak of an accident 
transient with a faster shutdown process is lower, power upgrade is allowed as long as the 
accidental surge peak remains within acceptable criteria. If the safety margin 
improvement with faster shutdown is validated, then there is a possible chance for the 
power upgrade. However, power upgrade not only depends on the realization of faster 




1.3.2 SDS1 performance 
As one of the most important safety systems in CANDU NPPs, SDS1 takes critical 
responsibility of protecting the reactor. Since it is the first safety system that reacts to an 
NPP accident, there is a direct relationship between SDS1 performance and the NPP 
safety margin. Regulators require SDS1 to have the highest safety integrity level (SIL). 
Its performance is hence one of the key issues of NPP safety. 
SDS1 is a standby system waiting to be called upon to shutdown the reactor. Therefore, 1) 
it should have high reliability when waiting for the call of duty; 2) it should react to the 
upset condition quickly and properly to mitigate the post-accident consequences; and 3) it 
should have firm obsolescence resistance since an NPP is built to be in service for 
decades. The software-based SDS1, however, is facing problems at meeting these 
requirements because of its inherent failure modes, serial processing pattern, and 
unavoidable reprogramming process for alternative platforms. 
Inherent failure modes and difficulties of algorithm validation have burdened the 
regulatory approval process for software reliability and availability. In a microprocessor-
based platform, task-distribution process and the serial processing pattern limit the 
overall processing speed. The obsolescence problem becomes more and more serious 
with microprocessor-based systems under rapid technology progress. These problems are 
offering a margin for SDS1 performance improvement. For this reason, SDS1 is chosen 
as the research topic of this thesis work to investigate how its performance can be 
improved and how the plant safety margins can be improved with a faster speed of 
response of the SDS1. 
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1.3.3 Advantages of using FPGAs 
FPGAs have been widely utilized in applications where flexible and low cost digital 
hardware implementations are needed. This programmable semiconductor device 
contains a matrix of high density configurable logic blocks connected via programmable 
interconnects. Resorting to computer-based design tools, the logic design for FPGAs is 
essentially circuit-independent [22]. This unique feature enables a design to be 
transferred from one FPGA platform to another without going through redesign [23], 
which leads to potential enhancement of the obsolescence resistance of a system. A 
schematic view of an FPGA chip structure is shown in Figure 1.3. 
 
Figure 1.3 – Schematic view of an FPGA chip 
It is important to point out that, in the design and implementation phase of any FPGA 
systems, Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tool kits which are operating system 
driven are involved. However, once the design and implementation phase is complete, the 
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final implemented product is a pure hardware system. It does not include software failure 
modes so that the regulatory approval process becomes less complex. 
With the help of parallel processing and pure hardware implementation, FPGAs have the 
potential to achieve faster processing speed than software-based systems. Development 
of modern semiconductor technology has allowed the amount of logic elements in one 
FPGA chip to reach a million-gate level. This feature offers abundant resource for 
realizing parallel processing for all the similar logic steps, say, thousands of value range 
checking. Propagation delay and queuing time consumed in a serial processing system 
are eliminated and, hence a faster processing speed can be obtained. In a pure hardware 
implementation, no operating system exists. Even the memory access is not necessary if 
there are no complicated calculations. Logics that are to be processed then can be 
distributed to corresponding elements directly through pre-configured routes. Therefore, 
the results can be obtained at the output quickly. In previous applications of FPGAs, it 
was found the processing speed of FPGAs can be two to three orders of magnitude faster 
than pure software implementation for the same problem [24]. 
Having the capability of higher obsolescence resistance, easier regulatory approval, and 
faster processing speed, FPGAs have shown great potential for improving current NPP 
safety systems that are computer-based. How to realize an FPGA-based safety system 
and how the NPP safety features can be improved by this method are the main 
motivations for this thesis. 
FPGA itself is not a brand new technology but has become more and more powerful for 
implementation of customized systems. Its logic elements capacity and processing speed 
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have been improved by several magnitude orders since it was invented in 1985, which 
now makes it possible for the replacement of software-based systems such as the existing 
SDS1. 
As what have been introduced, FPGA has obvious advantages over software-based 
systems such as improved obsolescence resistance, easier approval procedure, and faster 
processing speed. Replacing those existing software-based systems, even safety-related 
systems in NPPs, with FPGA-based platform, can have these advantages fully utilized. 
As a consequence, the whole plant can benefit from these advantages to achieve a safer 
NPP. 
1.4 Objectives, methodologies, and scope of research 
Current thesis work focuses on: 1) exploring the speed of the shutdown systems and its 
impact on plant safety; 2) validating the concept of improving safety margin with faster 
shutdown process; 3) realizing the SDS1 trip logic that is currently implemented within a 
software-based system; 4) verifying and validating its performance; and 5) evaluating the 
improvement that can be realized. To accomplish the listed objectives, research 
methodologies are defined as well as the research scope. 
1.4.1 Research objectives 
Objectives of the work are defined for three major stages of the research procedure: 1) 
analysis for the plant accident behavior and the impact of faster shutdown process; 2) 
implementation of an FPGA-based SDS1; and 3) evaluation of the FPGA-based SDS1 
and the safety margin improvement. 
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The analysis work concentrates on the accident scenarios and the related plant response. 
Analytical attempts are used to explore in detail the accidental transients within different 
shutdown processes. The objectives for the analysis work are defined below: 
(1) Accident scenarios are to be set up as analysis objects; and 
(2) The concept that the safety feature can be improved via a faster SDS1 is to be 
validated and verified based on the predefined accident scenarios; 
 For the FPGA implementation work, the focus is on: 1) the feasibility of a pure hardware 
implementation of the SDS1 trip logic; and 2) the effective utilization of FPGA 
advantages for the SDS1 implementation. Then the objectives are defined as follows: 
(1) An FPGA-based SDS1 trip channel is to be implemented. The related 
Input/Output (I/O) ports are defined and connected to a simulation 
environment for performance evaluation; 
(2) The functionalities of the designed FPGA-based SDS1 trip channel are 
validated under normal and accident conditions; 
(3) A methodology for comparison of the speed of responses is established; and 
(4) Comparisons are carried out under different NPP operating conditions. 
For the evaluation of the safety margin improvement, expected outputs are an illustration 
of the benefits that a faster SDS1 can offer to the plant and a practical implementation 
that can show the proved improvement under certain accident scenarios. More 
specifically, the following issues are to be addressed: 
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(1) The benefits of shortening response time of the shutdown systems is to be 
validated quantitatively in terms of the safety margins of a CANDU NPP; 
(2) A diverse FPGA implementation to achieve shortened response time and to 
validate the safety margin improvements in a simulation environment is to be 
demonstrated; and 
(3) Other benefits as a result of shorten response time, more specifically, the 
potential power upgrade, while maintaining the improved safety margins is to 
be explored quantitatively. 
1.4.2 Research approaches 
To obtain the above objectives, suitable research approaches are determined through 
literature survey, assessment, and selection. Specific techniques are targeted to certain 
procedures for cost-effective results.  
To validate the concept of safety margin improvement, thermalhydraulic analysis for 
accident transients is necessary. The analysis of transients based on distinct response time 
is capable of showing the improvement in a faster shutdown process against the slower 
one. With selected accident scenarios, an industry standard code, CATHENA [25], is 
used for such kind of analysis. A simplified reactor model and the accident scenarios are 
created for the thermalhydraulic simulation.  
A standard FPGA development procedure is applied for the SDS1 implementation. A 
systematic design is drafted based on current SDS1 trip logic. Hardware coding, 
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simulation, synthesis, and configuration are performed by using industry standard 
development kit [26].  
Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulation [27] is chosen for the functionality and 
performance validation of the FGPA-based SDS1. With an industry grade NPP simulator 
available, the FPGA-based SDS1 can be tested by being connected to the simulator and 
acting as a trip channel that reacts to the simulated accidents. Real-time monitoring of 
variables and trip signals is then enabled. The functionality evaluation is then 
straightforward when the captured responses from the FPGA system are analyzed. 
To statistically estimate the response speed of such an FPGA-based SDS1, Monte Carlo 
simulation [28] is selected. This is because the timing is not a fixed value due to 
measurement noise and equipment uncertainties. Applying this simulation method allows 
a more comprehensive description of the timing performance of the FPGA system, which 
is of importance to the safety margin improvement objective. 
The thermalhydraulic simulations are utilized further to analyze the improvement based 
on evaluated timing performance of the FPGA-based SDS1. Transients of a worst-case 
accident are simulated using different response time of SDS1 to generate comparable 
results.  
With the purpose of further verifying the effectiveness of the shortened response time and 
validating the safety margin improvement in a real-time environment, HIL simulation is 
again applied. Unlike the off-line CATHENA simulation, HIL simulation performs on-
line performance evaluation and the performance of the tested system can be monitored 
in real time. 
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In summary, the research approaches adopted in this work are listed as following: 
(1) Establish thermalhydraulic models for CATHENA simulations with specified 
accident scenarios that represent a typical worst case accident; 
(2) Analyze the simulated transients to verify the “faster shutdown” concept and 
validate the performance improvement; 
(3) Analyze the CANDU SDS1 trip logics and translate them into a suitable form 
for FPGA implementation; 
(4) Use a simulator to validate the results of the implemented FPGA system;  
(5) Use both deterministic and statistical methods to evaluate the performance of 
the FPGA-based implementation of SDS1 against its software-based 
implementations in PLCs; 
(6) Perform the thermalhydraulic simulation for the worst case scenario again 
using the evaluated FPGA response time; 
(7) Analyze transients of critical system variables based on the results of the 
thermalhydraulic simulation as a function of different shutdown response 
time to establish the baseline for evaluating the FPGA implementation; 
(8) Compare the simulation results with different response times so that the 
characteristics of transients are identified as a function of response time; 
  
21 
(9) Describe how the safety margins can be improved with a faster decision-
making process, as well as how this can be utilized for potential power 
upgrade; and 
(10) Demonstrate the feasibility of this approach using an HIL simulation with an 
industry grade CANDU NPP simulator and to provide further verification 
and validation. 
1.4.3 Research scope 
Although safety margin improvement covers a wide range of considerations, the current 
thesis mainly focuses on the CANDU safety margin improvement via improved SDS1 
resorting to FPGA technology. Necessary bounds are defined such that the research is 
under explicit direction and the accomplished work is oriented to specific results. 
First of all, the research objectives are defined within CANDU NPPs. Both the safety 
margin and the SDS1 trip logic are analyzed based on existing CANDU technical 
information. Although other NPPs or even non-nuclear industry share the safety margin 
concept as well, such kinds of safety margins are not considered in this work. 
Secondly, the improvement of SDS1 is focused on the shortening of its response time 
using digital hardware implementation. After being in service for decades, SDS1 can be 
potentially improved in many ways. However, this work exams only the shortening of 
response time as an objective, to which research effort is mainly paid. 
Choosing an FPGA as the implementation platform is based on its verified advantages, 
especially the fast processing that can potentially increase the SDS1 response speed. 
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Focus of this part is only to evaluate the response time of an FPGA-based SDS1prototype. 
There is no plan to qualify such a prototype work for regulatory approval, including the 
software design tools used for FPGA design and implementation. 
Some of the FPGA advantages indicated in this work are derived from comparison 
against current software-based system. The comparison is based on a survey of 
previously accomplished work. There is no intention to evaluate software-based system 
here to provide a performance comparison. 
Current study does not have all the SDS1 trip parameters implemented since one process 
trip parameter is enough for functionality validation and response time comparison 
against software-based system. Proper responses of other parameter implementation are 
only redundant supports and do not account more for the research objectives. However, 
data cross verifications between multiple channels will not be considered. 
Finally, the accident scenarios applied for safety margin analysis are obtained from 
previous CANDU safety analysis work. The CATHENA simulation is mainly based on a 
selected worst case scenario which is enough to show the safety margin improvement. It 
has to be pointed out that the overall evaluation of the plant safety margin needs thorough 
study for different accident scenarios. However, this will be beyond the scope. 
1.5 Main contributions 
Within the prescribed research scope, this thesis uses SDS1 as an example to show how 
FPGA-based safety-critical system can improve the safety margin of CANDU NPPs as 
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well as the feasibility for potential power upgrade. The main contributions of this thesis 
can be summarized as: 
(1) A valuable reference for FPGA applications in NPP safety systems has been 
presented in the “Top-Down” design flow with special design techniques involved; 
(2) Performance illustration of FPGA-based SDS1 has been given by the timing 
evaluation, which proves the advantages of applying FPGAs to NPP safety 
systems; 
(3) Quantitative description of the safety margin improvement with faster shutdown 
process has been obtained through thermalhydraulic simulations; 
(4) Analytical relationships between the response time and the critical transient 
parameters are derived as an evaluation of the response time effects; 
(5) Potential power upgrade has been validated with thermalhydraulic simulations; 
and 
(6) The safety margin improvement has been validated by on-line HIL simulations 
using an NPP simulator. 
1.6 Organization of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents analytical 
discussion for safety margin improvement, FPGA applications in NPPs, and relevant 
literature reviews. Chapter 3 covers the thermalhydraulic analysis for the validation of 
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safety margin improvement. The SDS1 trip logic and its FPGA implementation process 
are discussed in Chapter 4. The main content of Chapter 5 is the evaluation of both the 
FPGA-based SDS1 and the potential safety margin improvement. The HIL simulation 
work is introduced in Chapter 6 to demonstrate the safety margin improvement within a 
realistic NPP environment, followed by Chapter 7 where the conclusions are drawn and 
future research directions are suggested. 
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2 NUCLEAR SAFETY AND FPGA APPLICATIONS IN NPPS 
The objective of the current research work deals with safety issues in NPPs due to their 
significance to both the plants and public safety. This chapter covers the essentials of 
nuclear safety and relevant FPGA applications, including safety regulations and standards, 
safety margins, safety systems, why and how FPGA-based system can be and has been 
applied to NPPs, etc. Detailed literature review is also presented on these aspects. 
2.1 Nuclear safety 
The safety assurance of an NPP is to protect the on-site operating staff, the public, and 
the environment from the hazards of the radioactive substances. To achieve such a goal, 
both natural and engineered radiation barriers are deployed. The design, operation, and 
analysis of an NPP have to comply with strictly prescribed safety regulations and 
standards issued by regulators such that the nuclear safety objectives are achieved. Safety 
margin is defined for a plant parameter as a buffer between the operating value and the 
tolerance of the barriers. These crucial barriers can then survive in accidents to prevent 
release of radiological hazards. Safety analysis methods are developed and utilized to 
evaluate the plant behavior and safety margins. Safety systems are designed and installed 




2.1.1 Regulations and standards 
Significant efforts have been invested in designing reliable NPP safety systems to achieve 
the goal of safe and effective energy production. To satisfy the NPP safety demands, 
regulators and other national/international organizations, such as International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and IAEA, have developed guidelines and standards 
for the entire procedure of design, installation, and operation according to experiences 
and knowledge accumulated in decades. 
(1) IEC standards 
Among these organizations, IEC is well known for their meticulously developed IEC 
standards. For safety systems such as SDS1, where computer systems are involved, the 
standard named IEC-61508 provides corresponding requirements for their functional 
safety. 
IEC-61508 is specifically developed to provide requirements and guidance for electrical, 
electronic, and programmable electronic (E/E/PE) systems that are used to carry out 
safety-related functions [29, 30]. It provides detailed lifecycle requirements for the 
system itself and its software along with the precise definitions, safety integrity 
requirement, and technique overview. In its general requirements, an overall framework 
of the lifecycle of safety-related systems is described using a flow chart. Each step of the 
lifecycle, such as risk analysis and system realization, is depicted with objective, scope, 
requirements, inputs, and desired outputs. Following the general requirements are the 
requirements for E/E/PE systems and software, respectively. Definitions and 
abbreviations are also indicated for the whole standard to obtain consistency. 
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Conformance to this standard is now an essential requirement by the regulators to the 
NPP research and development (R/D) procedure. 
In addition to the IEC-61508 standard, there are two standards that are documented 
specially for NPPs: IEC-61513 and IEC-62138. IEC-61513 provides general 
requirements for NPP instrumentation and control (I&C) system important to safety [31], 
where both conventional hard-wired equipment and computer-based systems are 
considered. Requirements and recommendations for safety-related I&C systems are listed 
from overall architecture to each component. IEC-62138 focuses on the software aspects 
of computer-based systems that perform functional safety in NPPs [32]. 
Because of the popularity and effectiveness of IEC standards in NPP safety system R/D 
processes, they are considered as the minimum requirement for safety systems in NPPs. 
Each country develops its own regulations and guidance for nuclear safety based on 
related IEC standards. 
(2) IAEA safety series 
IAEA takes the responsibility of guiding the peaceful nuclear power utilization, including 
the NPPs and medical isotopes. To explicitly define, describe, and enforce the 
appropriate use of nuclear energy, IAEA publishes its safety series covering all the 
aspects of nuclear safety. For instance, safety standards for NPPs are developed and 
published for the reference of all the countries that have nuclear energy utilization 
purposes [33].  
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As for I&C systems in NPPs, including the shutdown systems, IAEA publishes relevant 
standards and guidance. Especially with the rapid development of digital systems, IAEA 
issues its specifications of requirements for NPP I&C systems [34] as well as the 
requirements for safety related NPP systems [35]. The development work for NPP safety 
systems follows a strict life-cycle process such that the proper functionality and 
acceptable quality are ensured. FPGA-based systems, as one of the digital systems that 
are being utilized for NPP I&C applications, have to follow these standards as well.  
(3) Canadian classification of NPP safety requirements 
Starting from 1946, Canada established its own nuclear safety regulator at the outset of 
its nuclear development plan. This regulator, Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), had 
been working for decades to provide surveillance and administration for Canada’s 
nuclear industry until it was replaced by a new government-organized one, Canadian 
Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC). With the evolution of CANDU reactors, safety 
requirements are developed to provide clearly defined safety objectives and the 
approaches. Presently, there are complete and mature safety guidelines and requirements 
for entire CANDU lifecycle, such as the “General Nuclear Safety and Control 
Regulations” and “Requirements for Shutdown Systems for CANDU NPPs”. These 
regulations set the standards how CANDU reactors should be designed, operated, 
maintained, and protected. For example, requirements for SDS1 define what criteria an 
SDS1 should meet to achieve the safety [36]: 
(1) Seismic qualification; 
(2) Environmental qualification including against jets crash and other dynamic loads;  
  
29 
(3) Unavailability of less than  310− years per reactor year; 
(4) Fail-safe operation; 
(5) On-line testing without impairing the normal operation; 
(6) Manual initiation from the control room; 
(7) Separation and independence of safety system channels from each other and from 
process systems; and 
(8) Requirements applicable to safety support equipment.  
Safety analysis criteria are also available to guide licensees in a proper manner of 
performing the required safety analysis of a nuclear facility [37]. Only with the 
satisfaction of such criteria can CNSC accept the analysis results when considering a 
licensing process. One thing that needs to be clarified is that CNSC evaluates the 
compliance of safety criteria also in association with other international standards, such 
as those from IAEA and IEC. Safety analysis in this thesis work takes these requirements 
into priority consideration. 
2.1.2 Defence in depth  
In fact, all the CANDU NPPs have extensive conventional safety programs which are 
much more stringent than that in other industrial facilities. The philosophy against 
hazards in NPP is to reduce the hazard levels to As Low As Reasonably Achievable 
(ALARA). Achievement in this aspect so far in Canada is that the radiation dose received 
by CANDU NPP onsite workers has been reduced by about a factor of 10 over the 40-50 
years of plant operation [38]. With the rules listed as power control, fuel cooling, and 
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radioactivity containment, CANDU established its “Defence in Depth” safety concept. 
This concept assumes possible design flaws, equipment failures, as well as human errors. 
It then sets up a safety model to protect the plant from these threats using multiple 
barriers, reliable process systems, reliable safety systems, competent operating and 
maintenance staff, and failure detection/correction techniques.  
To achieve the “Defence in Depth” goal and ensure safe and normal operation, NPPs 
require high reliability and availability of both process systems and safety systems. 
Several principles are followed during design and operation to meet the high reliability 
and availability requirements.  
The first one is redundancy. Additional components are installed to the system to avoid 
whole system failure when one of the components is down. The redundant components 
increase the reliability and availability by providing a backup at possible single 
component failure. For example, both SDS1 and SDS2 have three redundant trip channels. 
By this means, the shutdown system maintains its function even when one or two of its 
trip channels are out of operation. 
Another principle for NPP system design is independence, which means physical 
separation of systems or components. Independence prevents the failure happened in one 
system/component from affecting the others. As for the shutdown systems, all the three 
trip channels are independent from each other. This also helps online maintenance by 
allowing one channel to be tested without affecting the other two. 
Diversity is also important to system reliability and availability. This attempt provides 
more than one way to realize a specific system function. Normally, the diversity systems 
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are even designed by different teams to avoid potential duplicated defects. CANDU NPPs 
have two shutdown systems which can shutdown the reactor using two different methods. 
Therefore, even when an unexpected situation stops SDS1 from functioning, SDS2 is still 
able to shutdown the reactor since it monitors the similar trip parameters and trips the 
reactor in a totally different way. 
Periodic testing increases the reliability and availability by detecting failures that exist in 
standby system, e.g. shutdown system. A failure in the shutdown system will not be 
noticed until it is called for its function. The consequence of an unavailable shutdown 
system due to undetected failure is absolutely unacceptable by the NPP safety 
requirements. Thus, the periodic testing is of importance to avoid this kind of undesired 
scenario. 
To gather information of the NPP systems for safety concern, operational surveillance is 
applied to provide continuous monitoring and ability of detecting potential problems. A 
flaw can then be detected and corrected before it becomes real threat to plant safety. 
Fail safe operation is a critical feature of safety systems in NPPs. It leaves the system in a 
safe state after failure happens. Thus, the safety is not jeopardized when the system faces 
a failure. A good example is the clutches that hold the shutoff rods in SDS1. The shutoff 
rods are released not only by the trip signal but also by a failure of the clutch power 
supply. The reactor is then shutdown to conservatively protect the plant in such a case. 
Preventive maintenance and predictive maintenance are methods that are taken in 
advance to prevent system failure in the NPPs. Reliability data and other related 
information are collected as estimation inputs of the maintenance judgment. It offers NPP 
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systems an opportunity to correct the problem through maintenance rather than suffers a 
system failure. 
All the above mentioned principles and techniques are applied together to achieve NPP 
safety objective. Due to its importance to the plant safety, shutdown systems, as what 
have been introduced and discussed previously, have adopted most of these features to 
ensure the plant is not endangered at accident scenarios.  
2.2 Safety margins 
2.2.1 An overview 
As introduced previously, safety margin plays an important role of transient buffer 
between the operating value and the regulatory acceptance criteria. Because it takes time 
for the accidental transients of operating parameters to overcome this buffer, the 
existence of safety margin allows safety systems to react to accidents, stop the dangerous 
progress, and mitigate major threatening consequences. Figure 2.1 [5] shows a brief 
illustration of such a concept with two estimation methods: conservative calculation and 
best estimate calculation plus uncertainty bound. 
Most important safety margins relate to physical barriers against release of radioactive 
substances, such as fuel matrix and fuel cladding. Regulators always confirm safety 
margin to be an indispensable issue of NPP safety [39-41]. It should be clearly indicated 
that the safety margin is not exclusive to nuclear industry. It has been applied to wherever 
risks are involved. Therefore, experience and knowledge from other industries about 













Figure 2.1 –Concept of safety margins and uncertainties 
By definition, the safety margin is determined by the gap between the operating value 
and the acceptance criteria. However, the actual value is difficult to determine in many 
practical cases. That is why uncertainty exists within the best estimate calculation method 
and the conservative calculation has to take the highest possible uncertainty into account. 
Hence, the precise safety margin cannot be confirmed easily. Practically, safety margin is 
usually considered as the difference in physical units between the regulatory acceptance 
criteria and the calculated value of the relevant parameter [5].  
2.2.2 Safety margin improvement through faster shutdown process 
The safety margin can be improved by a faster shutdown process in a manner of 
shortening the response of safety systems. The principle of the investigated technique lies 
in the relationship between the accidental transients and the shutdown speed, which is 
illustrated using neutron dynamics theory and relevant analysis. 
(1) Neutron dynamics basics 
In a nuclear fission reactor, the chain reaction is sustained by generating the same number 
of neutrons as those that have been absorbed, leaked, and utilized for current fission. The 
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production of neutrons can be described using a factor so called effective reactor 
multiplication constant effK , which is defined as: 
 eff
Total Number of Current Generation NeutronsK
Total Number of Last Generation Neutrons
≡  (2.1)            
When effK is less than 1, the reactor is subcritical, which means the amount of the 
neutrons in the reactor is decreasing and the fission will eventually stop. When effK is 
greater than 1, the reactor is supercritical, which means more neutrons are produced than 
lost and the reactor power rises. Only when effK is equal to 1 will the reactor remain at a 
critical state. 
In reactor physics, a quantity that is closely related to effK is used more often. It is called 








≡  (2.2) 
It is the relative net neutron production between two generations, which can indicate the 
reactor criticality status more intuitively since it is of opposite sign of subcritical and 
supercritical:  
0ρ < : subcritical;  0ρ = : critical;  0ρ > : supercritical. 
During fission reactions, some neutrons are released immediately, which are called 
prompt neutrons. Others are released shortly after the fission when the fission products 
decay and are called delayed neutrons. These fission products are named precursors and 
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normally categorized into six delay groups according to their decay time. Their decay 
constants, fractions of their delay neutrons, lifetime, and concentration are denoted as iλ , 
iβ , il , and ic .  
One approximation commonly utilized in neutron dynamic analysis is to treat all delay 
neutrons as one group. In such an approximation, quantities describing the original six 
groups are simplified to only describe the single group.  
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 (2) Neutron density transient as a function of reactivity changes 
When positive reactivity is introduced into a reactor that is at the steady-state, the reactor 
is forced to produce a transient which is described in [42] with simplified consideration 
of a point kinetic reactor model and single delay neutron group: 
 




β ρ β ρ
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( )n t   is the neutron flux density, which is proportional to the reactor power; 
0n      is the initial neutron flux density;         
β       is the delay neutron fraction; 
ρ       is the introduced step reactivity;         
λ        is the decay constant of the delayed neutron group; and     
l         is the neutron lifetime. 
Equation (2.6) illustrates the transient of neutron density after the introduction of extra 
reactivity. The second term in the right side decreases rapidly after the start of the 
transient since it is related to the prompt neutrons. The first term then becomes dominant. 
This gives an exponential increase in reactor power after the step reactivity increase. The 
bigger the step reactivity is, the more expeditiously the transient will rise. Hence, in a 
LOCA of CANDU, the void-introduced positive reactivity can cause the reactor power to 
elevate exponentially. 
In an NPP, when the quickly rising transients of critical parameters exceed the predefined 
trip thresholds, safety systems take action to shutdown the reactor by means of injecting a 
large amount of negative reactivity. Up to 80 mk of negative reactivity can be inserted to 
the CANDU reactor core by SDS1in order to neutralize the effect of introduced positive 
reactivity. The inserted negative reactivity is so large that its earlier insertion can 
effectively stop the exponential increase in neutron flux density and significantly mitigate 
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the transient. Typically, the faster the shutdown action is, the sooner the rising trend of 
transient will be slowed down and the lower the surge peak will be. As a result, the gap 
between the safety limit and the surge peak is widened, which translates into a higher 
safety margin. Implementing a faster shutdown process then turns out to be an effective 
method for safety margin improvement.  
To analytically describe an accident-shutdown process, Equation (2.6) is not applicable 
any more. The reasons are: 1) there are two reactivity insertion processes; 2) reactivity 
inserted into the core by either process is relatively large; and 3) the inserted reactivity is 
a function of time and cannot be adequately approximated by a step change. 
(3) Accident-shutdown analysis using PJA 
To analyze the accident-shutdown process, an available method is the prompt jump 
approximation (PJA), which has been widely used for approximated reactor calculations 
[43-45]. In such an approximation, the transient caused by the reactivity interference 
within a very short time interval is considered as a “prompt change”. It assumes that, 
within an extremely short interval, the reactor has instant response to the inserted 
reactivity. It is an ideal assumption in mathematical consideration but does provide an 
accurate approximation to the neutron transient. As a matter of fact, the response time of 
neutron flux density is in the order of 410−  second, which can be approximated to 0, i.e. a 
prompt response.   
 PJA is utilized here to analyze the accident-shutdown scenario such that the difference 
between shutdown processes, especially the difference between surge peaks, can be 
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analytically described. Since it is only a concept demonstration, reasonable assumptions 
are adopted to simplify the analysis. 
First of all, the overall reactivity transient, including all potential reactivity feedback, is 
considered as a linear function in both accident and shutdown processes. It is reasonable 
because these two processes are all accomplished very quickly such that linear functions 
are capable of well approximating these non-linear reactivity insertions in a short period. 
Secondly, for the convenience of solving neutron dynamic equations, the two linear 
reactivity insertion processes are set to have the same slope, i.e. the rate of reactivity 
increasing in the accident is identical to that of reactivity decreasing in the shutdown. 
This is again due to the concept validation purpose. The curve that describes the 
reactivity transient of such a case is presented in Figure 2.2 in which the accident is set to 
happen at 0t =  s. 
 
Figure 2.2 – Reactivity insertion in accident-shutdown process 
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Once the shutdown process starts, a large amount of negative reactivity is introduced into 
the reactor such that the overall reactivity begins to drop. Thus in the current study, 1t in 
Figure 2.2 is considered as the initiation time of the shutdown process, which in turn is 
taken as the shutdown system response time since the accident is assumed to start at 
0t = s. 
As what is illustrated in Figure 2.2, the accident introduced reactivity rises at a rate of a. 
At time 1t the shutdown process is initiated and the reactivity decreases at the same rate. 
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 (2.7) 
The shutdown response time 1t is the time needed by the shutdown system before 
initiating negative reactivity insertion. It consists of two parts: the rising time rt for the 
reactor parameter, such as neutron power, to reach predefined shutdown threshold and the 
decision-making time dt of the trip logic. Both of them are shown in Figure 2.2 as well.  
In 1985, Ott and Neuhold had derived the neutron flux density equations based on such a 
scenario using point kinetics reactor model and single delay neutron group [46], which is 
listed in Equations (2.8) and (2.9). 
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where 1( )n t and 2 ( )n t are neutron flux density for different time range, and 1 1 2 1( ) ( )n t n t= . 
Equation (2.8) provides a method to determine the rising time rt  since the negative 
reactivity insertion starts after the trip threshold is reached. Assuming the reactor is in full 
power when the accident happens at 0t =  s and the predefined trip threshold is 110% full 
power, rt can then be decided by solving Equation (2.10) below. 
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Equation (2.10) turns to be 
 
ln(1.1)ln 1 0r r






+ − + = + + 
 (2.11) 













+ = ∀ ∈ −∑  






















=  (2.13) 
As for the power surge peak decision, both Equations (2.8) and (2.9) are investigated. 
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Equation (2.14) shows that 1( )n t is a monotonic increasing function with its maximum 
appears at 1 1( )n t . 
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Since 1t t≥ , it follows that 
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which means 2 ( )n t  is a monotonic decreasing function and have its maximum appears 
at 2 1( )n t .  
It is now proved that 1t t=  is the peaking moment and the maximum of ( )n t  is: 
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Equation (2.16) indicates that for PJA method, the surge peak appears when the negative 
reactivity is inserted at the shutdown initiation. This is an approximate description using 
the single delayed neutron group PJA method. Although the six delayed neutron groups 
PJA gives more realistic results, Equation (2.16) is accurate enough to be used in the 
current conceptual validation purpose. 
To mitigate the post-accident consequences, i.e. to reduce the extra heat generation after 
the accident, one can insert the negative reactivity either quickly after the shutdown 
initiation or earlier after the trip threshold is reached. The former implies a greater 
reactivity insertion rate a  at 1t t≥ , which cannot be reasonably approximated by the PJA 
method discussed previously. The latter means faster response of the shutdown system, 
which is also the objective of current study.  
To compare two shutdown processes, j and k , that have different shutdown decision- 
making time jdt  and kdt  ( )jd kdt t< , transient peak values of these two neutron flux 
densities ( jn and kn ) are calculated and compared. The peaking time 1jt  and 1kt   are 
expressed as: 
 1 1;j r jd k r kdt t t t t t= + = +  













    

















    
= − + −   −     
 (2.18) 
According to the SDS1 specifications of CANDU NPP [47], the maximum allowed 
decision-making time of SDS1 is 0.1 s, which is part of a standard SDS1 response time. 
By assigning 1kt  the maximum allowed response time, it is then possible to investigate 
the advantage of a shutdown process that has shorter decision-making time than 0.1 s. Let 
0.1kdt =  s and the peak time of process k is then illustrated by applying Equation (2.13): 
 1 ln1.1 0.1k r kdt t t
a
β
= + = +  (2.19) 
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Since )( tg ∆ is a monotonic decreasing function with an initial value 0,  
 ( ) 0 (0 0.1)g t t∆ < < ∆ <  (2.23) 
Equation (2.23) proves that the index of the exponential part in (2.20) is less than 0 since 
λ  is positive as the decay constant of the precursor group. Thus, substituting Equation 
(2.21) and Equation (2.23) back to Equation (2.20) yields 
 













From a neutron dynamics perspective, (2.24) analytically proves that for the given 
response time 1jt and 1kt , 1 1( ln1.1 )j kt t
a
β
< < , the transient surge peak of a faster 
shutdown process is lower. That is to say, it is feasible to have a larger safety margin by 
shortening the response time of SDS1. 
A specific example, i.e. a large LOCA, can be used to intuitively illustrate the concept.  
Let 
 1,kL tγ= −  
then  
 ( ) ln Lg t t
L t




β  of U-235 is 0.0065 [42]. For the specific large LOCA in CANDU, value of a  can also 
be approximately estimated: 
 0.0043 / 0.9 0.0048 /a k s= ≅ [6], 
which leads to 1.1251 /L s k= .  
Thus  
 
0.0065 1.1251 1.1251( ) ln ln 1.3542ln
0.0048 1.1251 1.1251
Lg t t t t
L t t t
γ      ∆ = ∆ + = ∆ + = ∆ +     + ∆ + ∆ + ∆     
(2.25) 
Plotting Equation (2.20) with substituted Equation (2.25) gives Figure 2.3.  




















Figure 2.3 – Surge peak ratio of LOCA transients (PJA) 
Figure 2.3 quantitatively illustrates how the peak ratio in a postulated LOCA varies with 
the difference between two shutdown processes. Increasing t∆  represents faster response 
in shutdown process j. As it can be seen, if the decision-making time of process j can be 
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shortened to be 0.03 s, i.e. 0.07t∆ = s, the peak value can be reduced to be about 94% of 
that of process k. A 6% safety margin improvement is then realized, which can contribute 
to the enhancement of the plant safety in postulated accident scenarios. 
To explore how the reactivity insertion rate a  affects the peak value ratio, different 
values of a  are assigned to Equation (2.22), which gives corresponding parameters listed 
in Table 2.1: 
Table 2.1 Relevant parameter values based on a 
a (k/s) γ (s/k) 1kt (s) L(s/k) 
0.006 1.0833 0.2032 0.8801 
0.003 2.1667 0.3065 1.8602 
0.001 6.5 0.7195 5.7805 
* For U-235: 1078.0;0065.0 −== sλβ   
Based on the parameters in Table 2.1, the surge peak ratios decided by Equation (2.20) 
are plotted in Figure 2.4. The plotted data illustrates the sensitivity of the surge peak ratio 
to the reactivity insertion rate a . As what can be seen, the faster the reactivity is inserted, 
the faster the ratio changes with t∆ . It means the difference between the two surge peaks 
is more notable in the fast reactivity change scenario. One can then predict that the surge 
peak difference is more obvious for a more severe accident in which the reactivity 

























Figure 2.4 – Surge peak ratios on different a 
Improvement of safety margins with faster shutdown system also provides opportunities 
for potential power upgrade of the operating NPPs. Since the safety margin of the system 
is directly related to the speed of the shutdown action, a faster shutdown system can 
potentially limit the peak of the accidental surge below the safety limit when the 
operating power is upgraded. Power upgrade is a cost-effective method for NPPs to 
increase their MW rates, which has been realized in U.S. successfully [48]. However, 
most of the accomplished power upgrade projects are based on license renewal, 
uncertainty reduction, equipments capacity enhancement, etc [49]. These methods are 
either based on complicated license re-evaluation or investment to upgrade equipment. 
With the availability of mature FPGA technology, the faster shutdown process can indeed 




2.3 CANDU SDS1 
In this work, CANDU SDS1 is used as an example to investigate the feasibility of 
realizing faster shutdown with FPGA technology. Research work here is focused on 
shortening the response time such that SDS1 can react faster.  
2.3.1 Evolutions  
In the early 1950s, the shutdown systems in CANDU reactors used very simple design. 
The prototypes of CANDU reactors, Nuclear Power Demonstration and Douglas Point, 
used a “dump tank” which drains the heavy water moderator and pumps it back to the 
PHT loop to provide negative reactivity [50]. The design of the gravity-drop mechanical 
shutoff rods (the prototype of the current SDS1) was first added into shutdown system in 
Pickering-A design [51]. The trip logic of SDS1 was firstly based on relay circuit and 
analog comparators [52]. After being in service for decades, all these designs are facing 
aging and digitization challenges. In the early 1980s, CANDU NPPs started replacing 
their conventional relay logic and analog devices in safety systems with digital computers 
[53]. The software-driven shutdown system in Canada was first developed and deployed 
in Darlington NPP [54]. The SDS1 trip logic was turned into digital computer based 
design (PDCs) in the CANDU 6 model (started in Pt. Lepreau and Gentilly-II in 1982) 
[55]. Recently, PLCs are also used to serve as shutdown system controller in a CANDU 
NPP refurbishment project [56]. All of these are a natural evolution with rapid 




Whilst CANDU NPPs are now having fully computerized SDS1, digital computers are 
used mainly in two components of the system: trip logic processing unit and the 
display/monitoring unit [55]. The monitoring computer is a passive component not 
involved in the shutdown process. Thus, the trip computer, which executes the trip logic 
using software, is the only component that can be replaced by faster FPGA 
implementation to speed up SDS1.  
2.3.2 Issues in software-based SDS1  
When global computerization tide appeared, there was increasing ubiquity of computer 
systems in both everyday life and industries. CANDU was among the first reactors, in the 
early 1980s, to use digital computers for shutdown logic implementation. However, 
difficulties were encountered after these software-based safety systems had been 
deployed in NPPs for years. 
The process of approving the license becomes difficult and time consuming, especially 
for software-based systems with complex control logic and algorithms. The reasons of 
this strait lie in the nature of software itself, such as discrete processing manner and 
inherent design faults [57].  
When the control algorithms become more and more complex to adapt the increasing 
safety and function demands, system specifications are getting miscellaneous. It is 
basically impossible to demonstrate that the design of a software-based system for 
realistic control purpose is correct and that failure mechanisms are completely eliminated 
[58]. The reliability of software-based system is also argued due to the large number of 
discrete states without the repetitive structure found in computers. Problems can arise in 
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the use of software-based systems when their discrete nature is accompanied by great 
complexity which is a source of error and unreliability [57]. Canadian industry has put 
efforts to improving this aspect through learned lessons in NPP safety critical software 
applications [59]. It is also very difficult to provide realistic test conditions for the 
software-based system. Actual operating conditions often differ from test conditions. 
However, the software simulation process at the verification and validation (V&V) stage 
has to be performed based on assumptions and there is no way to guarantee that the 
simulation is accurate enough [60].  
Due to above mentioned reasons, regulators are facing difficulties when approving a 
software-based system for safety application in NPPs [61]. When the system is about to 
be applied as safety critical components in an NPP, the approval work load can be 
burdened even further. Then the question arises for how one can take advantage of the 
digital system without suffering the burden of regulatory approval process, especially for 
safety critical systems. One option is given by advanced digital hardware platforms, e.g. 
FPGAs, which are pure hardware once implemented but capable of processing complex 
logic as software-based system do. 
2.3.3 Speed of response of CANDU SDS1 
Figure 2.5 shows the brief structure of one of the three CANDU SDS1 channels, which is 
composed of sensors for system variable measurement, trip computer for trip logic 
processing, relay logic for 2oo3 voting, and the shutoff rods for reactor trip [52]. 
Since this is basically a serial structure, the time consumed by a shutdown process is the 
summation of the time needed for each section. Theoretically, the shutdown process can 
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be speeded up by reducing the consumed time of any of these parts. However, the 
significance of these attempts can be totally different since the time spent by each section 
holds different portion of the total shutdown time. For instance, it takes up to two seconds 
for the shutoff rods to be fully inserted into the core while the maximum time consumed 
by the trip computer is 100 ms [47]. Furthermore, there has to be available techniques 
that are capable of effectively reducing the consumed time. Although SDS1 is equipped 
with compressed springs to provide extra driving force for shutoff rods insertion [16], the 
insertion still occupies the most length of the entire shutdown process. The decision-
making time consumed in the trip computer is to be studied in this work since the trip 
logic is what to be implemented using an FPGA. 
 
Figure 2.5 – Signal path of SDS1 
The speed of response of CANDU SDS1 has been followed with interest and explored by 
developer and utility of CANDU, such as AECL and OPG. Through a plant test of SDS1 
in Bruce-A NPP, AECL has proved that the faster insertion rate of shutoff rods can 
produce lower neutron flux transient during the shutdown process [62]. Shutdown system 
tests performed by OPG in Unit 8 of Pickering-B NPP indicate that it took 800 ms for 
reactor neutron power to start decreasing after the initiation of shutoff rods dropping [63], 
which implies that the speed of the shutdown system has to be fast enough to assure plant 
safety. It has to be pointed out that in both of the above two cases the shutdown process 
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was initiated from a normal operating status. Hence, during an accident in which the 
reactor safety is facing serious threat, a timely and fast shutdown process is of even 
greater significance. 
Regulators take speed of response as a critical factor of achieving NPP safety. It is clearly 
stated in the CNSC regulations that the shutdown speed and the shutdown margin should 
be effective enough such that the predefined limits are not exceeded [41]. In the design of 
the computer-based CANDU SDS1, AECL gives a specification that the logic processing 
time for the trip computer should not exceed 100 ms. This is ensured by a system 
watchdog which issues a channel trip signal if it has not received any response from the 
trip computer after 100 ms [47]. Both the regulatory requirement and the design 
specification are to ensure an effective shutdown speed such that the plant safety is 
reserved even at the appearance of undesired accidents. 
With a consideration of the safety significance that the shutdown speed means to NPPs, 
the emphasis of the current thesis is put on realizing faster speed of response of SDS1 and 
FPGA, with its demonstrated fast processing advantage, is chosen as an ideal platform for 
this purpose. Although what this approach shortens is only the decision-making time of 
the trip logic, which is not a significant portion of the entire shutdown process delay, it 
does prove the feasibility and advantage of fastening SDS1 speed by FPGA technology. 
2.4 FPGA applications for NPP I&C systems 
The FPGA utilization for signal processing and control logic execution has been 
approved to be feasible and cost-effective in many industries. When the demands for 
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more reliable performance and higher obsolescence resistance arise in nuclear industries, 
FPGA platform becomes a focus of advanced I&C systems. FPGAs are taken as an ideal 
option for the replacement of existing obsolescent systems due to its unique configurable 
hardware characteristics and application experience in other industries. However, 
challenges do exist for applying FPGA technology to NPP I&C systems since the nuclear 
industry has its own specific circumstances and unique life cycle requirements. 
Furthermore, during the FPGA design and implementation process, extra attention is 
needed to maximally utilize and realize its excellence in enhancing system performance. 
2.4.1 Why FPGA 
FPGA is not the only option for the update of NPP I&C systems but it does have 
attractive features to compete with other technologies. The superiority derived from the 
comparison against others highlights the feasibility of applying FPGAs for the purpose of 
updating NPP I&C system. 
When comparing to old analog systems, an FPGA, as a digital system, shows its 
outstanding capabilities of better energy resolution, higher signal throughput, stronger 
obsolescence resistance, and smaller physical size. Less analog components are used in 
an FPGA since the propagating electrical signals are digitized, which improves the noise 
immunity and temperature stability. At a very high sampling rate, the incoming signals 
could encounter pulse overlap, i.e. the pileup. The system performance is then 
downgraded with a decreased system throughput. Within an FPGA-based system, the 
digital processing manner has more efficient pileup rejection, which leads to higher 
throughput. As for the obsolescence resistance feature, the standard development process 
of an FPGA-based system reserves the effectiveness of the verified and validated FPGA 
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design and guarantees the functionality of a new FPGA-based system when transplanting 
the design from the obsolete hardware platform. Finally, due to the higher density and 
lower supply voltage, FPGA-based systems reduce the size and improve the portability. 
Cables and cabinets used in the old analog systems can be greatly reduced. 
Being a digital hardware platform, an FPGA-based system reveals its merits against 
software-based digital systems. With no operating system involved, the task distribution 
is realized directly by distributing signals into pre-configured integrated circuits. The 
waiting time consumed in a task queue is eliminated. The hardware components that 
execute the task in a software-based system, e.g. the microprocessor, data bus, and the 
memory, have to wait for the instructions from the operating system before moving to the 
next processing stage. In FPGA-based systems, task processing is arranged by building 
specific circuits for specific processing stages, which increases the processing speed by 
converting the task processing into signal propagation from input ports to output ports. 
Due to inherent failure modes, the V&V process of software-based systems cannot cover 
all the possible cases that could trigger system failure. It is then hard to categorize which 
inputs, of the ones that have not been executed yet, would produce a failure at execution 
[57]. Hence, software-based systems could lose its functionality at the appearance of 
unpredictable system collapse.  While for an FPGA-based system, the failure modes only 
exist in the components of the hardware structure, which are relatively few and can be 
dependably predicted. Thus, as long as both the design and hardware platforms have been 




FPGAs are competitive even against other modern state-of-the-art digital hardware 
technologies. Application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), which is most widely 
utilized for hardware implementation [64], has the potential of being considered as an 
option for NPP I&C systems. However, it requires large production volume of one ASIC 
design to make it profitable. On the other hand, only a few chips are needed for a specific 
I&C application in an NPP even with the consideration of backup and redundancy. 
Moreover, ASICs are not as flexible as FPGAs. In the case of system specification 
modification, FPGAs can be reconfigured with a revised design while the only way for an 
ASIC-based system is to redo the design and manufacture procedure. 
In general, FPGAs have demonstrated advantages and superiorities over analog systems, 
software-based digital systems, and other hardware-based digital system for NPP I&C 
applications. These potential advantages for NPP performance improvement have 
attracted great interest of nuclear industry all around the world. Scientists and engineers 
in nuclear industry have paid a lot attention to this technology and made extraordinary 
progress, which will be discussed later in the review section.  
2.4.2 Performance enhancement through FPGA applications 
With the truth that most existing NPPs are using antiquated technologies for I&C systems, 
FPGAs are optimistically anticipated to enhance plant performance in NPPs.  Since 
FPGAs have strengths in logic processing and signal processing, performance 




Detectors and sensors are pivotal NPP instruments that provide the measurements of 
system variables. Accuracy and timeliness are of importance for achieving reliable 
performance. High throughput and resolution that can be achieved by FPGAs make the 
performance enhancement possible for processing of the sensor signals. As a matter of 
fact, most FPGA vendors now provide digital signal processing (DSP) modules within 
the FPGA chip such that users can realize demanded signal processing by simply 
specifying the configuration of these modules [65]. 
I&C systems that are responsible for logic/algorithm execution act as central brain of an 
NPP. The accuracy and timing of their performance directly affect the productivity and 
safety of the entire plant. For those safety-related I&C systems, enhanced performance 
can realize faster and stronger protection for the plant and the environment. Safety 
systems based on FPGA technology can utilize the fast processing feature to realize such 
an objective, which is the major investigation of current work and make it one of the 
major contributions. 
Applying FPGA technology to NPP I&C system also enhances the system reliability and 
availability with fewer inherent failure modes. As an example, considerable progress has 
been made in reliability and availability by FPGA-based safety-related control and 
communication functions in accordance with the experience gained in Ukraine NPPs [66]. 
The deployed FPGA-based systems in Ukraine NPPs are qualified for complex solutions 
for nuclear installations of different types. They are proved to be a useful tool for retrofit 
and modernization of existing NPPs. Meanwhile the financial expenses in these NPPs are 
reduced without affecting the licensing processes. 
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2.5 Previous work review 
The focus of the review is on topics that are relevant to current study such as safety 
margin, CANDU SDS1, and the FPGA applications in NPPs.  
2.5.1 Work on safety margin  
Since safety margin is a crucial to NPP safety, both academic and industry have paid 
enormous attention and efforts to this subject. Regulators such as the CNSC also take the 
compliance of the safety margin requirement as a necessity of licensing [67]. The 
accomplished research work about safety margin can be generally categorized into two 
major areas: precise estimation and improvement techniques. 
Since uncertainties exist in the current safety margin estimation as shown in Figure 2.2, 
lots of research efforts are paid in seeking techniques for more precise results. As what 
has been surveyed and discussed in [5], traditionally the safety margin estimation is 
mostly based on conservative evaluation model calculations. Thus, the derived safety 
margin has high conservatism which reflects untrue operating situation and limits 
potential enhancement of the plant performance. New estimation methods are then 
proposed and investigated. For defence-in-depth principle, both deterministic and 
probabilistic assessments are applied for such kind of safety margin estimation. The 
deterministic method still includes conservative method but with best estimate method as 
a complement for different analysis objectives and issues [68, 69]; while the probabilistic 
methods, which includes best estimate plus uncertainties, are increasingly being used [70-
72]. All these efforts concentrate on finding a more accurate way to quantify safety 
margins and their uncertainties. During a safety margin assessment of an NPP, both 
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conservative safety analysis (CSA) and probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) may be 
utilized together to present a complementary assessment to the regulators [73]. 
Furthermore, the estimation of the confidence of safety margin has special meaning to 
regulators for their confirmation of the safety satisfactory of a nuclear facility. Various 
attempts are developed for this safety mandatory goal [74, 75].  
Since the current work has limited the scope on investigation of accidental transients of 
critical reactor parameters, the methods of determining the safety margin are not taken 
into consideration. However, research work carried out in this thesis does depend on what 
have been explored. For instance, the interaction between trip limit and safety limit 
determines the emphasis of the simulation work. The trip limit, which is of considerable 
significance to safety margin, is determined based on design based accidents (DBAs). In 
a CANDU NPP, there are total 10 trip parameters associated with the critical system 
variables. They are high reactor neutron power, high log rate neutron power, heat 
transport high pressure, heat transport low flow, reactor building high pressure, 
pressurizer low level, SG low level, moderator high temperature, heat transport low 
pressure, and SG feed-line low pressure. Any of these parameters across the predefined 
thresholds (even if temporarily in a transient) is considered to be a potential accident 
scenario. However, the trip decisions are made based on 2oo3 logics to reduce probability 
of spurious trips. To meet the acceptance criterion for a specific DBA, the trip limit is set 
such that the DBA does not pose any safety concerns to the plant system and operators. 
To ensure this, the trip limit is always set conservatively so that the safety limits are not 
jeopardized even in the worst case DBA.  Significant amount of work has been done to 
determine those limits under specific operating conditions and postulated accident 
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scenarios. Two design parameters, margin to trip and margin to dryout, are discussed in 
[4], which provides a clear relationship between the trip limits and the safety limits. It is 
also critical to emphasize that an NPP is a complex dynamic system. Even after the trip 
action is initiated, surges in the system variables are still expected due to thermal inertia 
associated with the system. Compliance of safety limits at the instant of shutdown system 
initiation does not necessarily guarantee that the safety limits will not be violated in 
subsequent period. For this reason, a similar concept known as “shutdown margin” in the 
unit of reactivity is proposed [76], where the role within the framework of the reactor 
safety is also described as a reference to the current work. According to [5], the safety 
margins can either be 1) deterministic, or 2) probabilistic. For current work, only 
deterministic safety margins are considered, more specifically, in terms of the transient 
thermal power level. 
Keeping adequate safety margin or even improving it has important implication to NPP 
maintenance and life extension projects [77]. It is intuitively understandable that one can 
increase the safety margins by lowering the corresponding trip thresholds or enhancing 
the safety limits. It has been shown in [4] that the probability of power surge exceeding 
the safety limit during an accident will decrease if the safety margin is increased by 
means of lowering the trip thresholds. One of the drawbacks associated with lowering the 
trip thresholds is that the reduced operating range of the reactor, e.g. lower 
temperature/pressure, resulting in an operating power de-rating. Thus, lowering power 
output leads to undesirable economical consequences. As for the safety limit 
enhancement, higher damage resistance of reactor components is required, for which 
large amount of extra expense on technology renovation cannot be avoided. Although 
  
62 
extra safety margin can be obtained in NPPs by investigating increased confidence on the 
toughness upper limits of  physical barriers with further and appropriate approaches [78], 
it is still a way of confirming more accurate safety limit instead of enhancing the physical 
tolerances of the NPP hazard barriers. 
Safety margin estimated by best estimate plus uncertainty is presented in an “improved” 
approach as compared to conservative calculation. This is again a more precise 
determination to approach the true value rather than expanding the original safety margin.  
Safety margin improvement is also followed with interest by other industries. Most of 
them are still in a form of addressing the uncertainty more rigorously [79]. In [80] and 
[81], dynamic safety margin is applied to improve the control of safety-critical systems. 
The technique of enhancing upper limit is adopted in mechanics inventions to widen the 
existing safety margin [82]. Even modification of reactor design has become a way of 
safety margin improvement [83]. However, none of these open publications have touched 
the area of controlling the post-accident transients for safety margin improvement. 
2.5.2 Discussions on existing NPP safety systems 
CANDU industry has paid attention and efforts to performance improvement of SDS1 
trip computers [84]. The usage of software-based systems for safety-critical systems has 
been debated from early 1980s to present [60, 85]. Nevertheless, these products of the 
1980s are facing more and more challenges from state-of-the-art technologies such as 
advanced FPGAs today. As the central control unit of SDS1, the trip unit should have 
high reliability, fast response, and strong obsolescence resistance. Easier regulatory 
approval would also be important. Unfortunately, nowadays bottlenecks of satisfying 
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these requirements have been encountered by software-based trip computers. It has been 
pointed out that extremely large amount of efforts and evidences are needed for assessing 
the reliability of software deployed in safety-critical systems [86]. CANDU industry itself 
has a tough and long-waiting licensing experience during the 1980s for their first 
software-based digital shutdown system [87]. Swedish regulatory body also stated their 
comments on licensing software-based safety systems [88] while the controversies on 
software-based safety systems between Korean nuclear facilities and regulators are  
shared in [89]. All these documented opinions and experiences expose the connate 
drawbacks of software-based safety systems. 
2.5.3 FPGA applications in NPPs 
FPGAs and similar programmable logic devices (PLD) are not new to nuclear industries. 
Numerous research projects and engineering applications were initiated decades ago. 
These projects focused on FPGA solutions that can increase the reliability and 
serviceability with the original functionality and specifications still accommodated. These 
projects covered from nuclear medical applications and reactor instrumentations to 
radiation detection and NPPs. Since the 1990s, nuclear industry has greeted a blooming 
era of FPGA applications.  
In the 1980s, the Canadian nuclear industry launched several research projects to apply 
PLDs to CANDU NPPs. Distinct applications have been developed for process control 
systems such as the CANDU fuel-handling machine and the NPP powerhouse emergency 
venting system [21].  Among these NPP projects, FPGAs show the ability of dealing with 
large number of I/O pins and complex logic functions as well as other economical and 
flexible features. An outstanding advantage approved among these NPP projects is that 
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the interconnected gates of logic provide independent parallel paths for the various logic 
circuits that are implemented. The transfer function connecting an output to any number 
of determining inputs operates independent of the other circuits within the chip, barring 
total failure of the device. Moreover, the pin-to-pin transitions are proved to be on the 
order of nanoseconds, and circuits can be modeled to precise timing characteristics with 
timing delays designed into the circuit. 
Besides the above fully implemented and qualified applications, AECL also paid 
attention to the FPGA application for safety-critical systems. Various prototype- 
approaches were investigated to make FPGA the alternate of those aged relays in safety 
systems such that the conditioning interlocks and more complex control logic can be 
implemented [90-92]. Unfortunately, these inspiring projects were not able to become on-
site applications. The immaturity of PLDs at that time, such as low density of logic 
elements and weak immunity to electromagnetic interference (EMI), constraint them to 
be widely used for safety related applications. The confidence of digital computers was 
relatively higher over that of the “newborn” PLDs, which led to the computerized SDS1 
in CANDU NPPs. 
Nevertheless, PLDs such as FPGA never left the sight of nuclear engineers. After the 
development of more than one decade, FPGAs became very popular in other industries 
and made remarkable contributions since the beginning of the century. Their powerful 
abilities are reflected in data acquisition, signal processing, and logic implementation. 
More and more FPGA applications then started to appear in nuclear fields such as reactor 
instrumentation and nuclear imaging [93-95]. These kinds of research work mostly 
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utilized FPGA’s features of signal processing and flexibility because they mainly involve 
data acquisition functions. 
In existing NPPs, as long as current systems satisfy the safety and operating requirements, 
there is no immediate demand of replacing them with new technology unless enough 
confidence is built upon convincing verification and validation. Fortunately, both 
regulators and nuclear power industry became aware of the potential of FPGAs and 
started both feasibility investigation and prototype attempts. Starting from 2008, IAEA 
has held four annual international workshops for FPGA applications in NPPs. Many other 
conferences of nuclear engineering also take FPGA as a striking topic with growing 
interest. Numerous topics have been presented. With respect to the scope of this thesis, 
the survey of the accomplished work is briefly categorized as safety-related and non 
safety-related.  
Non safety-related topics mainly concentrate on instrumentation/monitoring and 
supporting functions of NPP systems [96-98]. These FPGA applications are similar to 
those data-oriented ones. Data acquisition and processing are their main functionality, 
which can be helped by the signal processing capacity and flexibility features of FPGAs. 
On the side of safety-related systems, the high qualifications can still meet the specified 
requirements by fully utilizing FPGAs advanced features. To specifically and effectively 
guide the FPGA-based safety development for NPPs, regulators and other related entities 
have issued different guidelines and standards [23, 99, 100]. Following these guidelines 
as well as the original requirements of safety systems, FPGA-based safety applications 
are carried out worldwide.  
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Electricite de France (EDF), a French power utility, developed several FPGA-based 
projects for their NPPs. These projects include upgrading the control rod positioning 
system and pump speed control systems. Significant benefits are summarized as 
simplified design and safety justification, focused upgrade of existing I&C systems, and 
application portability on technologies [101]. In Japan, FPGA technology is utilized for 
radiation monitoring safety system from 2004 to 2007 [102]. A safety-critical FPGA 
system is developed in Korea based on an existing safety PLC and replaced this PLC to 
carry safety functions [103]. FPGA-based shutdown system is designed and implemented 
in Ukrainian and Bulgarian NPPs where the design load is reduced while the performance 
was upgraded [104]. An interesting example is documented in [105] that it took U.S. 
NRC only two years to complete the approval process, which is much shorter than a 
software-based implementation that can last over 10 years. Canadian nuclear industry did 
not fall behind. FPGA platform is investigated to improve the reactor trip methodology 
and the digital control computers in NPPs [106, 107]. 
The above surveyed FPGA work in nuclear industry provides a review of the preliminary 
but rapid progressing attempts of applying FPGA technology into both non safety-related 
systems and safety-related ones. As it can be seen, the flexibility feature enables FPGAs 
to accommodate different specifications of various projects. Its standard implementation 
process realizes simplified design and transportability of applications. Most importantly, 
its high reliability and serviceability make FPGA one of the best options for safety-
related system development.  
In addition to the inherent characteristics that lead to fast processing of FPGAs, 
tremendous effort has been continuously invested to develop techniques that enhance the 
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processing speed of FPGAs. The delay within FPGA interconnections and routing 
architecture can be potentially shortened to further increase the response speed [108, 109]. 
Improving the logic block architecture is also applied to the processing speed of FPGAs 
[110, 111]. To improve the arithmetic processing capability of FPGAs, specifically 
designed algorithm is proposed [112].  
There have been many non-nuclear applications that utilize the fast processing speed of 
FPGAs to achieve better performance. Real-time image processing uses the high-speed 
FPGAs to improve data arrangement through dynamic reconfiguration [113]. High-speed 
network flow processing is achieved using FPGA-based system [114]. Utilization of 
FPGA-based controller helps the motion control system obtain high-speed and high-
accuracy performance [115]. Such fast processing ability is also applied to many other 
projects, such as high-speed communication interface [116], rapid prototyping platform 
for variable-speed drives [117], and high-speed edge and corner detection in image 
processing [118].  
However, as noticed, the fast processing advantage has not been fully explored and 
applied for nuclear safety applications, even there is already successful work in other 
nuclear application domains [119, 120]. Since building a high-speed controller using 
FPGA technology has been demonstrated [121], current work proposes that 
implementing CANDU SDS1 using an FPGA is a way of realizing faster shutdown 




This chapter presents necessary background for the proposed research. Several key topics 
are introduced and discussed with detailed review of previously works. 
After the introduction of some nuclear safety basics, the concept of the safety margin is 
explored. Using neutron dynamic theory, it is demonstrated analytically that faster 
shutdown process is an effective way to reduce the jeopardizing effect of an accidental 
transient. It is then chosen as the topic of research in this thesis for safety margin 
improvement. 
FPGA applications in NPPs have been followed closely worldwide since the early 1980s.  
For both non safety-related and safety-related applications, FPGAs have successfully 
proved their superiorities as compared with other methods. Accomplished projects 
utilized distinct FPGA features to achieve desired specifications. But the fast processing 
speed of FPGAs has not been fully utilized to improve NPP safety. This direction with an 
objective of an FPGA-based fast-reacting SDS1 is explicitly investigated in this thesis.   
To summarize, this thesis brings forward an idea for safety margin improvement through 
faster shutdown process by using an FPGA-based SDS1. Based on the related work, the 





3 INVESTIGATIONS ON ACCIDENTS IN CANDU NPPS 
The thermalhydraulic investigations on specific accidents have to be carried out from 
practical perspective to test the proposed safety margin improvement concept. The main 
focus is whether or not a shortened shutdown process is able to improve the NPP safety 
margins. In this chapter, the thermalhydraulic investigations are performed using an 
industry grade code specifically for CANDU reactors called CATHENA. 
The procedure for thermalhydraulic studies can be divided into following steps: 1) 
constructing simulation models; 2) defining the test scenarios and simulation 
environments; 3) carrying out the simulations; 4) collecting and analyzing the simulation 
results; and 5) drawing the conclusions 
3.1 CANDU thermalhydraulic basics 
The reasons of using thermalhydraulic analysis for V&V of the accident scenario are: 1) 
Reactor variables that have close relationship to NPP safety mostly involve 
thermalhydraulic transients, such as thermal power, temperature, and pressure; 2) 
Transients of these thermalhydraulic-related variables are very intuitive and, hence, can 
clearly demonstrate their impacts to the safety margins; 3) Catastrophic consequences 
caused by severe accidents can threaten NPP safety through accidental transients of these 
variables. Therefore, accidental impacts on NPP safety can be described and analyzed by 
a proper thermalhydraulic analysis.  
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3.1.1 Chosen thermalhydraulic loop 
Power reactors use coolant to bring out the heat generated by fission reactions in the core. 
Most reactors use light water. A CANDU reactor is designed to cool the core using heavy 
water but recently light water is being considered [122]. No matter what kind of coolant, 
efficient circulation of the coolant is of extreme importance. Coolant is pumped through a 
pipe network from which the heat in the core is exchanged to the secondary side for 
electricity generation. The coolant, after passing through the steam generator (SG), is 
circulated back to the core to repeat the heat transfer function. A closed-loop circulation 
is formed. Failure of the circulation, such as loss of flow (stagnation) and loss of coolant, 
is considered as a severe accident since it leads to the halt of the heat removal process. As 
a result, the temperature can then increase at an exponential rate and pose a serious threat 
to the reactor core and the nuclear fuel inside the core. 
A CANDU reactor has its unique circulation loop, the PHT system. Unlike the designs of 
pressurized water reactor (PWR) or boiling water reactor (BWR) in which the core is 
fully submerged in the lighter water, CANDU reactors have the moderator and coolant 
separated. In a CANDU 6 reactor, a horizontal calandria houses both the pressurized fuel 
channels and the moderator. Coolant is distributed into 380 pressurized fuel channels to 
deliver the heat to the four SGs. The circulation of the coolant in a CANDU 6 reactor can 
be divided into two independent loops, each of which contains half of the fuel channels. 
The loop is arranged in a “Figure of 8” with the coolant making two passes in opposite 
directions, so is the coolant in two adjacent fuel channels. Each loop has its own SGs and 
other auxiliary equipments such as pumps, valves, pressurizer, reactor inlet header (RIH), 












Figure 3.1 – CANDU PHT loops 
Most of CANDU thermalhydraulic analysis work is associated with the PHT system,  
where many phenomena with safety concern occur [123, 124]. LOCA, which always is 
the safety focus, is one type of the postulated accidents in the PHT system during 
simulation and analysis. The fuel channel, which is the source of thermal power, is 
another component that is worthy of investigation [125, 126]. One DBA that could 
happen in a fuel channel is a loss of flow accident (LOFA). Thermalhydraulic 
investigation of a channel-based LOFA helps reveal the channel behavior during such 
undesired conditions.  
Thermalhydraulic analysis in this thesis investigates the reactor behavior during a 
channel LOFA and a PHT LOCA. Structures and parameters of both PHT and a fuel 
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channel are used for construction of CATHENA simulation models. Transients of critical 
variables, such as thermal power and sheath temperature, are recorded and analyzed for 
the postulated accidents. 
3.1.2 CATHENA basics in accident simulations 
CATHENA stands for Canadian Algorithm for THEermalyhraulic Network Analysis. It 
is developed by AECL as an industry tool for postulated accident analysis in CANDU 
reactors [25]. It uses a transient, one-dimensional two-fluid representation of two-phase 
flow in the piping networks. Under a two-phase condition, liquid and vapor may have 
different temperature, pressure, and velocity. Thus, each phase has independent 
conservation equations of mass, energy, and momentum. CATHENA simulation/analysis 
is based on solving such six partial differential equations. 
In addition to the two-fluid thermalhydraulic model, CATHENA provides a generalized 
heat transfer package as well as the reactor control system modeling. Therefore, it is 
possible to simulate the transient thermal behavior of the core as a function of actions in 
control/safety systems, e.g. an accident and its related shutdown process. The description 
of the accident are defined in CATHENA with details of the accident and shutdown 
process, such as the flow rate change at LOCA or how fast the negative reactivity is 
injected during a shutdown process. 
A component package in CATHENA is available for constructing desired system models. 
The components include the model of pipes, valves, T-junctions, volumes, reservoirs, etc. 
The envisaged reactor model or simulation loop can easily be built using different 
combinations and connections of these models. Some of these models can even be used 
  
73 
as boundary conditions in the simulated network. Users have to specify the characteristic 
parameters of each component, such as length, fluid direction, and material properties. 
One can use tables to enter process information so that CATHENA can select appropriate 
dynamics within the simulated process. 
The constructed model and gathered information are integrated to generate an input file 
for CATHENA. Edit of the input file has to follow certain format predefined in the 
CATHENA manual. Simulation parameters such as print interval and output file name 
should also be specified. Initial conditions are required in the input file. 
In a simulated accident scenario, the accident takes place when the system is at steady-
state. Hence, the steady-state behavior of the system has to be simulated first. The yielded 
results are used as the initial conditions for the transient simulation. In the steady-state 
simulation, there is no interference introduced into the system. As long as the initial 
conditions are within reasonable range, the simulation results represent a steady-state 
system.  
3.1.3 Description and justification of the postulated accidents 
As what have been introduced, the LOFA and LOCA are the two accidents that threaten 
the integrity of physical barriers for radioactive substances. This study chooses these two 
accident scenarios for analysis with a consideration of strengthening the safety margin 
improvement concept by validating it under severe accident cases. 
The LOFA might involve one fuel channel as a result of a flow blockage or the whole 
PHT because of loss of forced circulation such as a pump trip. There are then large 
increase in the mass of the exit flow and overpressure within PHT system/channel. One 
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of the undesired consequences is the flow/power mismatch, i.e. more power is being 
generated in the fuel channel than that can be removed by the coolant flow. If the reactor 
cannot be shut down at this time, fuel channel can potentially encounter dryout and fuel 
bundle rupture with the accumulated heat. Since SDS1 monitors the PHT flow as a trip 
parameter, the serious consequences can be prevented by shutting down the reactor right 
after the occurrence of this accident. Because the positive reactivity introduced is slow at 
the beginning of LOFA when quick voiding has not occurred, a timely shutdown will 
effectively prevent sharp surges in PHT pressure and power. Thus the response time of 
the SDS1 is of critical significance to the plant safety during such an accident. 
The large LOCA, which is often postulated to happen in the PHT, brings much faster 
positive reactivity in the core than LOFA. Void fraction increases because of not only the 
coolant outflow but also the quick boiling of coolant following the channel 
depressurization. This can be a fast developing process and leave very short time for the 
plant to react. The exponentially increase in power transient offers the worst case 
scenario for the safety margin analysis than other cases, especially when the SDS1 
response time is of the main interest. 
The justifications of choosing both LOFA and LOCA for the thermalhydraulic 
investigations are: 1) they are typical severe accidents concerned as threat to the plant 
SIL; 2) their occurrence involves dramatic transients of the reactor thermalhydraulic 
variables, such as power, temperature, and pressure; and 3) their responses could be 
different for different SDS1 response speed, which provides a clear picture on the 
benefits of response time reduction of the shutdown system. 
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3.2 CATHENA simulation for the postulated accidents 
To support the current investigation, simplified CANDU 6 fuel channel model and 
reactor core model are constructed without considering details of the fuel assembly, and 
associated control systems, since the current work focuses only on the transients of 
critical system variables after a major accident. The fuel channel model is constructed 
with a simplification of boundary conditions and fuel bundles. It uses standard 37-
element CANDU 6 fuel channel attributes. The reactor core model includes reactor core, 
RIH, ROH, feeder pipes that connect the core to both RIH and ROH, and the two header 
boundary conditions at both ends of the core model.  
Since LOFA is one of the severe DBAs that can cause fuel overheating during reactor 
operation [127], it is selected first to analyze the local transient behavior under different 
shutdown processes. Furthermore, a large LOCA of 35% break at RIH in the PHT system 
is chosen as the worst-case accident scenario for the core-wide transients analysis since 
this kind of accidents has been categorized as one of the most severe accidents that can 
occur in a CANDU reactor. 
During simulation studies, a steady-state condition is reached first; subsequently the 
selected accident scenarios are initiated.  The simulation studies are performed under 
different response time of the SDS1. The data for both the fuel channel model and the 




3.2.1 Construction of simulation models 
To investigate the impacts resulted from accidents, this thesis puts the emphasis on some 
critical in-core variables such as the reactor thermal power and sheath temperature of the 
fuel bundles. The simulation is then limited to the transients taking place within the core. 
Model construction work also mainly specifies details of the CANDU 6 core. Two 
simulation models are constructed for the thermalhydraulic simulations. One is a fuel 
channel model for the LOFA analysis while another is a reactor core model for the 
selected large LOCA. 
A typical CANDU 6 reactor core consists of 380 horizontal pressurized channels. Each 
holds 12 fuel bundles. All these fuel channels are located inside a calandria filled with 
heavy water moderator. Heavy water is also used as coolant that passes through pressure 
tubes to remove the heat generated in the core. Coolant goes through the RIH where it is 
further distributed to each channel through feeder pipes. The ROH collects heated coolant 
from the channels before transporting the thermal energy to the PHT system for steam 
generation. On the top of the calandria, there are 28 SDS1 shutoff rods that can be 
inserted into the core to stop the chain reaction when activated by the SDS1 trip signal. A 
reactor face view with a bank of shutoff rods on top is shown in Figure 3.2. 
The geometry parameters of the fuel channel, which is needed for CATHENA simulation, 
are listed in Table 3.1. As what is stated in Table 3.1, there are totally 21 simulation 
nodes defined within a standard CANDU 6 fuel channel. Fuel bundles within the channel 









Figure 3.2 – CANDU 6 face view with SDS1 shutoff rods 
 
Table 3.1 Fuel channel attributes for CATHENA simulation 
Length (m) Flow Area ( 2m ) Hydraulic Diameter (m) No. of Bundles Fuel Bundle No. of Nodes 
5.9436 3.40694E-3 7.37629E-3 12 37-element 21 
 
(1) Fuel channel model 
The fuel channel model for the LOFA simulation is based on parameters listed in Table 





Figure 3.3 – Fuel channel model 
Purpose of such a model is to explore the local transients during a LOFA. The INBC and 
OUTBC are two reservoirs used as boundary conditions. The part of “assembled fuel 
bundles” is a simplification of the 12-bundle pattern. The channel power, which is 
5481.58KW, is selected from one of the 380 fuel channels. 
As it can be seen, the fuel channel model concentrates on the transient of a severe DBA 
within a single fuel channel. Since the transient surge appears within a short period after 
the accident happens, auxiliary components of the fuel channel are not included. 
(2) Reactor core model 
As for the reactor core model, the core partitioning method is applied. Operation 
experience and research results have shown that CANDU has flat neutron flux mapping 
which causes relatively uniform power distribution [128, 129]. It can be mentioned that 
there is no large difference in thermal power between nearby fuel channels. Hence, it is 
reasonable to use a model of assembled fuel channel to represent part of the reactors, as 





Figure 3.4 – Postulated region assembly 
Moreover, due to relative large physical size of CANDU 6 core, one usually divides it 
into fourteen virtual zones for control system design and implementation [130, 131]. 
However, any single fuel channel from an inlet to an outlet covers two zones. Since the 
current study focuses on the global thermalhydraulic behavior, the model should cover 
the core from the flow inlet to the outlet. Hence, a 7-regional partition of the core is used. 
Each of these seven regions is formed by merging two zones adjacent in horizontal 
direction of the mentioned 14-zone partition, which is similar as the model used in [132]. 
This simplified model is used for the study of the core thermal power distribution in each 
of the seven regions and their associated safety margins. Trip decision for the postulated 
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accident is initiated with consideration of regional signals in each of the seven regions, 
such as regional neutronic signals and power signals. The 7-regional core model used in 
the current study is shown in Figure 3.5.  
 
Figure 3.5 – Core partitioning for simulation studies 
 
Table 3.2 Region characteristics 
Region No. of 
channels 
Power (MW) LHGR (MW/m) Region PPF 
Region 1 52 265.833 0.8601 0.9424 
Region 2 52 264.288 0.8551 0.9370 
Region 3 62 346.352 0.9399 1.0300 
Region 4 48 306.073 1.0728 1.1755 
Region 5 62 348.210 0.9449 1.0354 
Region 6 52 265.905 0.8603 0.9427 
Region 7 52 264.560 0.8560 0.9379 
Total 380 2061.221 0.9126 N/A 
        
          *LHGR: Linear Heat Generating Rate; PPF: Power Peaking Factor 
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The effects of neutronics and Xenon are also taken into consideration in the modeling 
process. The characteristics of the seven regions are listed in Table 3.2. 
After the geometry configuration of the core model is determined, a point kinetic model 
is chosen for each region to count for neutronic effects in the reactor core. Kinetics 
coefficients are determined by the effective density and temperature that are obtained 
from steady-state simulations results. The simulated core is assumed to be at an 
equilibrium condition, before any fault is initiated. Decay power and Xenon effects are 
both taken into account using CATHENA internal system models. Reactivity feedback 
from both coolant density and the temperature is also considered in accordance with the 
CATHENA simulation requirements, in which it is described in a quadratic form listed in 
Equation (3.1) [133]: 
 
2( )k A x B x∆ = × ∆ + ×∆  (3.1) 
where, 
k∆ is the added reactivity by the change of the density or the temperature; 
 x  represents the appropriate variable (density or temperature); and 
both A  and B are the related coefficients. 
For the simulated CANDU reactor, coefficients used in Equation (3.1) are listed in Table 






Table 3.3 Coefficients of reactivity change caused by void fraction and temperature 
 A B 
Density 0 -0.0118 
Fuel Temperature 3.747E-6 -0.006 
The RIH and ROH are modeled using available components from the CATHENA 
component base. Basically these two headers are modeled as branches of connected pipes 
with volumes. The actual layouts of these two header models are shown in Figure 3.6 and 
Figure 3.7.   
 





Figure 3.7 – Layout of the ROH model 
With the models of core, RIH, and ROH are prepared, they are connected to the feeder 
pipes and two boundary conditions at both ends to form the CATHENA simulation 
model. Due to the relatively short transient interval of an “accident-shutdown” process, 
the model has been simplified such that not all the components in the PHT system are 
included. The transients of other PHT components have been omitted because they do not 
affect the in-core parameters instantly. 
The pipe set Z(i) in the RIH model and N(i) in the ROH model are connected to 
corresponding regions, e.g. Z(1) is connected to Region 1 at the inlet side while N(1) is 
connected to the outlet side. The geometry parameters of these pipe sets are indicated in 
Table 3.4. Only parameters for P(i) and Z(i) are presented because P(i) set and Z(i) set are 
identical to M(i) set and N(i) set, respectively. 
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Table 3.4 Pipe attributes in RIH and ROH 
Pipe No. Length ( m ) Flow Area ( 2m ) Hydraulic Diameter ( m ) Simulation Node 
P0 0.1 1.2946 1.2839 1 
P1 0.1 5.6555E-1 8.4858E-1 1 
P2 0.1 7.2909E-1 9.6348E-1 1 
P3 0.1 3.5432E-1 6.7167E-1 1 
P4 0.1 3.7476E-1 6.9077E-1 1 
P5 0.1 3.5432E-1 6.7167E-1 1 
Z1 0.1 1.7716E-1 4.7494E-1 1 
Z2 0.1 1.7716E-1 4.7494E-1 1 
Z3 0.1 2.1123E-1 5.1860E-1 1 
Z4 0.1 1.6353E-1 4.5631E-1 1 
Z5 0.1 2.1123E-1 5.1860E-1 1 
Z6 0.1 1.7716E-1 4.7494E-1 1 
Z7 0.1 1.7716E-1 4.7494E-1 1 
 
In reality, CANDU 6 has two independent loops, each of which has its own RIH and 
ROH. However, for the purpose of examining the global thermal behavior of the reactor 
under a large LOCA scenario, these two loops are aggregated to form a single loop model 




Figure 3.8 – CATHENA simulation model for large LOCA studies 
Again, this is a simplified reactor core model because, for the current study, 10 seconds 
simulation runs after the LOCA are sufficient. The effects of other unmodeled system 
components are relatively small and can be neglected. As far as power transients are 
considered, only a period of 1-3 seconds is needed for the safety margin analysis [134].  
3.2.2 The simulation cases 
As this is a safety-related analysis, accident cases should be selected for the CATHENA 
simulation. It is then possible to observe how the reactor responds to the accident and 
how the proposed technique help improving the safety features. A LOFA case is 
simulated first with the fuel channel model to investigate the local transient of a typical 
DBA. Since the results are more persuasive if the worst case scenario is considered, 
simulation of a large LOCA is then carried out. The improvement on system safety under 





(1) LOFA  
A LOFA is an accident in which the coolant flow rate of the PHT system encounters 
decrease or even stagnation. Such an accident is caused by some undesired events, such 
as loss of off-site power, pump failure, heat exchanger blockage, pipe blockage, or valve 
closure, etc. At an onset of a LOFA, the coolant heat transfer coefficient is reduced and 
the reactor core is subject to overheating. Fuel integrity faces severe threat [127].  
























channel flow rate transient in a LOFA
 
Figure 3.9 – Flow rate transient in a LOFA 
On November 25, 1993, Unit 4 of Darlington NPP in Ontario Canada, encountered a 
LOFA due to the loss of plant power supply [135]. The PHT pumps were tripped, leading 
to significant reduction of the in-core coolant flow. The resulting increased PHT pressure, 
PHT temperature, and the reactor thermal power lead to both the SDS1 and SDS2 trip. 
The plant data of the flow rate during this accident is adopted for the LOFA case 
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simulation in this work. Figure 3.9 shows the LOFA flow rate transient in the fuel 
channel model [135]. 
(2) Large LOCA 
Large LOCA scenario is chosen as a core wide simulated accident since it is one of the 
most severe accidents that could occur in a CANDU NPP. There have been plenty 
investigations from the 1980s [136], the 1990s [137], to present [138, 139] for such 
LOCA scenario. The large LOCA, which is mostly postulated to happen in the PHT 
system, causes decrease in coolant mass and increase in the void fraction. Decreasing 
coolant deteriorates the heat removal capability of PHT system, which leads to a fuel 
overheat stage. While the increase in void fraction brings linearly increased positive 
reactivity [140] followed by a dramatically elevated thermal power. Impacts of these two 
consequences can jeopardize the safety of the plant. For such a severe accident, it 
becomes more evident for the proposed techniques to alleviate the post-accident scenario. 
It is also relatively easy to describe this accident scenario in LOCA using just the break 
size and the rate of flow change. Furthermore, there are both power and temperature 
surges in the “accident-shutdown” transients, which are the main considerations for 
safety margin analysis in the current work. 
LOCA accidents can be categorized by different accident scenarios, such as break size 
and break location. Following the worst-case principle, the worst case LOCA has to be 
selected by specifying the break size and location. The way to define the “worst” is based 
on the severe consequences that the accident can cause. 
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There are several key locations in the PHT system where large LOCA can occur, such as 
RIH, ROH, pump suction pipe, etc. In this work, the selected simulation case is RIH 
break LOCA. More specifically, 35% break at RIH is chosen for large LOCA simulation. 
The justifications for such choice are given below. 
RIH is the location where the coolant is distributed to all 380 fuel channels in CANDU 6. 
Each CANDU 6 fuel channel has a flow rate of 24 kg/s, which means that the RIH flow 
rate can reach as high as 9120 kg/s. Under an operating pressure of 11 MPa, a break 
appears at this critical point can cause rapid lost of the coolant. Due to the selected 
LOCA consequences, the plant safety can be seriously jeopardized. Investigation of the 
RIH break LOCA helps gain knowledge of the post-blowdown scenario as well. 
At a certain location, breaks of different sizes can have distinctive impacts to the system 
behavior. However, a larger break does not mean a worse consequence. Large break 
yields fast lost of the coolant but not the long stagnation of the coolant. When stagnation 
happens, the flow rate is reduced to around 0 kg/s. The halt of heat removal results in 
rapid heat accumulation. On the other hand, the loop depressurization from the break 
dramatically lowers the boiling point of the coolant. With the accumulated heat and 
lowered boiling point, the coolant starts vaporization quickly, which increases the void 
fraction even further. The result is then a vicious circle: increasing void fraction causes 
higher power and temperature with positive reactivity. The accumulated heat in turn 
increases the void fraction. Thus, the longer the stagnation is, the worse the situation will 
be. CANDU research work has pointed out the 35% break at the RIH to potentially be the 
worst large LOCA case since it causes the longest stagnation during the post-accident 
period [141, 142]. Engineering experiments conducted at AECL provides even more 
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detailed information on the RIH breaks [143]. In Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11 [143], the 
recorded data have shown the flow rate and sheath temperature during LOCA for 
different break sizes. 35% RIH break turns out to have the longest stagnation and results 
in the highest sheath temperature, which confirms it as the worst case of RIH break 
accidents. In the planned CATHENA LOCA simulation work, 35% RIH break is then 
used to analyze the safety features. In the simulation process, the 35% RIH break is 


















Figure 3.11 – Sheath temperature at central channel during RIH breaks [143] 
 
3.2.3 Simulation for steady-state conditions 
Steady-state simulation is used to establish the initial conditions before performing the 
accident simulation. Thus, it is necessary to run a steady-state simulation. The initial 
conditions for accident simulation is obtained for both the fuel channel model and the 
reactor core model as listed in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6. 
 
Table 3.5 Steady-state conditions for LOFA 
Location Flow Rate (kg/s)* Power (KW) Sheath Temp. (℃)* Pressure (MPa)* 
Fuel Channel 24 5431.579 345 10.025327 
*Sheath temperatures are sampled at the hottest point of sheath’s innermost layer. 







Table 3.6 Steady-state conditions for large LOCA 
Location Flow Rate (kg/s)* Power (MW) Sheath Temp. (℃)* Pressure (MPa)* 
RIH 9120.0002 N/A N/A 10.602951 
Region 1 1226.7261 265.833 328 10.465877 
Region 2 1227.0570 264.288 327 10.465866 
Region 3 1646.6269 346.352 333 10.501979 
Region 4 1088.6030 306.073 336 10.473398 
Region 5 1459.8117 348.210 334 10.471931 
Region 6 1235.4499 265.905 328 10.469471 
Region 7 1235.7260 264.560 327 10.469462 
ROH 9119.4647 N/A N/A 10.000005 
*Sheath temperatures are sampled at the hottest point of sheath’s innermost layer. 
*Flow rates and pressures are sampled at the first node of each component. 
Since the objective of this work is to investigate the improvement of the safety margin by 
comparing the accident transients under different response time of SDS1, each accident 
simulation is performed with different SDS1 response times. 200 ms and 10 ms are 
chosen for the LOFA simulation. For the large LOCA case, three response time values, 
100 ms, 50 ms, and 20 ms are used. 
Furthermore, the starting time of the LOFA is set to be 0t =  s, while the large LOCA is 
assumed to occur at 1t =  s. Trip setpoint of LOFA is set at 80% of PHT flow according 
to CANDU 6 SDS1 design specifications [36]. 
The entire LOFA and LOCA simulation covers a 9-second interval. Beyond 9 seconds, 
the boundary conditions of these two simplified open-loop models can no longer satisfy 
the saturated steam enthalpy requirements to provide meaningful results. Typically, the 
reactor thermal power surge occurs within the first 1-3 seconds after the initiation of 
accidents.  These thermal power surges are used for safety margin studies. 
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3.3 Simulation results 
Simulation results for critical system variables, such as thermal power and sheath 
temperature, are collected and compared for the validation purpose. The advantage of a 
faster shutdown is demonstrated in terms of improvement on safety margin. 
3.3.1 Results for the LOFA case 
The reactor power transients and sheath temperature transients in the LOFA under 
different SDS1 response times are plotted in Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13, respectively. 

























Figure 3.12 – Comparison of power transients in LOFA 
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Figure 3.13 – Comparison of sheath temperature transients in LOFA 
As can be seen, the differences between the two power surges or the two temperature 
transients are relatively small. The reason lies in the small reactivity change during the 
chosen LOFA. Decreasing in the coolant flow, unlike the LOCA, only reduces the heat 
transfer coefficient at the initial stage. Voiding appears when accumulation of the fuel-
generated heat reaches a certain level, which is then capable of increasing the in-core 
thermal power and sheath temperature. The gradual rising of temperature is a reflection 
of such phenomenon. The LOFA simulation results also confirm what has been plotted 
and discussed in Figure 2.4. Accident transients in which there is no dramatic reactivity 
change show less dependency on the response time of the shutdown systems. 
Although there is no significant reduction of the peak power surge by using faster 
shutdown process, the LOFA simulation results do confirm the feasibility of lowering the 
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peak of power surge with an increase of shutdown speed. The LOFA simulation also 
yields a clear indication that safety margin improvement may not be significant for 
accident cases with slow reactivity increase.  
3.3.2 Results for the Large LOCA case 
Simulations for 35% RIH break accident present reactor power and sheath temperature 
transients with respect to three SDS1 response times. Figure 3.14 and 3.15 show these 
transients and the comparison result is indicated by the labeled surge peak values. 



































Figure 3.14 – Comparison of power transients in large LOCA 
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Figure 3.15 – Comparison of sheath temperature transients in large LOCA 
It should be pointed out that the sheath temperature has not reached the peak value since 
there is no ECCS included in this simulation. It takes more than 9 seconds, which is the 
valid simulation interval for current simulation model, for the temperature transient to 
reach the peak. However, the simulated transients still present the trend of the increasing 
sheath temperature can be alleviated by faster shutdown process. 
Due to the large and quick positive reactivity introduction in a large LOCA, reactor 
power rises at expeditious rate. In such a circumstance, the faster shutdown process can 
have significant influence on the safety margin. Power surges caused by LOCA are 
reduced clearly in the 50 ms and 20 ms cases as compared to the 100 ms case. As a result, 




This chapter mainly focuses on the research approaches adopted for thermalhydraulic 
investigations, including the thermalhydraulic model construction, selection of the 
accident scenarios, and CATHENA simulation. Purpose of these research approaches is 
to validate the concept of improving the safety margin via faster shutdown. 
The thermalhydraulic simulation model is constructed based on both CANDU 
characteristics and CATHENA requirements. Simplifications are applied such that the 
investigations concentrate only on in-core transients. A LOFA that happens in a single 
fuel channel and a 35% RIH break event, as the worst-case of an RIH break LOCA, are 
selected as the simulation scenarios. Steady-state conditions are chosen to be the initial 
conditions for the simulated accidents. 
Results of the CATHENA simulation for both cases have demonstrated the correctness 
and feasibility of the proposed concept. Comparison between the two simulated cases has 





4 SDS1 TRIP LOGIC AND ITS FPGA IMPLEMENTATION 
The concept of safety margin improvement has been validated using both analytical 
method in Chapter 2 and thermalhydraulic simulation method in Chapter 3. An FPGA-
based SDS1 has to be designed and implemented to demonstrate practical feasibility of 
this concept. The SDS1 in a typical CANDU 6 is selected for this purpose. The trip logic 
within the trip computer is translated into a digital hardware design and implemented on 
an FPGA system. Following the standard FPGA development procedure, this 
implementation involves coding, simulation, synthesis, and hardware configuration. 
4.1 SDS1 trip logic 
The SDS1 trip logic in a CANDU 6 is executed within trip computers called PDCs [55]. 
Different trip parameters correspond to different safety-critical process variables. Safety-
critical variables are measured on-line in real-time and compared against predefined 
threshold within PDCs. Trip decisions are then passed to the downstream of SDS1 for 
execution. The trip logic units contains signal conditioning of the inputs, the trip 
threshold, comparison between the measured system variables and the thresholds, 
decision of the extensive conditions, and the generation of output trip signals. 
4.1.1 PDCs in a CANDU 6 unit 
PDC-based SDS1 in CANDU 6 plants is the first computer-based shutdown system in 
CANDU NPPs. Two PDCs are deployed to deal with seven process-based trip parameters. 
The other three parameters (neutron power, neutron log rate power, and reactor building 
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pressure) still rely on analog circuits for trip functions. Hence, CANDU 6 NPPs use both 
conventional analog logic and computers in their SDS1.  
The reasons why CANDU chooses digital computers for the shutdown systems are [55]:  
(1) Safety features and production availability can be improved by replacing the 
obsolescent analog circuit with digital computers ; 
(2) The testing loads of the operators can be reduced by using digital computers ; 
(3) Digital computers have greater flexibility than analog circuits in logic design; 
and 
(4) Digital computers bring reduced construction and commissioning cost.  
Since PDCs were not a part of the initial CANDU 6 design, it had to be retrofitted into 
the system where most of the setups were designed for relay or analog systems. This 
integration problem was solved by means of supplementing or replacing some 
components in the analog design such that the requirements for a new digital system can 
be satisfied. Therefore, the SDS1 is a system with the trip unit replaced by digital 
computers but the rest remains as conventional. An overview of a PDC-based trip 




Figure 4.1 – Overview of SDS1 trip channel 
As the control unit in SDS1, PDCs acquire trip parameters and make decisions by 
comparing them against the trip thresholds. For those thresholds dependent to reactor 
operating conditions, PDCs also calculates appropriate thresholds. Under some special 
circumstances, it is also necessary for PDCs to consider additional conditions for trip 
decision. The inputs of PDCs are the sampled and amplified sensor values while the 
output is normally the trip decision. Since there are two PDCs in a single trip channel, 
trip decisions from both of them, along with the three analog trip decisions, are combined 
to form a selection logic (mostly just an OR gate). Output of this selection logic is the 
channel trip decision. Trip decisions from all three channels are processed by a 2oo3 
voting logic to generate the final SDS1 trip signal. This final decision is the signal passed 
to the clutches for shutoff rods release.   
In the revised design of the PDCs, a surveillance unit called “Watchdog” is added [55]. It 
monitors the update of PDCs. If a PDC does not update its watchdogs for more than 100 
ms, the watchdog declares a failure of its associated PDC. The watchdog then trips and 
puts its associated channel in a safe state. PDCs also have a self-testing circuit with the 
test vectors stored in a programmable read-only memory (PROM). When the self-testing 
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mode is activated, the inputs of PDCs are switched from the sensor signal paths to the 
PROM. Test vectors are then read by PDCs and the decision outputs are compared to 
expected terms from the design specifications. All the trip parameters have corresponding 
test vectors, thus it is possible to test the PDCs ability for all the trip parameters. This 
automatic test feature makes the maintenance more cost-effective. Since PDCs have 
brought proven benefits to CANDU NPPs and the operating experience has verified their 
adaptability and reliability, the Canadian nuclear industry has further developed a fully 
computerized shutdown systems that integrate PDCs and other computer-based 
components in the Darlington NPP [51, 104]. It has been confirmed that adoption of 
digital computers did enhance the plant safety and performance. But challenges appear 
with the increasing demand for system safety [144]. After nearly two decades of infield 
service, these systems are facing additional new challenges such as obsolescence 
problems and availability of alternative technologies. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, there are a total of ten trip parameters in the CANDU 6 SDS1 
trip logic. Seven of them are process-based and processed by PDCs, while the other three 
use conventional analog circuits. The trip parameters such selected that they can cover 
most of process failure scenarios. The SDS1 Trip parameters, setpoints, and protective 






Table 4.1 SDS1 Trip Parameters and Setpoints 
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when FP
LOG %9<Φ  
11 Manual Trip N/A N/A N/A 
12 Start-up Count Rate N/A N/A N/A 
*  ROPT—Reactor Overpower Trip; FP—Full Power; LINCLΦ  : Ion chamber line signal (neutron flux); 
AVECLΦ  : Ion chamber signal average (neutron flux); LOGLΦ  : Ion chamber signal log rate (neutron flux); 
HTS: Heat Transport System. 
 
Distribution of trip parameters in PDC1 and PDC2 is illustrated by logic structures in 
Figure 4.2 and 4.3 respectively. Manual trip signals are not shown because they are 
mandatory commands issued by the operators. Multiplexers are used as a signal selector 






























The logic structures provide a systematic description of PDCs, in which the logic flow 
and component connections are clearly illustrated. Since the connection of this logic flow 
has been validated by infield experiments and operations in NPPs, it will be used as the 
reference for the FPGA system design in this thesis. Function blocks and interactions of 
the FPGA system are defined and specified based on the PDC specifications such that the 
SDS1 functionalities can be preserved. 
4.1.2 Trip logics 
The essential trip logic in the SDS1 consists of two major steps: acquiring critical plant 
variables in real-time and comparing them against the setpoints, which themselves can be 
functions of other system variables (e.g. reactor power). A trip decision is made 
depending on the results of the comparison. It is important to emphasize that, as the 
information propagates through the logic, some data processing procedures are required. 
For example, the sensor data may need to be preprocessed before they can be used for 
logic operation. The pre-processing also takes time. In a software-based implementation 
involved with operating systems, several computer instruction cycles have to be used to 
complete a single operation. A trip function may be composed of several internal CPU 
operations. When the functions are realized on an FPGA platform, some of the 
processing can be carried out in parallel, hence, to shorten the decision-making time.   
In practice, many accident or incident conditions can lead to a forced trip of an NPP. In 
this study, the “SG low level” scenario has been selected for the functionality evaluation 
of the current FPGA-based SDS1 implementation. The reasons to choose this scenario 
are: 1) the signals to indicate “SG low level” pass through PDC1 which will be replaced 
by the FPGA based implementation; 2) “SG low level” is one of the commonly reported 
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incidents in existing NPPs; and 3) the results are very intuitive when the SG levels are 
being observed on the simulator. The trip parameters for the “SG low level” scenario 
involve more than just SG levels. In fact, because the level depends on the reactor power, 
the setpoint is also a function of the reactor power. The setpoint determination involves 
sorting and range checking calculations. These operations do take time when 
implemented in a digital computer, such as PDC1.   
The actual shutdown logic in the “SG low level” scenario is illustrated in Figure 4.4: 
 
Figure 4.4 – SG low level trip logic 
 
As can be seen from Figure 4.4, in the PDC1 logic structure, the “SG low level” trip logic 
can be divided into several major function blocks: 
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(1) input signal processing including range checking and sensor value sorting; 
(2) setpoint conditioning since the setpoint depends on the reactor power; 
(3) processing logic where the trip decision is made; 
(4) extensive conditions that validate the trip decision; and 
(5) the trip signal selection in which the final trip decision is made. 
The FPGA design has to take these function blocks into consideration in order to 
implement the functionalities and satisfy SDS1 requirements. Only in such a premise can 
the FPGA design introduce advanced techniques such as parallel processing to the 
implementation. One thing needs to be clarified is that, even though the input signals 
appear to be in a parallel pattern in Figure 4.4, the actual processing within the PDC is 
still serial in nature because the algorithm is executed by a microprocessor-based system, 
so is the sorting of the 18 neutron sensor values. The FPGA design can handle such kind 
of issues using parallel processing techniques. 
4.2 Implementation of SDS1 trip logic on an FPGA platform 
The “SG low level” trip logic is used as an example for the FPGA design. The process to 
implement FPGA-based “SG low level” trip logic” can be divided into four major steps: 
1) system design; 2) hardware programming; 3) functionality validation; and 4) final 
implementation on FPGA chips.  
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The system design starts with a sketch of the system overview, which is a function block 
diagram. Each function block in the sketch is complemented with detailed specifications. 
How the FPGA design takes advantage of parallel and hardware processing is described 
in detail.  
After the functionality of each component is specified, VHDL programming environment 
is used to synthesize the desired functions. VHDL stands for VHSIC (Very High Speed 
Integrated Circuits) Hardware Description Language. It is used to code text models that 
describe logic circuits [145]. The synthesis process translates high level algorithmic 
operations into register-level or gate-level specifications, i.e. specifications at a circuit 
level.  
Once the synthesis part is complete, the function simulation can be carried out by 
applying test vectors to the inputs and verifying whether the outputs match the expected 
ones. The entire verification step is performed within the software design environment. 
This verification process can detect design flaws in the function specification, data path, 
and logic control within the simulation coverage, so that corrections can be made.  
Once all the logic is validated, the system design is considered complete.  At this stage, 
the designed system can be downloaded to an FPGA chip according to the selected 
register maps. An EDA tool can be used for selection of routing of signal paths and 
placement of logic elements. Once this step is accomplished, the implementation of 
FPGA-based system is considered to be completed. In practice, extensive testing will 
have to be performed to valid the performance of the system. This is, however, not the 
focus of this thesis. 
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4.2.1 System design 
An overview sketch for the main functionalities of SDS1is drawn based on the PDC logic 
structures. The sketch contains the same major function blocks as discussed in Section 
4.1.2. In this first step, the digital system architecture of PDC logics, sub-systems, 
functionalities of each subsystem, and the relationships among them have to be designed. 
In this case, the overall system architecture is shown in Figure 4.5: 
 
Figure 4.5 – System architecture of the FPGA-based SDS1 
When applied to “SG low level” logic, the specific functionalities of each functional 
block in Figure 4.5 can be summarized as follows: 
(1) The input circuit is responsible for pre-processing of the measured input 
signals. All signals are synchronized to the on-board system clock. 
Measurements from the 18 neutron detector are also sorted at this stage. Data 
range of all the inputs is also checked to ensure that they are valid. 
(2) The desired trip thresholds are stored in the setpoint registers. For different 
trip parameters, the trip thresholds are distinctive. In the current work, since 
the algorithm for both the average power and the estimated power is not 
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available, the trip thresholds are assumed to be pre-determined and stored in 
the registers. The design process then is simplified as follows: once the 
sorting process is complete, an “enable signal” is passed to the threshold 
registers in the next step. The stored threshold values are then fetched for 
comparison purpose.  
(3) Once the SG levels and the trip thresholds are established, the processing 
logic then is in the decision-making unit for trip decisions. Four inputs of the 
SG levels are compared to the stored thresholds by the processing logic. If 
the trip condition is established, the trip signal is then issued to the output 
circuit for trip execution. 
(4) The “Extensive Conditions” block is another decision-making unit that 
determines whether or not an extensive condition is effective for the trip 
status confirmation. The reason for this part is because the reactor does have 
certain special operating status. For example, when the neutron flux log rate 
is less than that of 1% full power and the average neutron flux is less than 
that of 10% full power, the “SG low level” condition is considered as an 
unnecessary trip parameter.  
(5) The output circuit consists of a multiplexer that is controlled by the extensive 
condition unit. If the extensive conditions stand, no matter what status the 
sensor trip signal is, the final trip decision will be overwritten. Another signal 
that controls the output circuit is the manual push button signal. When the 
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push button signal is received by the output circuit, the trip signal will 
definitely be issued regardless the outcomes of other decision-making units. 
Remark: Due to I/O port limitations of the FPGA platform used in this prototype work, 
18 neutron sensor values are stored in registers. They become available to the system 
once the SG level measurements reach the input circuit. The extensive condition part is 
also simplified since neither the estimated power nor the log rate neutron sensor signals is 
available for this work. This simplification has virtually no effects on logic complexity. 
The overall logic is still more complex than that is implemented in [146]. The system 
description of the designated FPGA system based on above specifications can be 
illustrated in Figure 4.6.  
 
Figure 4.6 – System description of the FPGA-based “SG low level” trip channel 
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An analog to digital (A/D) chip is used as an interface between the test signal source and 
the FPGA system. Detailed description of each block used in the FPGA implementation 
is elaborated next. 
4.2.2 Input circuit 
The input circuit is used for pre-processing of the input signals. Pre-processing is 
absolutely necessary to maintain the correctness of the subsequent logic processing. Input 
signals have to be validated for their proper ranges before being passed to the rest of the 
system. Sometime sorting of input signals is also required for calculating the parameter-
related setpoint. In the “SG low level” logic, both “range checking” of the input values 
and sorting of values from 18 neutron detectors are required. The input circuit is designed 
for these two functionalities.  
(1) Range checking 
The range checking is performed by comparing the input value against its upper and 
lower limits defined in the regulations. Only when the value is within these limits, the 
value is treated as a valid measurement. In the current design, a parallel processing 
algorithm is utilized.  
In total, there are four SG level signals and 18 neutron sensor measurements. 22 range 
checking circuits are implemented such that each signal has its own circuit to eliminate 
waiting time at this stage. All these 22 range checking circuits perform the checking 
simultaneously once the data arrive. Although in the current design the 18 neutron values 
are pre-stored in a register array, the range checking is still performed when the “data 
ready” signal reaches the input circuit. Secondly, for each range checking circuit, the 
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value is compared against its upper and lower limits again in a parallel manner. Two 
comparators, one for each limit, are implemented. Thus, two comparison steps are 
executed simultaneously. The result of one limit checking is a Boolean value. As long as 
the input value is between the upper and lower limits, an enable signal will be sent to the 
register to release the values to the subsequent logics. Figure 4.7 provides the details of 
such a parallel range checking circuit. 
 
Figure 4.7 – Parallel range checking circuit 
By processing data in parallel, waiting time is eliminated and the efficiency is enhanced. 
Comparing to a serial processing, such design can shorten the processing time. The price 
to pay is to use additional hardware resource for implementing the identical circuits. 
Fortunately, today’s FPGAs have high density of logic elements and the increase in 




(2) Sorting network 
In additional to range checking, sorting is also needed for the 18 neutron sensor 
measurements. This is because the threshold for the “SG low level” trip logic is a 
function of the reactor power. The 16 highest neutron sensor values from the 18 detectors 
have to be selected for setpoint calculations. Due to the fact that the specific setpoint 
calculation algorithm is not considered in this work, a predefined setpoint is stored in the 
register arrays. It is available to the processing logic once an “enable” signal representing 
sorting completion is issued from the sorting network. 
To sort the values from 18 neutron detectors using a parallel processing scheme, the 
Batcher-Merge sorting algorithm is utilized [147]. Although this algorithm was 
developed originally for parallel processing system using multiple microprocessors, its 
sorting structure is ideal for hardware implementation. An illustrative diagram for an 8-
element Batcher-Merge sorting network is presented in Figure 4.8. 
The sorting algorithm can be decomposed into several simpler units with which 2 input 
values (a1 and a2) are to be sorted. Each unit is nothing but a comparator. A bottom-up 
sorting unit assigns the larger value to b2 and the smaller value to b1. This is opposite in 
a top-down sorting unit. The sorting in Figure 4.8 can be divided into three steps: 2-
element sorting (which corresponds to the four sorting units in the left column), 4-
element sorting (which is the top left and bottom left partitions), and the 8-element 
sorting (which is the rest of the network). Sorted elements are merged into the next stage. 
Sorting operations in the same process are carried on simultaneously in parallel fashion. 
This is shown at the first column that all the 2-element sorting operations are done at the 
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same time. A signal representing completion is sent by each stage to enable the next stage 
such that the pipeline processing is ensured. 
To clearly show how the sorting is processed, an unsorted array, (7, 4, 3, 5, 8, 1, 2, 6), is 
fed to the inputs of the sorting network in Figure 4.8. Each sorting unit relocates the input 
values to its corresponding outputs. For example, in the bottom-up sorting unit at the top-
left corner, the input 7 is relocated to the pin of b2 since 7 is bigger than 4. Following 
such a processing principle, the output of the entire sorting network is a sorted array (1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8). 
 
Figure 4.8 – An illustrative diagram for Batcher-Merge sorting network 
The entire sorting network consists of six stages (columns). Because the dataflow goes 
from the inputs (left) to the outputs (right) stage by stage and every stage executes the 
processing simultaneously, such a layout of the sorting network allows for pipeline 
implementation to increase the processing speed. Six stages are illustrated in Figure 4.8, 
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which forms a six-step pipeline. This is the one of the primary reasons why FPGA 
implementation can speed up the logic processing process. Such a sorting scheme does 
not need any memory storage, and no operating systems are involved. The sorting units 
can be implemented by using integrated circuit elements on an FPGA platform. Moreover, 
in the case of pipeline implementation, each stage of the sorting network is controlled by 
a clock signal. Therefore, one can attain different processing speed by using different 
clock frequency.  
Based on the sorting algorithm in Figure 4.8, this thesis work develops the 16-element 
sorting network for the “SG low level” trip logic. Slight revisions are made such that the 
element integration and the VHDL coding are simplified. The 16-element sorting 
network is indicated in Figure 4.9. Comparing units are the same as those in Figure 4.8. 
There is an issue for the sorting network that needs extra attention. This network is only 
suitable for an input set that has 2n  (n=1, 2 …) elements; but there are 18 neutron values 
in the “SG low level” trip logic. The solution for this problem is: 1) 16 of the 18 neutron 
values are sorted first; 2) the sorted smallest value (O16) is then compared to one of the 
two unsorted values to pick up the bigger one which can be add it to the sorted set; 3) 
steps 1) and 2) are repeated for the last unsorted value. Thus the 18 values have to go 
through two 16-element sorting networks and two comparators. At last a set of 16 biggest 
values out of an 18-value set is generated. This is then what the trip logic needs for 
setpoint generation. One should be aware that the final 16 outputs are not necessarily 
sorted since what the system needs are only 16 biggest values out of the 18 inputs. The 









Figure 4.10 – The “16 out of 18” method 
4.2.3 Setpoint register 
The water level setpoint for the “SG low level” trip logic is set to be 2.00 m within a 0-6 
meters full level range [146] for two reasons: 1) Presently there is no enough knowledge 
for the setpoint calculation algorithm; and 2) it is set so for the convenience of applying 
the industry grade NPP simulator to the HIL simulation. In such a setup, any SG level 
lower than 2.00 m will trigger the SDS1 to issue a reactor trip signal. 
As for the binary representation of the setpoint, it is scaled according to the binary value 
of the input SG level converted by the A/D converter. The A/D interface converts the 
input analog voltage signals into 12-bit digital signals. It uses 1 V and 5 V as the low and 
high references, respectively. Thus, the signal with a magnitude of 1 V comes from the 
simulator represents 0.00 m of the SG level while 5 V signal is for the 6.00 m, i.e. the 
highest level. For the 2.00 m setpoint, the corresponding voltage is 
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Since 5 V is the highest input voltage, it corresponds to the biggest 12-bit binary 
value 2)1111,1111,1111( . The binary value of the setpoint that should be stored in the 
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This binary value is then stored in a register array as illustrated in Figure 4.11, where 
each register holds one bit. Once the “enable” signal arrives, the stored value is made 
available to the processing logic.  
 
Figure 4.11 – Register array for setpoint storage 
 
4.2.4 Extensive conditions 
According to Table 4.1, there are two extensive conditions for the “SG low level” trip 
logic. In practical NPPs, when both the neutron log rate signal and the average neutron 
signal are lower than the prescribed limits, the reactor is operating at low power level. 
This could happen such as the reactor is at a start-up state. In this case, the decision from 
the processing logic should be bypassed since the SG level is not used in the trip decision. 
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However, in this work it has technical difficulty to extract the two neutron-related signals 
from the simulator; hence this part has not been realized. The extensive condition block 
in the system design is then simplified as a selection signal generator activated by the 
“data ready” signal from the A/D interface. The Boolean value of the selection can be 
changed by a switch on the FPGA development board. It is an alternative way to simulate 
extensive conditions under the current circumstances. 
4.2.5 Processing logic 
The processing logic is the central unit of the trip logic, where the sensor trip decisions 
are made. A parallel processing scheme is again utilized to process all the four input SG 
levels. Four subgroups of identical processing logic are developed thus each SG level 
input uses its own. It not only shortens the processing time, but also prevents whole 
system failure if a single circuit is used. The faults, defects, or even failures occurred in 
one subgroup are isolated, which ensures that the system is able to perform its most 
functionalities in the presence of single circuit failure. 
As for the processing logic, it contains simple comparators in the current design as in 
both the relay design and the microcomputer design [55]. However, during the simulation 
work, there was signal oscillation in both the signal source and the FPGA chip. The 
reason has been traced to the background noise and the device output uncertainties. The 
input value oscillation near the trip threshold can easily confuse the processing logic, 
which leads to frequent jitters at the output trip signal. As a result, the system always 
generates spurious trip signals. The reliability level becomes unacceptable since the 
system does not give authentic reflection of the actual scenarios.  
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To solve the trip signal jitter problem, the oscillation issues have to be resolved. It is 
found that a single trip threshold divides the signal transient into only two stages: trip and 
not trip. When oscillation happens around this single trip threshold, the trip signal flips 
with the oscillation. 
The solution is given by adding one more threshold as the trip decision reference. The 
processing logic is programmed as a state machine that makes trip decision with 
consideration of both thresholds. The extra reference threshold is set to be higher than the 
actual trip threshold. The transient of the oscillation is now divided into three stages (top, 
middle, and bottom) by the two thresholds. Top stage is safe and a trip signal is 
unnecessary. The bottom stage means the SG level has go below the trip limit and the trip 
signal has to be issued. At the middle stage, the system considers “not trip” if the 
transient comes from the top stage while “trip” if the transient is from the bottom stage. 
Only when a transient from the bottom stage goes beyond the reference threshold will the 
trip signal be eliminated. The design principle is illustrated in Figure 4.12. The system 
now judges the trip status with one more concern and the jitters of the trip signal are 
eliminated. With the reference threshold, the processing logic can be more aware of the 
approaching accident scenario such that the probability of successful accident detection is 
increased. Moreover, the reference threshold provides double confirmation for trip signal 
elimination, which prevents possible missed detection of the trip status. 
The added threshold is stored in a register array as well. Both the reference threshold and 
the trip threshold are made available for the processing logic by the “enable” signal from 




Figure 4.12 – The two-threshold design 
 
The state machine for the two-threshold scheme is specified as following: 
(1) There are totally four states: Idle, Top, Middle, and Bottom; 
(2) The Idle state corresponds to the system reset signal, i.e. the system is forced 
to Idle state by the reset signal no matter which state it currently resides; 
(3) The other three states are based on the stage of the current signal; and 
(4) The change in the transient stage activates a state transition and related 
signals will be issued. 







data ready= ‘1’ & SG>SP+
Trip= ‘0’
data ready= ‘1’ & SG<SP
Trip= ‘1’
























SG: Steam Generator level;   SP: Setpoint;
SP+: reference Setpoint;       preTrip: previous Trip signal 
 
Figure 4.13 – State diagram of the processing logic 
 
Since the decision logic is simple, the reset signal and the clock are both selected as 
system-global. As a result, the implementation of pipeline processing is straight forward 
and the signal communication is synchronous. Within a highly synchronous system, extra 
components are not necessary to coordinate communications between different clock 
domains. Consequently, the performance of the system is highly effective. 
4.2.6 Output circuit 
The first part of the output circuit acts as a multiplexer in which the output is determined 
by a selection signal. The selection signal, as previously mentioned, comes from the 
extensive conditions. In the current work, the system is simplified and there are only two 
inputs to the multiplexer: sensor trip from the processing logic and a grounded pin. If the 
extensive conditions are established, the grounded pin is selected as the output to bypass 
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the sensor trip decision. But the extensive conditions have lower priority than an 
operator-issued manual trip. Therefore, following the multiplexer, an OR gate is used to 
connect both the selected output and the manual trip signal. In a practical NPP, the 
manual trip signal is connected to the output of a 2oo3 voting logic such that it has the 
highest priority to bypass all the trip decisions from SDS1. Figure 4.14 shows structure of 
such an output circuit. 
 
Figure 4.14 – The structure of the output circuit 
 
4.2.7 Implementation details 
After all the detailed designs are complete, the implementation process is initiated.  
First of all, VHDL coding is carried out based on the component specifications. 
Components only need to be coded once. For multiple uses of one component, such as 
the sorting units in the sorting network, duplicated instances can be generated. Each 
coded component is tested through function simulation using the design tool to ensure 
specifications are met.  
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Schematic programming is available in the current design tool, Altera Quartus II, which 
allows top level system construction via connection of all the necessary components. A 
snapshot of a part of the EDA development environment is shown in Figure 4.15, where 
function blocks are connected by data buses and signal paths to form a logic processing 
subsystem for one of the four input SG level signals. 
 
 
Figure 4.15 – Snapshot of the EDA development environment 
Compilation is performed after the whole schematic design is verified through function 
simulation. The outcome of the compilation is a bitstream file that contains specific 
circuit description and routing instructions. Configuration of the actual FPGA platform is 
done by downloading this bitstream file to an Altera Stratix FPGA chip. 
To establish connections between the implemented FPGA platform and the simulation 
environment for evaluation purposes, it is necessary to have an A/D interface. Four A/D 
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chips are mounted onto a printed circuit board (PCB) board to form such an interface. 
Incoming 4-20mA signals from the simulation environment are converted by the 
interface into digital signals that can be processed by the FPGA platform. 
The configured FPGA platform along with the connected A/D interface is shown in 
Figure 4.16. 
 
Figure 4.16 – FPGA platform and the A/D interface 
4.2.8 Discussions for the implemented FPGA platform 
During the design and implementation process, techniques that fully utilize the 
advantages of an FPGA platform are deployed whenever possible. Waiting time in a task 
queue, which is unavoidable in software-based processing, is reduced by using parallel 
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implementation, e.g. the range checking and variable sorting. Pipeline processing is 
applied to tasks that can be divided into N stages (N=1, 2 …) such that different stages of 
these N tasks can be processed simultaneously. The total clock cycles in such an 
implementation are less than 100. Furthermore, a configured FPGA chip is independent 
from the software-based design tool. The processing delay in such a pure hardware 
system is only the signal propagation latency in the circuit. Therefore, the processing 
speed of a certain algorithm or logic is increased significantly. As a matter of fact, in a 
previous work [146], it has proved that for an identical logic, the FPGA platform can 
have a processing speed 13 times faster than that of an industry standard PLC. 
Despite the advantages in increased processing speed, bottleneck problems that limit full 
exploration of NPP FPGA applications do exist in the current study. Since the access to 
the plant data and SDS1 technical information is limited, current implementation work 
has to be based on some assumptions. Although the implemented platform is capable of 
demonstrating the processing speed advantage, it is not possible to conduct performance 
comparison against SDS1 in use. Meanwhile, there is yet no specific guideline for FPGA 
applications in CANDU NPPs, which makes it harder for current implementation to 
comply with specific CANDU NPP requirements. Finally, the total trip-related I/O ports 
in a CANDU 6 SDS1 are 133 [148]. It requires special hardware interface to implement 
the full system. However, this work can only use products available in our research lab, 
which is another reason for focusing on one of the ten trip parameters for implementation 
and evaluation. 
Comparing to other systems that have been utilized in NPPs for safety functions, FPGAs 
do have some disadvantages. The most widely used FPGAs are SRAM-based ones, 
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which are configured through on-board SRAMs. The weakness of SRAM-based FPGAs 
is that they are vulnerable to radiation. The configured interconnection between CLBs 
can be affected by radiation such as neutron flux within the NPP containment, which may 
cause malfunctions of the system and is completely unacceptable. Previous research work 
has explored such a problem and concluded that FPGAs may have difficulties of 
surviving radiation environment [149]. Moreover, reliability of CMOS-based devices can 
be weakened by the CMOS scaling since the soft error rate increases along with the 
density of on-chip transistors [150]. In the foreseeable future, much higher density of 
transistors is expected in CMOS technology, design and implementation of a reliable 
device will be seriously challenged by variability and degradation [151]. Fortunately, 
efforts and measures have been investigated to alleviate such disadvantage of future 
FPGA applications [152, 153].   
4.3 Summary 
The “SG low level” trip logic is used as an example for FPGA implementation in this 
research. The trip logic is translated from a PDC logic structure into a digital hardware 
system design. Each function block in this digital hardware system is then coded in 
VHDL with parallel and pipeline schemes. Due to limited access to industry information 
and data, some parts of the design are simplified but desired functionalities are kept. To 
accommodate the simulation environment, extra logic and components are added. 
All the coded components are debugged and tested with function simulations, after which 
the system integration (still in VHDL) and synthesis are performed. All of these steps are 
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executed using an EDA tools called Quartus II from Altera since an Altera Stratix FPGA 
is used. Synthesized FPGA design is compiled to a bitstream that can be downloaded to 
the FPGA chip for configuration. When the configuration is done, the FPGA 
implementation of the “SG low level” trip logic is considered to be finished. The next 
step will be performance test. 
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5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE FPGA-BASED SDS1 
To evaluate the performance of the implemented FPGA-based SDS1 trip channel, special 
test environments and cases are arranged for both the functionality verification and 
performance evaluation. The evaluated response time of such trip channel is then applied 
to the large LOCA CATHENA simulation to generate comparable results against those 
derived from an existing SDS1. 
5.1 Methodology, experimental setup, and test cases 
The purpose of evaluating the implemented FPGA-based SDS1 trip channel is: 1) to 
confirm that it does satisfy the function specifications of a standard SDS1; 2) to 
investigate whether or not it can processes the trip logic faster than an existing SDS1. 
5.1.1 Methodologies for performance evaluation 
For the designed FPGA-based SDS1, both functionalities and response time are examined 
in comparison with a software-based safety PLC. The functionality evaluations are 
performed by connecting this FPGA trip channel to an HIL simulation environment using 
an NPP simulator, while the response time is evaluated by simultaneously applying a 
sinusoidal input to both FPGA trip channel and the safety PLC as used in [146]. The 
difference in response times is captured and analyzed.  
5.1.2 Experimental setups 
For functionality evaluations, an HIL simulation environment has been set up. It consists 
of an NPP training simulator, a data acquisition system, an A/D converter interface, and 
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the implemented FPGA-based SDS1. A block diagram of the experimental setup is 
illustrated in Figure 5.1, in which the data formats in this HIL simulation are also shown. 
 
Figure 5.1 – HIL simulation environment for functionality evaluation 
As shown in Figure 5.2, channel E of the SDS1 in the simulator is replaced by the FPGA 
trip channel. The simulation data generated by the simulator is applied to the FPGA 
board through data acquisition workstation and a UDP/IP Ethernet connection. The 
outputs from the FPGA board are sent over to the simulator in a similar manner. 
 
Figure 5.2 – Channels representation of the HIL simulation 
The above HIL set up is not used for evaluating the response time, because the simulator 
is running at a 200 ms time step (5 Hz) which is much slower than the clock frequency of 
the FPGA board (5M Hz). A separated test environment is constructed as shown in 
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Figure 5.3. A sinusoidal signal is applied to the FPGA board, and the responses are 
recorded on an oscilloscope for off-line processing. 
 
Figure 5.3 – Setup for evaluation response time of the FPGA implementation 
 
5.1.3 Simulation approaches and test cases 
The functionalities and response time are evaluated using the experimental setups. The 
operating frequency of the FPGA channel is set at 5M Hz with due consideration of 
background noise in the simulation environment. In the functionality evaluation, the 
following accident scenario is used: 
A fault is introduced deliberately to close a feed water valve on one SG. As a result, the 
SG level begins to decrease. To evaluate the behavior of channel E only, positive biases 
have been added to the setpoints in channel D and channel F, so that the responses from 
these two channels are always after that of channel E. The manual trip on channel D is 
initiated at an early stage of the simulation to fulfill the 2oo3 logics when the trip signal 
from channel E is registered. Under this arrangement, the reactor trip event solely 
depends on the trip signal from the FPGA-based channel E. The evaluations have been 
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repeated with the manual trip signal issued at different time instance to show that the 
effectiveness of FPGA-based channel E is insensitive to the time of manual trips.  
The response time is assessed by applying an upper shifted sinusoidal signal (1 –5V) to 
the FPGA system input. The response from the “SG low level” trip channel is captured 
and recorded on an oscilloscope. Because of the experimental uncertainties and 
measurement noise, the measured response time varies with each realization. Thus 
statistical analysis, based on Monte Carlo methods, has been carried out to estimate the 
response time of the FPGA implementation. The input frequencies are randomly selected 
within the range of 0.1 Hz to 10 Hz based on a uniform distribution. For each input 
frequency, the response time is measured. It is found that 120 samples are sufficient to 
produce an acceptable 1% relative error in the mean. Therefore, the Monte Carlo 
simulation is performed with 120 randomly selected input frequencies. 
5.2 Experimental results and analysis 
Experimental results are captured and analyzed. The analysis results are compared 
against the performance of an existing SDS1 to give verification of the system 
correctness and the timing performance.  
5.2.1 Functionality simulation 
The feed water valve is deliberately closed to initiate the accident at time 0. The channel 
D manual trip is also issued. As the water level decreases below the preselected setpoint 
for FPGA channel (channel E), the 2oo3 logic is fulfilled. Shutoff rods are inserted into 
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the reactor and the thermal power of the reactor reduces dramatically. For clarity, the 
results from one simulation run are shown in Figure 5.4.  
























Figure 5.4 – Functionality evaluation of FPGA-based SDS1 
5.2.2 Response time evaluation 
A sample data captured by the oscilloscope is shown in Figure 5.5. In this particular case, 
it is shown that the response time of the FPGA channel is measured to be 10.12 ms. This 
is one of the 120 Monte Carlo simulation cases and only provides an intuitive view for 
the timing performance. The distribution of the recoded response time under 120 samples 
is illustrated in Figure 5.6 and the results of the statistic analysis are listed in Table 5.1. 
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FPGA response time = 10.12ms
 
Figure 5.5 – Result of a response time test of the FPGA-based SDS1 
 







































5.2.3 Analysis of the test results 
The FPGA-based trip channel has been extensively evaluated under different trip 
conditions. A sample of the simulation results in Figure 5.4 has clearly shown that the 
FPGA-based trip channel can successfully provide correct trip signals. 
The statistic analysis of the timing simulation indicates that the average response time of 
the FPGA trip channel is 10.50 ms. Although there exist several samples that have 
relative large variance from the mean, this 10.5 ms value is considered as rational result 
with acceptable relative error. This response time is considerably shorter than that of a 
software-based PLC system (78.69 ms) [146] under the identical HIL environment (i.e. 
the same SG low level scenario on the same simulator and the same data acquisition unit). 
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The reduced delay, 78.69 - 10.5 = 68.19 ms, is a significant improvement of the SDS1 
decision-making time. Percentage wise, the FPGA implementation is 86.66% faster as 




















Figure 5.7 – Comparison of response time between FPGA and PLC 
There are several factors that can potentially affect the response time of the FPGA trip 
channel. First, the algorithm complexity of the trip logic is a dominant one. For a certain 
trip parameter implemented with the same FPGA design technique, the simpler the trip 
logic is, the faster the trip decision can be made. Within the FPGA chip itself, the clock 
frequency also has significant influence on the response time. A faster clock can certainly 
produce a shorter response time. However, one should always consider the sensor 
dynamics and the noise effect when choosing the suitable clock frequency. Finally, the 
speed of data acquisition systems, in particular, A/D converter time, has to be considered.  
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In the current work, the A/D conversion time is 20 sµ  according to the datasheet [154], 
which is negligibly small as compared to the channel response time. Thus, it has minimal 
effect on the response time of the FPGA and allows the measured time to represent 
directly the performance of the FPGA-based SDS1. 
As for the comparison between FPGA and PLC implementations, it should be mentioned 
that the Tricon v9 PLC tested in [146] is a matured industrial product which is already 
utilized in CANDU NPP [56]. It also has been approved by U.S. NRC as acceptable for 
safety-related use in NPPs [155]. Such a Tricon v9 PLC system has many additional 
features that the FPGA platform does not have. For instance, the PLC itself is a triple 
redundant controller while the FPGA channel in this work has no redundancy. All the 
inputs of the Tricon v9 system are made triplicate for validation purpose before feeding 
to the three main processors. A voter is deployed for the results from the three main 
processors such that the probability of incorrect output can be reduced [155]. Such triple 
redundancy enhances the system reliability and qualifies its compliance to the regulation 
requirements. The tradeoff, however, is the extra time consumed at both the input and 
output ends for the inputs validation and result voting.  Although the Tricon v9 PLC 
performs the trip logic slower than the FPGA channel, it is capable of performing many 
other complicated control functionalities. Furthermore, the A/D conversion time is 
common to all implementations whether an FPGA or a PLC is used. The sole objective to 
use this PLC as a benchmark example is to show that FPGA-based implementation can 
carry out what a traditional operating system driven software-based system can do, and 
can do it faster. 
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5.3 CATHENA simulation using evaluated response time 
The large LOCA scenario in Chapter 3 is simulated again with the obtained FPGA 
response time. 100.0 ms is selected in the first simulation case, since it is considered by 
industry as the maximum allowed response time for CANDU SDS1[47]. According to 
the evaluation work reported previously, 10.5 ms is used as the improved response time 
to generate simulation results for comparison. Although the largest measured response 
time (12.4 ms) should be used for CATHENA simulation with the “worst case concern”, 
the simulation results are identical for both 10.5 ms and 12.4 ms due to the calculation 
accuracy of CATHENA code. Moreover, 12.4 ms is not guaranteed to be the worst case 
with limited samples, but 10.5 ms is a statistically evaluated value with acceptable 
relative error. Therefore, 10.5 ms is used in this study for the result analysis work.  
5.3.1 Simulation results  
The simulation results are analyzed for the verification of the safety margin improvement. 
The relationship between the response time and transient parameters is obtained from the 
simulation results analysis.  
Simulation results with 100.0 ms response time are shown in Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9, 
including the region power transients (Figure 5.8) and the region temperature transients 
(Figure 5.9). To illustrate the importance of the shutdown process, the power transient 
when no shutdown action is taken is shown in Figure 5.10 along with the core power 













































































































Figure 5.10 – Core power transients with and without shutdown action  






























Figure 5.11 – Comparison of power transients under two different response times 
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The identical large LOCA scenarios have also been examined with both response times 
of 10.5 ms and 100.0 ms.  The peak for the power surge is recorded at 1.5082 for 10.5 ms 
and 1.778 for 100.0 ms. The results under both response times are compared in Figure 
5.11. 
5.3.2 Analysis of simulation results 
As the simulation results indicate, a large LOCA can cause dramatic increase in reactor 
power and temperature. The positive reactivity brought by rapid voiding of PHT system 
destroys the thermal balance within the core. The shutdown system reacts to this situation 
and inserts sufficient amount of negative reactivity (-80 mk) to stop the chain reaction. 
That is why the power transient starts to drop quickly soon after the shutoff rods insertion. 
Thus, the sooner the SDS1 is activated, the smaller the power peaks will be.  
By comparing the slopes of the transient curves, one can also note that the rate at which 
the transient rises for 10.5 ms shutdown time is much smaller than that of 100.0 ms 
response time. Slower power increasing produces a lower peak in the transient. The 
difference between the two peaks, as described in Figure 5.11, is 1.778-1.5082 = 0.2698. 
In other words, it represents 27% reduction in the power surge peak, which means that 
555.15 MJ less amount of heat has to be removed from the core eventually according to 
Table 5.2. Without getting into specifics of the safety limit in an operating reactor, it is 
evident that lower power peaks will be beneficial to safety margins. 
Although the sheath temperature does not reach the peak value within this simulation 
time range, the temperature transient in 10.5 ms case does show improvement according 
to the simulation results. Moreover, within the 9-second simulation process the amount of 
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heat generated in 10.5 ms case is 6,649.04 MJ. It is 555.15 MJ less than the 7,204.19 MJ 
of 100.0 ms case. Comparison of these two cases is summarized in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 Comparison of key parameters under two shutdown cases 
Case Delay Time (ms) Power Peaks Temp. Peaks (℃) Heat (MJ) Time to Peak (s) 
1 100.0 1.778 931.79 7, 204.19 0.839 
2 10.5 1.5082 909.05 6, 649.04 0.757 
∆ 89.5 0.2698 22.74 555.15 0.082 
 
Although it has been shown that shorter response time produces lower peaks in power 
surges, how the variation of the response time affects the peak of surge is yet to be 
investigated. Further analysis on the relationship between the decision-making response 
time and the peak of the power surge under a large LOCA has been carried out. 
Simulations under different response time varying from 10.5 ms to 200.0 ms are 
performed. Based on the simulation results, the relationship between the response time 
and the power peak can be approximated by the following linear equation (5.1): 
 0.003 1.4765peak dP t= +  (5.1) 
where  
peakP  is the peak value (in normalized power) of the thermal power transient as result of a 
LOCA; dt  is the decision-making time (in the unit of millisecond) needed by the trip 
channel, known as the response time. 
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Since the power surge peaking time is also of importance to the safety analysis, a formula 
to predict the surge peak time is also established based on the simulation results as 
follows (5.2): 
 0.0008 0.7547peak dT t= +  (5.2) 
where  
peakT  is the time (in the unit of second) that the thermal power transient reaches its peak 
after the LOCA is initiated; dt  is the decision-making time (in the unit of millisecond) 
needed by the trip channel, known as the response time. 
The sampled data and the curve fitting results for these two relationships are illustrated in 
Figure 5.12.  
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Figure 5.12 – Power surge (peak and time) vs. the response time 
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These two linear relationships clearly illustrate why shortening the response time of a 
shutdown system can be beneficial to mitigate the impact of an accident and to contribute 
to the NPP safety. In other words, by shutting down the chain reaction faster, less decay 
heat will be generated, which effectively increase the operational safety margin. Since, by 
definition, the safety margin of a particular system variable is defined as the difference 
between the operating values of this variable and its safety limit, the safety margin of 
reactor power is directly related to the operating power level. One can potentially 
increase the power level without scarifying the safety margins, i.e. maintain the same 
level of power surge, if the response time of the shutdown system can be shortened. 
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the test environment and test cases used in this work are described to 
show the evaluation methodologies.  
The simulated results, for both the functionality and timing performance, are presented 
along with the analysis. The FPGA-based trip channel responds properly to the postulated 
“SG low level” scenario by issuing the expected trip signal. The reactor is then tripped at 
the moment when SG level goes below the predefined setpoint. The statistical analysis of 
the timing performance has highlighted the advantage of an FPGA-based trip channel as 
compared to an SDS1 controller utilized in an existing CANDU NPP.  
On the basis of the timing evaluation, CATHENA simulation is carried out to quantify 
the safety margin improvement. Relationship between the response time and critical 
parameters, i.e. peak power surge, is established through data analysis. 
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6 VALIDATION OF FPGA-BASED SDS1 IN AN HIL SIMULATION 
To demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed safety margin improvement scheme from 
more practical point of view, HIL simulations have been carried out in this chapter. The 
HIL platform, as described in [27], consists of a CANDU NPP simulator, an industry 
grade FPGA development system, and associated interface devices. In this study, a large 
LOCA similar to what has been discussed in Chapter 3 is created in the NPP simulator. 
One channel of the safety shutdown system of SDS1 within the simulator is replaced by a 
National Instruments (NI) FPGA implementation. Trip signal issued by the FPGA-based 
trip channel is used by the simulator to form the simulator trip signals. 
6.1 Advantages of HIL simulations 
The HIL simulation studies are conducted under a large LOCA scenario similar to those 
used in the CATHENA analysis. This experimental platform enables us not only to 
validate the results from CATHENA directly, but also to examine the practical aspects of 
a diverse FPGA implementation in real-time, such as signal interface, and the real-time 
response of the NPP operating parameters.  More importantly, it further demonstrates the 
feasibility and benefits of this concept. 
The in situ performance of the FPGA implementation is evaluated.  Both the decision-
making process of the FPGA-based SDS1 and the behavior of the simulator under large 
LOCA conditions can be examined in parallel. Moreover, power transients generated by 
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the simulator provide powerful validation of the safety margin improvement from a 
practical NPP environment. 
6.2 HIL simulation setup  
HIL simulation is selected due to explained reasons and advantages. The simulation loop 
is constructed similar to that of Chapter 5. However, the FPGA platform used in this 
chapter is an industry grade equipment from NI. The HIL simulation interface is also 
upgraded to provide sufficient I/O ports for the current HIL simulation.  
6.2.1 HIL simulation platform 
HIL simulations are utilized to further verify the effectiveness of shortening the response 
time on improvement of safety margin in a real-time environment and to demonstrate the 
technical feasibility of FPGA-based implementation. An HIL simulation platform similar 
to that in Chapter 5 has been built up for validation and verification of NPP safety 
systems in [27]. In the current study, the entire HIL simulation platform operates in real-
time to respond to the LOCA instead of the “SG low level” scenario described in Chapter 
4. Since industry grade NPP simulator is used in the HIL platform, the evaluation of the 
developed FPGA system can be carried in an integrated and more realistic environment 
by considering the entire plant operating environments. 
The main justifications for using HIL simulations are: 1) to provide a quasi-practical 
environment for verification and validation of the safety shutdown systems in real-time; 2) 
to examine the practical signal interfaces and their effects on the FPGA-based decision-
making system; 3) to allow for real-time monitoring of relevant variables in the simulated 
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plant coherently; and 4) to study the trip channel performance in comparison with other 
forms of shutdown system implementation. These features associated with an HIL 
platform cannot simply be done in an off-line CATHENA simulation. 
The entire HIL simulation platform discussed in [27] is exploited here except that the 
system under test (SUT) now is an FPGA system instead of the PLC. The simulator acts 
as the virtual NPP where the postulated accident is simulated and the plant responses to 
the shutdown process are captured and displayed. A microcontroller-based interface, as 
shown in Figure 6.1, replaces the PC-based data acquisition workstation used in Chapter 
4 to provide more efficient data transmission and processing. In addition to one UDP/IP 
input port, there are eight voltage I/Os, eight current I/Os, and eight digital I/Os on this 
interface. The programmed microcontroller transfers the UDP/IP packages into 
corresponding 4-20 mA industry grade signals that are taken as the inputs of the NI FPGA 
system. 
 
Figure 6.1 – Microprocessor-based HIL interface board 
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The FPGA system used here, as shown in Figure 6.2, is an NI PXI-7811R system from 
NI with an onboard Virtex-II 1M-gate FPGA device. It is programmed through 
LabVIEW FPGA module, which enables custom onboard decision-making that executes 
with hardware-timed speed and reliability [156]. The FPGA programming module, 
running in the PC-based controller board of the PXI platform, is the design tool for the 
FPGA device. The trip logic under a LOCA condition is decomposed into function blocks 
and coded via the programming module. An apparent advantage of this NI PXI FPGA 
system is that it has expansion chassis to house extra I/O ports if needed [157]. Two 
chassis are used with four I/O modules in each. One expansion chassis along with its 
plug-in I/O modules, which are capable of converting FPGA digital ports into 
multifunction ports, are shown in Figure 6.3. 
 
 




Figure 6.3 – National Instruments expansion chassis and I/O modules 
The assembly of the entire PXI FPGA system is illustrated by a schematic diagram in 
Figure 6.4. 
 
Figure 6.4 – Assembly of the PXI FPGA system 
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6.2.2 Implementation of the trip logic 
In the implemented trip logic, the neutron overpower is used as the trip parameter since it 
is a key parameter associated with the LOCA conditions. The process variables being 
monitored are obtained from the neutron detectors. The simulated LOCA causes 
transients in the neutron flux. 
 
Figure 6.5 – Logic process of neutron overpower trip process 
The logic for neutron overpower trip consists of a comparison between the measured 
neutron flux and the predefined trip thresholds. The measured values from the sensors are 
validated by range checking circuit. To prevent spurious trips, an additional comparison 
channel is used to provide decision reference for the trip logic in this work. This is 
identical to the technique used in Chapter 4 to prevent spurious trip signals and jitters. 
There are totally 18 neutron detectors in SDS1 of a CANDU NPP. The trip decision is 
issued if any of these 18 values exceeds the trip threshold. Both the FPGA-based trip 
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channel and the software-based ones in the simulator are shown in an illustrative diagram, 
Figure 6.5, to describe the logic process of the HIL simulation. 
 
 
Figure 6.6 – Programmed neutron overpower trip logic 
A portion of the actual programmed block diagram within the design environment is 
shown in Figure 6.6. The signal sources in Figure 6.6 are the I/O ports from the chassis-
hold modules. The 4-20 mA industry grade signals are converted by these modules into 
digital signals for FPGA processing. Input signals to the FPGA are fed to the decision-
making unit after passing the range checking. Trip decisions of all the 18 paths are pre-
trip signals, which are merged into an OR gate to generate the final channel trip signal. 
Indicators are distributed into different intermediate signal paths for on-line monitoring 
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purpose. As an outcome of the FPGA-based trip logic, the channel trip signal is wired to 
a different I/O module such that the HIL interface can fetch it once it is available and 
pass it to the simulator as an indication of the simulated accident. 
The real-time monitoring feature is easily realized in the LabVIEW programming 
environment. Indicators connected to the signal paths are assembled to generate a graphic 
interface that displays the ongoing transients on monitored parameters. A screenshot of 
such an interface is presented in Figure 6.7. 
 
 
Figure 6.7 – Real-time monitoring interface 
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The FPGA implementation process of the above trip logic comprises of several steps, 
which is similar to what have been done in Chapter 4: 1) systematic design, 2) coding the 
logic in VHDL, 3) synthesis and function simulation, and 4) configuration of the FPGA 
device. The systematic design specifies a map of function blocks for the shutdown logic. 
HDL coding provides logic illustration for each function block. The digital circuit 
specification is translated from all the algorithmic operations by a synthesis process. 
After successfully passing the verification process using function simulations, the design 
can then be compiled into a bitstream file and downloaded to the FPGA hardware system 
for execution. 
6.2.3 Setup of experiments 
 
Figure 6.8 – HIL simulation setup with FPGA-based shutdown channel 
Once the design and implementation of the FPGA-based CANDU trip channel are 
completed, the system is connected to the NPP simulator through proper interface to form 
the HIL simulation environment. Process variables of the simulated scenario are fetched 
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from the simulator and available to outside access through UDP/IP connections. The 
interface board translates these UDP/IP signals from the simulator into 4-20 mA industry 
standard analog signals that are connected to the FPGA system. Trip signal generated by 
FPGA system is then sent to the simulator to perform shutdown actions. An illustrative 
diagram of the experimental setup can be described in Figure 6.8. 
The actual experimental setup is shown in Figure 6.9. 
 
Figure 6.9 – Experimental setup with FPGA-based shutdown channel 
It is important to point out that the HIL simulation is different from off-line simulation 
such as CATHENA. In off-line simulations, the accident scenarios are examined by 
solving thermalhydraulic equations. The simulation is entirely performed in terms of 
mathematical formulations. The trip process is based on a predefined function. Hence, 
neither on-line monitoring nor trip performance evaluation can be easily carried out.  
In an HIL simulation, the FPGA system acts as one of the trip channels to interact with 
the rest of simulator dynamics on-line in real-time. Its performance can be conveniently 
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compared against other two trip channels within the NPP simulator to demonstrate their 
effects on system safety margins. HIL simulations allow on-line monitoring of changes in 
the plant parameters/signals in real-time. Without doubt, an HIL simulation provides a 
more realistic view of the safety control systems in an NPP. It is a useful platform to 
evaluate safety control system hardware and software. It plays an excellent 
complementary role to the thermalhydraulic-based safety analysis tools, such as 
CATHENA. 
6.2.4 Selection of simulation case 
Through HIL simulation, a large LOCA accident in the form of 20% break at two RIHs is 
configured to take place in the simulator at time 0t =  s. The FPGA-based trip channel 
monitors the variation of all the neutron detectors and makes the trip decision once the 
preset conditions are met. It should be mentioned that the scenarios used in the HIL 
simulation is slightly different from what was done in the CATHENA simulations. The 
main reasons for the discrepancy are as follows: 
(1) Since 10.5 ms used by CATHENA simulation is based on a statistical 
analysis performed in Chapter 5, it would be difficult to reproduce exact 
response time in the HIL simulation for the conditions of the postulated 
accident; 
(2) The power output of the NPP simulator used in the HIL simulation is higher 
than that of a CANDU 6. Its full electric power level is at 900 MW with an 
LHGR of 0.9941, while CANDU 6 has an electric power output of 600 MW 
with an LHGR of 0.9126;  
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(3) Due to the discrepancies in power levels, the trip set-point of the NPP 
simulator is also slightly different from that used in CATHENA simulation 
for CANDU 6;  
(4) The trip logic channels in the simulator are software-based trip logic; and 
(5) The trip logic implemented in CATHENA is limited due to insufficient 
technical information while the NPP simulator is designed to produce 
complete plant responses. 
6.3 HIL simulation results 
Even though it is unfortunate that one cannot provide a direct comparison between the 
results of the HIL simulation and the CATHENA simulation, one can still draw many 
qualitative conclusions. With full understanding of the limitations of the HIL simulation 
platform and the power level difference between CANDU 6 and the simulator, 
adjustments have been made accordingly to accommodate the above discrepancies to 
ensure the validity of the simulation results.  
Since there are three independent trip channels in the SDS1, one of the channels in the 
simulator is replaced by the implemented FPGA-based shutdown system. Subsequently, 
the speed of trip logic response of the FPGA-based system can be compared against that 
of the standard software-based trip logic within the simulator. The simulations have been 
carried out and the results are shown in Figure 6.10.  
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Figure 6.10 – Power comparison between FPGA trip and simulator trip channels 
As can be seen, the neutron power starts rising at exponential rate after the initiation of 
the large LOCA. Because the FPGA-based trip channel responds to the accident scenario 
more quickly than the software-based simulator trip channel does, trip signal from the 
FPGA-based trip channel is issued earlier. As a consequence, the reactor is shut down 
earlier with the FPGA-based trip channel and the neutron power transient is forced to a 
6.26% lower peak than that of the simulator-based shutdown transient.   
6.4 Discussions 
By observing the response times of the shutdown system channels, clearly, the FPGA-
based channel provides significant improvement in the speed of response as compared to 
the software-based trip channel. As a result, the peak value of the power excursion is 
lower if the trip is initiated by the FPGA-based system. 
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Although the shape of the power transients are different from what has been obtained in 
CATHENA simulations due to reasons as explained earlier, the corresponding curves do 
demonstrate the concept of improving safety margin with a faster shutdown system 
response time. This HIL simulation results further validate the concept of safety margin 
improvement when a faster shutdown system is used. 































Figure 6.11 – Potential power upgrade with a faster SDS1 
It is interesting to point out that with a faster shutdown system, one can effectively 
upgrade the steady-state operating power of the reactor without jeopardizing the safety 
margins. To further demonstrate this concept, a series experiments have been conducted 
by varying the speed of shutdown systems in CATHENA. These simulations use the 
same model and LOCA case as in Chapter 3. The results for two shutdown system 
response times (10.5 ms and 100.0 ms) are shown in Figure 6.11, where the transient of 
the 10.5 ms case is based on 10% enhanced operating power. As shown, the safety 
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margin improvement can be maintained as 1.778-1.6788 = 9.92%, with even lower power 
surge in this case, when a 10% operating power upgrade is to be implemented. 
It is important to point out that power upgrade in practice involves much more than 
simply increasing the speed of shutdown systems. Speed of response of shutdown 
systems will ensure that there is no further increase in power peak surges in the event of 
an accident. However, if operating at a higher power output under the normal operating 
conditions, many plant systems have to be subjected to higher temperature and pressure, 
impacts of a power upgrade on other system components have to be fully investigated 
and approved by regulatory bodies. This will be beyond the scope of the investigations in 
the current thesis. 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter mainly focuses on validation of the designed FPGA-based SDS1 via HIL 
simulation. The accident scenario is similar as what has been considered in CATHENA 
simulations except that a more realistic simulation environment is involved. Moreover, an 
industry grade FPGA platform, with more I/Os than the prototype in Chapter 4, is used. 
The logic implementation is more concrete with actual input signals rather than restoring 
values within the registers. 
To further verify the improvement shown in CATHENA off-line simulation, the real-time 
HIL simulation is utilized by realizing the similar LOCA scenario in an FPGA-based trip 
channel. The industry grade NPP simulator is connected to provide on-line monitoring 
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and trip action. Trip logic for the LOCA is implemented and the experimental 
environment for data monitoring and analysis are developed.   
Results from the HIL simulations have been presented and analyzed. It has been 
demonstrated that FPGA-based trip logic can provide faster shutdown reaction to 
accident scenario, providing a 6.26% lower power surge than that of the simulator-based 
transient.  
Based on the proven improvement, potential power upgrade is discussed and illustrated. 
It has been shown that the safety margin improvement can still be reserved as 9.92% after 




7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Conclusions as well as suggestions for future work are presented in this chapter. The 
conclusions are drawn with reference to the research objectives and the obtained research 
results. However, limitations do exist in the current work, which leave margins for future 
investigation, based on which the future directions for this line of research are also 
discussed.  
7.1 Conclusions of this research 
This thesis started with a purpose of investigating possible improvement of CANDU NPP 
safety features by use of FPGA technology. As stated by the objectives of this work, the 
concept of safety margin improvement via faster shutdown process has to be validated 
and both the implementation and evaluation of an FPGA-based SDS1 have to be 
accomplished and followed by verifications of achievable benefits.  
During the verification process, theoretical investigation is carried out first to obtain 
analytical approval of the concept. Furthermore, thermalhydraulic models to describe a 
LOFA and a large LOCA have been established for a CANDU reactor. Using an 
industrial grade simulation program, CATHENA, the accident transients are simulated 
based on different response times of SDS1. Conclusions of the investigation are 
summarized as follows: 
(1) The peak values of the transient responses of the critical reactor variables are 
a function of the response time of the shutdown systems. The sooner the 
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shutdown action takes place, the smaller these peak values will be, which 
corresponds to a bigger safety margin; and 
(2) The safety margin improvement for accidents with slow reactivity 
introduction, such as a LOFA, is not significant due to gradually power 
increase. 
To validate this concept, an FPGA-based SDS1 has been implemented based on the 
existing SDS1 trip logic. The overall system design matches the PDC logic structure such 
that the implemented system satisfies the function specifications of SDS1. The design 
flows from the top level system down to the details of function blocks. Special techniques 
such as parallel and pipeline structures have been adopted wherever possible to improve 
the system performance. The entire design process is performed under the VHDL coding, 
which is absolutely circuit independent. The implemented system has been evaluated 
with appropriate experimental setup. Following the response time evaluation, the 
CATHENA simulation for a large LOCA is carried out again to confirm the safety 
margin improvement offered by such an FPGA-based SDS. Quantitative description of 
the safety margin improvement has been obtained by analytical estimation of the 
relationship between the critical transient parameters and the response time. 
Conclusions for the implementation work can be drawn as following:  
(1) According to the FPGA implementation process, it has been concluded that 
FPGA application for the SDS1 trip logic is feasible and circuit independent; 
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(2) The functionality tests have concluded that the implemented SDS1 trip 
channel can perform successfully under the “SG low level” condition.  
(3) It has been concluded in the current work that one of the main advantages of 
using FPGA-based SDS1 is the fast shutdown speed. The evaluated 10.5 ms 
response time has conduced that the FPGA implementation can shorten the 
response time of software-based SDS implementation by as much as 86.66%; 
(4) According to the CATHENA simulation based on the evaluated response 
time, 26.98% improvement of the safety margin has been obtained via the 
FPGA-based SDS1 under a large LOCA condition; and 
(5) The analytical relationship between the response time of SDS1 and critical 
transient variables, which turns out to be linear for both cases, has been 
derived and illustrated in Equation (5.1) and Equation (5.2). 
To further validate the benefit obtained from the off-line CATHENA simulation, an on-
line HIL simulation has been performed with an industry grade FPGA system and 
improved simulation interface. The simulated accident is also a large LOCA except the 
circumstances are different to CATHENA simulations due to different reactor types. 
Possibility of power upgrade under faster shutdown process is also explored and 
discussed. The accomplished work can be concluded as follows: 
(1) The safety margin improvement, which is 6.26% in normalized power, and 
the faster shutdown process of FPGA trip channel have been validated again 
in a more realistic on-line HIL simulation involving an NPP simulator, and  
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(2) Based on the result of the analysis work, one can potentially increase 10% of 
the nominal operating power of the reactor, while retaining a 9.92% safety 
margin improvement simply by using a faster shutdown system. 
7.2 Limitations and suggestions for future work 
In a thesis work, limitations do exist for the research scope. The limitations in current 
work are discussed below while suggestions for the future work are given as potential 
research directions.  
7.2.1 Limitations of the current work 
The scope of this thesis has been set as investigation of CANDU NPP safety margin 
improvement with an FPGA-based SDS1. The research relied on the fast processing 
speed of the FPGA platform and related benefit analysis. Within this scope, the FPGA-
based SDS1 trip channel is implemented for processing speed evaluation. The evaluated 
timing performance is then utilized in a thermalhydraulic simulation to verify the safety 
margin improvement and potential power upgrade. All the objectives defined within the 
research scope have been achieved. However, FPGAs are powerful digital systems that 
can be applied to many other control applications in NPPs. Since distinctive requirements 
and specifications exist in each application, unique methodology is often needed during 
the investigations. 
Although a particular FPGA-based SDS1 trip channel has been implemented, challenges 
and difficulties do appear during the research process. One of them is the limited access 
to some necessary information such as the full SDS1 trip logic. The implemented digital 
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system has to be simplified to make it functional. Thus, attempts of highlighting the fast 
processing speed can only succeed by comparing the performance of the simplified logic 
implemented in an FPGA and a PLC. Without implementing the full shutdown logic, this 
work is unable to compare the in situ performance of an FPGA-based system and the 
onsite SDS1 in existing NPPs. 
It is eventually a prototype research work, where the available resource is not as complete 
as an industry project. The two FPGA platforms, the Altera Stratix FPGA development 
kit and the National Instruments PXI FPGA system, are of limited capability. Either the 
lack of enough I/O pins or the communication deficiency of the HIL interface constrains 
the investigation. 
As for the use of CATHENA, only two postulated accident scenarios are simulated to 
verify the transient differences between two shutdown processes. Practically, CATHENA 
is capable of doing more than this. Besides simulating an accidental scenario, CATHENA 
also provides capability to integrate with other programs to realize more complicated 
functionality. Its remote access control model enables communication between 
CATHENA and other area-specific codes. The accessible variables in CATHENA can be 
fetched as inputs for calculations being performed in another program. This actually 
extends the functionality of CATHENA as a sole thermalhydraulic code. For example, 
the reactor models developed in [128] and [130] have the potential to be appropriately 
connected to CATHENA for on-line simulation studies. 
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It should be noticed that only response time has been considered in this work as a factor 
of the accidental transient. Without doubt, a detailed exploration for effects of other 
parameters will make the current work more comprehensive. 
7.2.2 Suggestions for future work 
Suggestions for future work are given by referring to identified limitations. Only 
potential research topics or approaches are discussed with respect to the CANDU safety 
issues. 
The suggestions are listed as following: 
(1) Investigation of FPGA applications for other I&C systems in CANDU NPP 
is needed since FPGAs offer obvious advantages over software-based 
solutions; 
(2) It is worth implementing a full SDS1 (or even SDS2) trip logic in an FPGA 
system such that the in-situ performance of FPGA-based SDS1 can be 
thoroughly examined; 
(3) If possible, it is of extreme importance to implement and evaluate an FPGA-
based system that is fully capable of realizing all the I/O functions in SDS1; 
(4) Achieving an on-line simulation through cooperation between CATHENA 
and another program allows exhaustive investigation on both 
thermalhydraulics and reactor physics; 
(5) It would be interesting to consider other trip parameters in the accident 
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APPENDIX A  
CATHENA Simulation Input File 
The following input file is for the CATHENA simulation of 35% RIH break case with 
100 ms SDS1 decision-making time.   
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
' CANDU 6 RIH 35% LOCA', 
'UWO-CIES JINGKE SHE'/ 
'CONTROL PARAMETERS'/ 
'SOLUTION CONTROL'/ 
0.0, 10.0, , 0.0001, 0.0001, 0.01/ 
'* START TIME IS 0.0'/ 
'* END TIME IS 10'/ 
'* INNITIAL TIME STEP IS 0.0001'/ 
'* MINIMUM TIME STEP IS 0.0001'/ 
'* MAXIMUM TIME STEP IS 0.01'/ 
'PRINT CONTROL'/ 
0.01, 0.01, 0.01, , , ,.TRUE.,'A'/ 
'RESTART CONTROL'/ 
,'CORERIH35.rst', 0.01, ,.FALSE.,'C','C',/ 
'END'/ OF CONTROL PARAMETERS GROUP 
'COMPONENTS'/ 
'INBC',,,,,,,,,'D2O'/ 
'P0',    0.1000, 0.000, 1.2946372,     1.28389,     , , 'CIRC',    1, 'D2O'/ 
'P1',    0.1000, 0.000, 5.6555204E-1,  8.485772E-1, , , 'CIRC',    1, 'D2O'/ 
'P2',    0.1000, 0.000, 7.2908516E-1,  9.634833E-1, , , 'CIRC',    1, 'D2O'/ 
'P3',    0.1000, 0.000, 3.5432176E-1,  6.716670E-1, , , 'CIRC',    1, 'D2O'/ 
'P4',    0.1000, 0.000, 3.7476340E-1,  6.907703E-1, , , 'CIRC',    1, 'D2O'/ 
'P5',    0.1000, 0.000, 3.5432176E-1,  6.716670E-1, , , 'CIRC',    1, 'D2O'/ 
'V1', , , , , , ,'VOLMC', ,D2O, , 0.0001/ 
'V2', , , , , , ,'VOLMC', ,D2O, , 0.0001/ 
'V3', , , , , , ,'VOLMC', ,D2O, , 0.0001/ 
'V4', , , , , , ,'VOLMC', ,D2O, , 0.0001/ 
'V5', , , , , , ,'VOLMC', ,D2O, , 0.0001/ 
'V6', , , , , , ,'VOLMC', ,D2O, , 0.0001/ 
'Z1', 0.1000, 0.000, 1.7716088E-1, 4.7494E-1, , , 'CIRC',1,'D2O'/ 
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'Z2', 0.1000, 0.000, 1.7716088E-1, 4.7494E-1, , , 'CIRC',1,'D2O'/ 
'Z3', 0.1000, 0.000, 2.1123028E-1, 5.1860E-1, , , 'CIRC',1,'D2O'/ 
'Z4', 0.1000, 0.000, 1.6353312E-1, 4.5631E-1, , , 'CIRC',1,'D2O'/ 
'Z5', 0.1000, 0.000, 2.1123028E-1, 5.1860E-1, , , 'CIRC',1,'D2O'/ 
'Z6', 0.1000, 0.000, 1.7716088E-1, 4.7494E-1, , , 'CIRC',1,'D2O'/ 
'Z7', 0.1000, 0.000, 1.7716088E-1, 4.7494E-1, , , 'CIRC',1,'D2O'/ 
'ZONE1', 5.9436, 0.000, 3.40694E-3, 7.37629E-3, , , '37ELMT', 21,'D2O',52/ 
'ZONE2', 5.9436, 0.000, 3.40694E-3, 7.37629E-3, , , '37ELMT', 21,'D2O',52/ 
'ZONE3', 5.9436, 0.000, 3.40694E-3, 7.37629E-3, , , '37ELMT', 21,'D2O',62/ 
'ZONE4', 5.9436, 0.000, 3.40694E-3, 7.37629E-3, , , '37ELMT', 21,'D2O',48/ 
'ZONE5', 5.9436, 0.000, 3.40694E-3, 7.37629E-3, , , '37ELMT', 21,'D2O',62/ 
'ZONE6', 5.9436, 0.000, 3.40694E-3, 7.37629E-3, , , '37ELMT', 21,'D2O',52/ 
'ZONE7', 5.9436, 0.000, 3.40694E-3, 7.37629E-3, , , '37ELMT', 21,'D2O',52/ 
'N1', 0.1000, 0.000, 1.7716088E-1, 4.7494E-1, , , 'CIRC',1,'D2O'/ 
'N2', 0.1000, 0.000, 1.7716088E-1, 4.7494E-1, , , 'CIRC',1,'D2O'/ 
'N3', 0.1000, 0.000, 2.1123028E-1, 5.1860E-1, , , 'CIRC',1,'D2O'/ 
'N4', 0.1000, 0.000, 1.6353312E-1, 4.5631E-1, , , 'CIRC',1,'D2O'/ 
'N5', 0.1000, 0.000, 2.1123028E-1, 5.1860E-1, , , 'CIRC',1,'D2O'/ 
'N6', 0.1000, 0.000, 1.7716088E-1, 4.7494E-1, , , 'CIRC',1,'D2O'/ 
'N7', 0.1000, 0.000, 1.7716088E-1, 4.7494E-1, , , 'CIRC',1,'D2O'/ 
'W1', , , , , , ,'VOLMC', ,D2O, , 0.0001/ 
'W2', , , , , , ,'VOLMC', ,D2O, , 0.0001/ 
'W3', , , , , , ,'VOLMC', ,D2O, , 0.0001/ 
'W4', , , , , , ,'VOLMC', ,D2O, , 0.0001/ 
'W5', , , , , , ,'VOLMC', ,D2O, , 0.0001/ 
'W6', , , , , , ,'VOLMC', ,D2O, , 0.0001/ 
'M0',    0.1000, 0.000, 1.2946372,     1.28389,     , , 'CIRC',    1, 'D2O'/ 
'M1',    0.1000, 0.000, 5.6555204E-1,  8.485772E-1, , , 'CIRC',    1, 'D2O'/ 
'M2',    0.1000, 0.000, 7.2908516E-1,  9.634833E-1, , , 'CIRC',    1, 'D2O'/ 
'M3',    0.1000, 0.000, 3.5432176E-1,  6.716670E-1, , , 'CIRC',    1, 'D2O'/ 
'M4',    0.1000, 0.000, 3.7476340E-1,  6.907703E-1, , , 'CIRC',    1, 'D2O'/ 
'M5',    0.1000, 0.000, 3.5432176E-1,  6.716670E-1, , , 'CIRC',    1, 'D2O'/ 
'OUTBC',,,,,,,,,'D2O'/ 
'END'/ OF COMPONENTS GROUP 

























































'END' /OF CONNECTIONS 
'BOUNDARY CONDITIONS'/ 
'RESERVOIR B.C.', 'RIH'/ 
'INBC'/ 
11.75E6, , 2.65E2, 0, 'HG-BY-SAT', 'HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
'RESERVOIR B.C.', 'ROH'/ 
'OUTBC'/ 




'END'/OF BOUNDARY CONDITIONS 
'SYSTEM MODELS'/ 
'KINETICS', 'RPOWER1'/ 
1, 21, 'SIM_PK', 'DEN_VOID'/ 
0.001, 'EQUILIBRIUM', 'CANDU', '.FALSE.'/ 
/ 
'FUELCHL1'/ GENHTP model label 
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fluid density coefficient 
0.0, -0.0118/ 
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fuel temperature coefficient 
3.747E-6, -0.006/  
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fluid temperature coefficient 
0.0,0.0/ 
'KINETICS', 'RPOWER2'/ 
1, 21, 'SIM_PK', 'DEN_VOID'/ 
0.001, 'EQUILIBRIUM', 'CANDU', '.FALSE.'/ 
/ 
'FUELCHL2'/ GENHTP model label 
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fluid density coefficient 
0.0, -0.0118/ 
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fuel temperature coefficient 
3.747E-6, -0.006/  
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fluid temperature coefficient 
0.0,0.0/ 
'KINETICS', 'RPOWER3'/ 
1, 21, 'SIM_PK', 'DEN_VOID'/ 




'FUELCHL3'/ GENHTP model label 
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fluid density coefficient 
0.0, -0.0118/ 
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fuel temperature coefficient 
3.747E-6, -0.006/  
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fluid temperature coefficient 
0.0,0.0/ 
'KINETICS', 'RPOWER4'/ 
1, 21, 'SIM_PK', 'DEN_VOID'/ 
0.001, 'EQUILIBRIUM', 'CANDU', '.FALSE.'/ 
/ 
'FUELCHL4'/ GENHTP model label 
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fluid density coefficient 
0.0, -0.0118/ 
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fuel temperature coefficient 
3.747E-6, -0.006/  
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fluid temperature coefficient 
0.0,0.0/ 
'KINETICS', 'RPOWER5'/ 
1, 21, 'SIM_PK', 'DEN_VOID'/ 
0.001, 'EQUILIBRIUM', 'CANDU', '.FALSE.'/ 
/ 
'FUELCHL5'/ GENHTP model label 
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fluid density coefficient 
0.0, -0.0118/ 
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fuel temperature coefficient 
3.747E-6, -0.006/  
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fluid temperature coefficient 
0.0,0.0/ 
'KINETICS', 'RPOWER6'/ 
1, 21, 'SIM_PK', 'DEN_VOID'/ 
0.001, 'EQUILIBRIUM', 'CANDU', '.FALSE.'/ 
/ 
'FUELCHL6'/ GENHTP model label 
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fluid density coefficient 
0.0, -0.0118/ 
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fuel temperature coefficient 
3.747E-6, -0.006/  
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fluid temperature coefficient 
0.0,0.0/ 
'KINETICS', 'RPOWER7'/ 
1, 21, 'SIM_PK', 'DEN_VOID'/ 
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0.001, 'EQUILIBRIUM', 'CANDU', '.FALSE.'/ 
/ 
'FUELCHL7'/ GENHTP model label 
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fluid density coefficient 
0.0, -0.0118/ 
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fuel temperature coefficient 
3.747E-6, -0.006/  
'QUADRATIC', 'DIF'/ fluid temperature coefficient 
0.0,0.0/ 




C     CALCULATE THE NOMALIZED POWER 
C                                      
      DATA S1 /2.65833E8/, S2 /2.64288E8/, S3 /3.46352E8/ 
      DATA S4 /3.06073E8/,S5 /3.4821E8/,S6 /2.65905E8/,S7 /2.6456E8/  
      R1="THER_PWR:RPOWER1"*S1 
      R2="THER_PWR:RPOWER2"*S2 
      R3="THER_PWR:RPOWER3"*S3 
      R4="THER_PWR:RPOWER4"*S4 
      R5="THER_PWR:RPOWER5"*S5 
      R6="THER_PWR:RPOWER6"*S6 
      R7="THER_PWR:RPOWER7"*S7 
      NOMPWR=(R1+R2+R3+R4+R5+R6+R7)/2.061221E9 
C                                 










































'RPOWER1','DK_ADD'/ application point is region 1 power 
'RPOWER2','DK_ADD'/ application point is region 2 power 
'RPOWER3','DK_ADD'/ application point is region 3 power 
'RPOWER4','DK_ADD'/ application point is region 4 power 
'RPOWER5','DK_ADD'/ application point is region 5 power 
'RPOWER6','DK_ADD'/ application point is region 6 power 




'NOMPWR',1.0,0.01/  measurement time constant of 0.01s 
/ 
'GT'/ 




















0.0, 0.1/ TDWAIT,TDELAY (SDS1 decision-making time) 
'REACTV'/ application point 
/ 
'OUTPUT','OUT0'/ 







































































'END'/ of system control 




















308  308  308  307  307  306  305  304  302  301  299  297  295  293  291  288  285  282  279  276     
269  269  269  268  268  268  268  267  267  267/                                                       
400  399  398  397  395  392  389  385  380  375  369  363  357  349  342  334  325  316  307  297     
275  274  274  273  273  272  271  271  270  270/                                                       
502  501  499  496  492  487  481  474  465  456  446  435  423  410  396  382  367  351  335  318     
282  281  280  279  278  277  276  275  274  273/                                                       
611  610  607  603  597  589  579  568  555  541  526  509  491  472  452  430  408  386  362  339     
290  289  287  286  284  283  282  280  279  278/                                                       
723  722  718  711  703  692  679  663  646  626  605  582  558  532  505  477  448  418  388  357     
297  295  293  292  290  288  287  285  283  281/                                                       
835  833  828  820  809  794  777  757  735  710  683  654  623  590  556  521  486  449  412  375     
304  302  300  298  296  294  292  290  288  286/                                                       
940  937  931  921  907  889  868  844  817  786  753  718  681  642  602  561  519  476  433  391     
310  308  306  304  301  299  297  295  292  290/                                                       
1032 1029 1022 1010  994  973  949  921  889  854  815  775  732  688  642  595  548  500  452  404     
316  314  311  309  306  304  302  299  297  294/                                                       
1106 1103 1095 1081 1063 1040 1013  981  946  907  864  820  773  724  673  622  570  518  466  415     
322  319  316  314  311  309  306  304  301  299/                                                       
1156 1152 1143 1129 1110 1085 1056 1022  984  942  897  850  800  748  694  640  586  531  476  422     
326  324  321  318  315  313  310  308  305  302/                                                       
1176 1172 1163 1149 1129 1104 1074 1039 1000  958  912  863  812  759  704  649  593  537  482  427     
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330  327  324  322  319  316  314  311  308  306/                                                       
1168 1164 1156 1141 1122 1097 1068 1033  995  953  908  860  809  757  703  648  593  538  483  429     
332  330  327  324  322  319  317  314  311  309/                                                       
1131 1127 1119 1105 1087 1063 1036 1003  967  927  885  839  791  741  690  638  585  532  479  427     
334  331  329  326  324  321  319  316  314  311/                                                       
1067 1064 1056 1044 1027 1006  981  952  919  883  844  803  759  713  666  618  569  520  471  422     
335  332  330  327  325  322  320  318  315  313/                                                       
982  979  973  962  948  930  908  883  855  823  789  753  715  675  633  590  547  503  459  414     
334  332  330  327  325  323  321  319  316  314/                                                       
883  881  876  867  855  840  823  802  778  752  724  694  661  628  592  556  519  481  442  404     
333  331  329  327  325  323  321  319  317  315/                                                       
774  772  768  762  753  741  727  711  693  672  650  626  601  573  545  516  485  454  423  391     
330  328  327  325  323  322  320  318  317  315/                                                       
663  662  659  654  647  639  629  617  604  589  573  555  536  516  494  472  449  425  400  375     
326  325  324  322  321  320  318  317  316  314/                                                       
553  552  550  547  543  537  531  523  514  504  493  482  469  455  441  425  409  393  376  358     
322  321  320  319  318  317  316  315  314  313/                                                       
448  448  447  445  443  440  436  432  427  422  416  410  402  395  387  378  369  359  349  339     
317  316  316  315  315  314  313  313  312  312/                                                       
353  353  353  352  352  351  350  348  347  345  344  342  339  337  334  332  329  326  322  319     





















308  308  308  307  306  306  305  304  302  301  299  297  295  293  290  288  285  282  279  276     
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269  269  269  268  268  268  268  267  267  267/                                                       
399  398  397  396  394  391  388  384  379  374  369  363  356  349  341  333  325  316  306  296     
275  274  274  273  273  272  271  271  270  270/                                                       
500  499  497  495  491  486  479  472  464  455  445  434  422  409  395  381  366  350  334  318     
282  281  280  279  278  277  276  275  274  273/                                                       
609  607  605  600  594  586  577  566  553  539  524  507  489  470  450  429  407  385  362  338     
290  288  287  286  284  283  281  280  279  277/                                                       
719  718  714  708  699  688  675  660  643  623  602  580  556  530  503  475  447  417  387  357     
297  295  293  291  290  288  286  285  283  281/                                                       
830  828  823  815  804  790  773  753  731  706  679  650  620  588  554  519  484  448  411  374     
304  302  300  298  296  294  292  290  288  286/                                                       
933  931  925  915  901  884  863  839  812  782  749  715  678  639  600  559  517  475  432  390     
310  308  306  303  301  299  297  294  292  290/                                                       
1025 1022 1015 1003  987  967  943  915  883  848  811  771  728  684  639  593  545  498  450  403     
316  314  311  309  306  304  301  299  297  294/                                                       
1098 1095 1087 1074 1056 1033 1006  975  940  901  859  815  768  720  670  619  568  516  465  414     
321  319  316  314  311  308  306  303  301  298/                                                       
1147 1143 1135 1121 1101 1077 1048 1015  977  936  892  845  795  744  691  637  583  529  475  421     
326  323  320  318  315  312  310  307  305  302/                                                       
1167 1163 1155 1140 1121 1096 1066 1032  994  951  906  858  807  755  701  646  591  535  480  426     
329  327  324  321  319  316  313  311  308  305/                                                       
1159 1156 1147 1133 1114 1089 1060 1026  988  947  902  854  804  753  699  645  591  536  481  428     
332  329  327  324  321  319  316  314  311  308/                                                       
1122 1119 1110 1097 1079 1056 1028  997  961  922  879  834  787  737  687  635  583  530  478  426     
334  331  328  326  323  321  318  316  313  311/                                                       
1059 1056 1049 1037 1020  999  975  946  913  878  839  798  755  710  663  615  567  518  470  421     
334  332  329  327  325  322  320  317  315  313/                                                       
975  973  966  956  942  924  902  878  850  819  785  749  711  671  630  588  545  501  457  413     
334  331  329  327  325  323  320  318  316  314/                                                       
878  875  870  862  850  835  818  797  774  748  720  690  658  625  590  554  517  479  441  403     
332  330  328  326  324  322  320  318  317  315/                                                       
770  768  764  758  749  737  724  708  689  669  647  623  598  571  543  514  484  453  422  390     
330  328  326  324  323  321  320  318  316  315/                                                       
660  658  656  651  644  636  626  615  601  586  570  553  534  514  493  470  448  424  399  374     
326  325  323  322  321  319  318  317  315  314/                                                       
551  550  548  545  541  535  529  521  512  503  492  480  467  454  439  424  408  392  375  357     
322  321  320  319  318  317  316  315  314  313/                                                       
447  447  446  444  442  439  435  431  426  421  415  409  402  394  386  377  368  359  349  338     
317  316  316  315  314  314  313  313  312  311/                                                       
353  353  352  352  351  350  349  348  346  345  343  341  339  337  334  331  328  325  322  319     























311  311  311  311  310  309  308  307  305  303  302  300  297  295  292  290  287  284  280  277     
269  269  269  268  268  268  268  267  267  267/                                                       
410  410  409  407  405  402  398  394  389  384  377  371  364  356  347  339  329  319  309  299     
275  275  274  273  273  272  271  271  270  269/                                                       
522  521  519  516  511  506  499  491  482  472  460  448  435  421  406  390  374  357  339  321     
283  282  281  280  278  277  276  275  274  273/                                                       
642  641  638  633  626  617  607  594  580  565  548  529  509  488  466  443  419  394  369  343     
291  289  287  286  285  283  282  280  279  277/                                                       
767  765  760  753  744  731  717  699  680  658  635  609  582  554  524  493  461  429  396  363     
297  296  294  292  290  288  286  285  283  281/                                                       
892  889  884  874  862  846  826  804  778  751  720  688  653  617  580  541  502  462  422  381     
305  302  300  298  296  294  292  289  287  285/                                                       
1009 1006  999  987  972  952  928  900  870  835  799  759  718  674  630  584  538  491  444  397     
311  309  306  304  301  299  297  294  292  289/                                                       
1113 1110 1102 1088 1070 1046 1018  986  950  910  867  822  774  724  673  621  568  516  463  411     
317  314  312  309  306  304  301  299  296  294/                                                       
1197 1193 1183 1168 1148 1121 1090 1054 1014  969  922  871  818  763  707  650  593  535  478  422     
322  320  317  314  311  308  306  303  300  297/                                                       
1252 1248 1238 1222 1200 1172 1138 1099 1056 1009  958  904  848  789  730  670  609  549  489  430     
327  324  321  318  315  312  310  307  304  301/                                                       
1275 1270 1260 1244 1221 1192 1158 1118 1074 1026  973  918  861  801  740  679  617  555  495  435     
330  327  324  322  319  316  313  310  307  304/                                                       
1265 1261 1251 1234 1212 1184 1150 1111 1067 1020  968  914  857  798  738  678  617  556  495  436     
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333  330  327  324  321  318  316  313  310  307/                                                       
1221 1217 1208 1192 1171 1145 1113 1076 1035  990  942  890  836  781  724  666  607  549  491  434     
334  331  329  326  323  320  318  315  312  310/                                                       
1148 1145 1136 1122 1103 1079 1051 1018  981  940  896  849  800  749  697  644  590  536  482  429     
335  332  329  327  324  322  319  316  314  311/                                                       
1051 1048 1041 1029 1013  993  968  940  908  872  834  794  751  706  660  613  565  517  468  420     
334  331  329  327  324  322  320  317  315  313/                                                       
940  937  931  922  908  892  871  848  822  793  761  727  691  654  615  575  534  493  451  409     
332  330  328  326  324  322  319  317  315  313/                                                       
817  815  811  803  793  780  765  747  726  704  679  652  624  594  563  531  498  464  429  395     
329  328  326  324  322  320  319  317  315  313/                                                       
693  692  689  683  676  667  656  643  628  612  593  574  553  531  507  483  458  432  405  378     
326  324  323  321  320  318  317  316  314  313/                                                       
572  571  569  565  561  555  548  539  529  519  507  494  480  465  449  433  415  397  379  359     
321  320  319  318  317  316  315  314  313  312/                                                       
458  457  456  454  452  449  445  440  435  429  423  416  408  400  391  381  371  361  350  339     
316  315  314  314  313  312  312  311  311  310/                                                       
355  355  354  354  353  352  351  350  348  346  344  342  340  337  335  332  328  325  322  318     





















316  316  316  315  314  313  312  311  309  307  305  303  301  298  295  292  289  285  282  278     
269  269  269  269  268  268  268  267  267  267/                                                       
427  427  425  423  421  418  413  409  403  397  390  383  375  366  357  347  337  326  314  303     
  
198 
277  276  276  275  274  273  273  272  271  271/                                                       
554  553  550  547  542  535  528  518  508  497  484  470  455  439  423  405  387  368  348  328     
286  285  283  282  281  280  279  278  276  275/                                                       
692  690  687  681  673  663  651  637  621  603  583  562  539  515  490  464  437  409  381  352     
295  293  291  290  288  286  285  283  282  280/                                                       
837  835  830  822  811  796  779  759  736  711  684  655  623  591  557  522  486  449  412  375     
303  301  299  297  295  293  291  289  287  285/                                                       
986  983  976  965  950  931  908  882  852  819  784  746  706  664  621  577  532  487  441  396     
312  309  307  304  302  300  297  295  293  290/                                                       
1126 1122 1114 1100 1081 1058 1029  997  960  919  876  830  781  731  679  626  573  520  467  414     
319  317  314  311  309  306  304  301  298  296/                                                       
1252 1248 1238 1222 1199 1171 1138 1099 1056 1009  958  904  847  789  730  669  609  548  489  430     
327  324  321  318  315  312  309  307  304  301/                                                       
1353 1349 1337 1319 1294 1262 1225 1181 1133 1080 1023  963  900  835  770  703  637  571  506  443     
333  330  327  324  321  318  315  312  309  306/                                                       
1421 1416 1404 1384 1358 1324 1283 1237 1185 1128 1067 1002  936  867  797  727  656  587  519  452     
338  335  332  329  326  323  320  317  314  310/                                                       
1449 1444 1432 1411 1384 1349 1308 1260 1207 1148 1086 1020  951  881  809  737  666  595  525  458     
343  340  336  333  330  327  324  321  318  315/                                                       
1437 1432 1420 1400 1373 1339 1298 1251 1199 1141 1080 1015  947  878  807  736  665  595  526  459     
346  342  339  336  333  330  327  324  321  318/                                                       
1384 1379 1368 1349 1324 1292 1253 1209 1160 1106 1048  986  922  857  790  722  654  587  521  457     
347  344  341  338  335  332  329  326  323  320/                                                       
1296 1291 1281 1264 1242 1213 1178 1139 1094 1045  993  938  880  820  758  696  634  572  511  451     
347  344  341  339  336  333  330  327  325  322/                                                       
1179 1176 1167 1153 1133 1109 1079 1045 1007  965  920  872  822  769  716  661  606  550  495  441     
346  344  341  338  336  333  331  328  326  323/                                                       
1045 1042 1035 1024 1008  988  964  936  905  871  834  794  752  709  663  617  570  523  475  428     
344  342  339  337  335  332  330  328  326  323/                                                       
900  898  892  884  872  857  838  817  793  767  738  707  674  640  604  567  529  490  451  412     
341  339  337  335  333  331  329  327  325  323/                                                       
754  752  749  742  734  723  710  695  678  659  638  616  592  566  540  512  483  454  424  393     
336  334  333  331  329  328  326  325  323  322/                                                       
612  611  609  605  600  593  585  575  564  552  538  523  507  491  473  454  434  414  393  372     
330  329  327  326  325  324  323  322  321  319/                                                       
482  481  480  478  475  471  467  462  456  449  442  434  425  416  406  396  385  373  361  348     
323  322  321  321  320  319  319  318  317  317/                                                       
365  365  365  364  364  362  361  360  358  356  354  351  349  346  343  340  336  333  329  325     























312  312  312  311  311  310  309  307  306  304  302  300  298  296  293  290  287  284  281  277     
269  269  269  269  268  268  268  268  267  267/                                                       
414  414  413  411  408  405  402  397  392  387  380  374  366  358  350  341  331  321  311  300     
276  275  275  274  273  273  272  271  271  270/                                                       
529  528  526  523  518  512  505  497  488  477  466  453  440  425  410  394  377  360  342  323     
284  283  282  281  280  278  277  276  275  274/                                                       
653  652  649  644  637  628  617  604  589  573  556  537  516  494  472  448  423  398  372  346     
292  291  289  288  286  285  283  282  280  279/                                                       
782  780  776  769  759  746  731  713  693  670  646  620  592  563  532  500  468  434  401  366     
300  298  296  294  292  290  289  287  285  283/                                                       
912  910  904  894  881  865  845  821  795  766  735  701  666  628  590  550  510  469  427  386     
308  305  303  301  299  297  294  292  290  288/                                                       
1035 1032 1024 1012  996  976  951  922  890  855  816  776  733  688  642  595  547  499  451  403     
315  312  310  307  305  302  300  297  295  293/                                                       
1144 1141 1132 1118 1099 1074 1045 1012  974  933  888  841  791  740  687  633  579  525  471  417     
321  319  316  313  310  308  305  303  300  297/                                                       
1232 1228 1218 1202 1181 1153 1121 1083 1041  995  945  893  838  781  723  664  604  545  487  429     
327  324  321  319  316  313  310  307  305  302/                                                       
1291 1286 1276 1259 1236 1206 1171 1131 1086 1037  984  928  869  809  747  685  622  560  498  438     
332  329  326  323  320  317  314  312  309  306/                                                       
1315 1310 1299 1282 1258 1228 1193 1151 1105 1055 1000  943  883  821  758  694  630  567  504  443     
336  333  330  327  324  321  318  315  312  310/                                                       
1305 1301 1290 1273 1250 1220 1185 1144 1099 1049  996  939  880  819  757  694  630  567  505  444     
339  336  333  330  327  324  321  319  316  313/                                                       
1260 1256 1246 1230 1208 1180 1147 1108 1066 1019  968  915  859  801  741  681  621  561  501  442     
  
200 
340  338  335  332  329  326  324  321  318  315/                                                       
1184 1180 1171 1156 1137 1112 1082 1047 1009  966  921  872  821  768  714  659  603  547  492  437     
341  338  335  333  330  328  325  322  320  317/                                                       
1083 1079 1072 1060 1043 1021  996  966  933  896  856  814  770  723  676  627  577  527  478  428     
340  338  335  333  330  328  325  323  321  318/                                                       
966  964  957  947  934  916  895  871  844  813  781  746  708  670  629  588  546  503  460  416     
338  336  334  332  330  327  325  323  321  319/                                                       
839  837  832  825  814  801  785  766  745  721  696  668  639  608  576  542  508  473  438  402     
335  333  332  330  328  326  324  323  321  319/                                                       
711  709  706  701  693  683  672  658  643  626  607  587  565  542  518  493  467  440  413  385     
332  330  329  327  326  324  323  321  320  318/                                                       
585  584  582  578  574  567  560  551  541  530  518  505  490  475  458  441  423  405  386  366     
327  326  325  324  323  321  320  319  318  317/                                                       
467  467  466  464  461  458  454  449  444  438  431  424  416  408  398  389  379  368  357  345     
321  321  320  319  319  318  317  317  316  316/                                                       
362  361  361  360  360  359  358  356  355  353  351  349  346  344  341  338  334  331  327  324     





















308  308  308  307  307  306  305  304  302  301  299  297  295  293  291  288  285  282  279  276     
269  269  269  268  268  268  268  267  267  267/                                                       
399  399  398  397  394  392  388  384  380  375  369  363  357  349  342  334  325  316  306  297     
275  274  274  273  273  272  271  271  270  270/                                                       
501  501  499  496  492  487  481  474  465  456  446  435  423  410  396  382  367  351  335  318     
  
201 
282  281  280  279  278  277  276  275  274  273/                                                       
611  610  607  603  596  588  579  568  555  541  525  509  491  471  451  430  408  386  362  338     
290  288  287  286  284  283  282  280  279  277/                                                       
723  721  717  711  702  691  678  663  645  626  605  582  557  532  505  477  448  418  388  357     
297  295  293  291  290  288  286  285  283  281/                                                       
835  832  827  819  808  794  777  757  734  709  682  653  622  590  556  521  485  449  412  375     
304  302  300  298  296  294  292  290  288  286/                                                       
939  936  930  920  906  888  867  843  816  786  753  718  681  642  602  561  518  476  433  390     
310  308  306  303  301  299  297  294  292  290/                                                       
1031 1028 1021 1009  993  972  948  920  888  853  815  774  732  687  641  595  547  499  451  404     
316  314  311  309  306  304  301  299  297  294/                                                       
1105 1101 1093 1080 1062 1039 1012  980  945  906  864  819  772  723  673  621  570  518  466  414     
321  319  316  314  311  308  306  303  301  298/                                                       
1154 1150 1142 1128 1108 1084 1055 1021  983  941  896  849  799  747  694  640  585  530  476  422     
326  323  321  318  315  313  310  307  305  302/                                                       
1175 1171 1162 1147 1128 1103 1073 1038  999  957  911  862  811  758  704  648  593  537  481  427     
330  327  324  321  319  316  313  311  308  305/                                                       
1167 1163 1154 1140 1120 1096 1066 1032  994  952  907  859  808  756  702  648  593  537  482  428     
332  329  327  324  321  319  316  314  311  308/                                                       
1129 1125 1117 1104 1085 1062 1034 1002  966  926  884  838  790  740  689  637  584  532  479  427     
334  331  329  326  323  321  318  316  313  311/                                                       
1065 1062 1055 1043 1026 1005  980  951  918  882  843  802  758  712  666  617  569  520  471  422     
334  332  329  327  325  322  320  317  315  313/                                                       
981  978  972  961  947  929  907  882  854  822  788  752  714  674  632  590  546  502  458  414     
334  331  329  327  325  323  320  318  316  314/                                                       
882  880  875  866  854  839  822  801  777  751  723  693  661  627  592  555  518  480  442  403     
332  330  328  326  324  322  320  318  317  315/                                                       
773  772  768  761  752  740  726  710  692  672  649  625  600  573  545  515  485  454  422  390     
330  328  326  325  323  321  320  318  316  315/                                                       
662  661  658  653  647  638  628  617  603  588  572  554  535  515  494  471  448  424  400  375     
326  325  323  322  321  319  318  317  315  314/                                                       
552  551  549  546  542  537  530  522  514  504  493  481  468  455  440  425  409  392  375  357     
322  321  320  319  318  317  316  315  314  313/                                                       
448  447  446  445  442  440  436  432  427  422  416  409  402  394  386  378  368  359  349  338     
317  316  316  315  314  314  313  313  312  311/                                                       
353  353  352  352  351  350  349  348  347  345  343  341  339  337  334  331  328  325  322  319     























308  308  308  307  306  306  305  304  302  301  299  297  295  293  290  288  285  282  279  276     
269  269  268  268  268  268  268  267  267  267/                                                       
399  398  397  396  394  391  388  384  379  374  369  363  356  349  341  333  325  316  306  296     
275  274  274  273  272  272  271  271  270  269/                                                       
500  499  497  495  491  486  479  472  464  455  445  434  422  409  395  381  366  350  334  318     
282  281  280  279  278  277  276  275  274  273/                                                       
609  607  605  600  594  586  577  566  553  539  524  507  489  470  450  429  407  385  362  338     
290  288  287  286  284  283  281  280  279  277/                                                       
719  718  714  708  699  688  675  660  643  623  602  580  556  530  503  475  447  417  387  357     
297  295  293  291  290  288  286  285  283  281/                                                       
830  828  823  815  804  790  773  753  731  706  679  650  620  588  554  519  484  448  411  374     
303  301  299  297  295  293  291  290  288  286/                                                       
933  931  925  915  901  884  863  839  812  782  749  715  678  639  600  559  517  475  432  390     
310  308  305  303  301  299  296  294  292  290/                                                       
1025 1022 1015 1003  987  967  943  915  883  848  811  771  728  684  639  592  545  498  450  403     
316  313  311  308  306  304  301  299  296  294/                                                       
1098 1095 1087 1074 1056 1033 1006  975  939  901  859  815  768  720  670  619  568  516  465  413     
321  319  316  313  311  308  306  303  301  298/                                                       
1147 1143 1135 1121 1101 1077 1048 1015  977  936  892  845  795  744  691  637  583  529  475  421     
326  323  320  318  315  312  310  307  304  302/                                                       
1167 1163 1155 1140 1121 1096 1066 1032  993  951  906  858  807  754  701  646  590  535  480  426     
329  326  324  321  318  316  313  310  308  305/                                                       
1159 1156 1147 1133 1113 1089 1060 1026  988  947  902  854  804  753  699  645  590  536  481  427     
332  329  326  324  321  319  316  313  311  308/                                                       
1122 1119 1110 1097 1079 1056 1028  996  961  921  879  834  786  737  686  635  582  530  478  426     
333  331  328  326  323  321  318  316  313  311/                                                       
1059 1056 1048 1037 1020  999  974  946  913  878  839  798  755  709  663  615  567  518  469  421     
  
203 
334  331  329  327  324  322  319  317  315  312/                                                       
975  972  966  956  942  924  902  877  849  818  785  749  711  671  630  588  545  501  457  413     
333  331  329  327  325  322  320  318  316  314/                                                       
877  875  870  862  850  835  818  797  774  748  720  690  658  625  590  554  517  479  441  403     
332  330  328  326  324  322  320  318  316  314/                                                       
770  768  764  757  748  737  723  707  689  669  647  623  598  571  543  514  484  453  421  390     
329  328  326  324  323  321  319  318  316  314/                                                       
659  658  655  651  644  636  626  614  601  586  570  552  534  513  492  470  447  424  399  374     
326  325  323  322  320  319  318  317  315  314/                                                       
550  550  548  545  540  535  528  521  512  502  492  480  467  454  439  424  408  392  375  357     
322  321  320  319  318  317  316  315  314  313/                                                       
447  446  445  444  441  439  435  431  426  421  415  408  401  394  386  377  368  358  348  338     
316  316  315  315  314  313  313  312  312  311/                                                       
352  352  352  351  351  350  349  348  346  345  343  341  339  336  334  331  328  325  322  318     
311  311  311  311  310  310  310  310  310  309/        
'PRINT:(33008)','CALCULATE STATISTICS'/ 

























































10.600646E+06, 1.118E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 8.1355, 8.1355/ 
'P1', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.556869E+06, 1.118E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 8.3545, 8.3545/ 
'P2', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.558240E+06, 1.118E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 7.9668, 7.9668/ 
'P3', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.512847E+06, 1.118E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 7.9807, 7.9807/ 
'P4', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.517243E+06, 1.118E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 7.8986, 7.8986/ 
'P5', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.516754E+06, 1.118E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 8.0400, 8.0400/ 
'V1', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 




10.526644E+06, 1.118E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 4090.9090/ 
'V3', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.530757E+06, 1.118E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 5029.0910/ 
'V4', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.485266E+06, 1.118E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 2448.1285/ 
'V5', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.490226E+06, 1.118E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 2562.7516/ 
'V6', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.488761E+06, 1.118E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 2466.3393/ 
'Z1', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.471466E+06, 1.118E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 7.9802, 7.9802/ 
'Z2', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.471459E+06, 1.118E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 7.9823, 7.9823/ 
'Z3', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.509159E+06, 1.118E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 8.9832, 8.9832/ 
'Z4', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.477035E+06, 1.118E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 7.8016, 7.8016/ 
'Z5', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.476447E+06, 1.118E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 7.9747, 7.9747/ 
'Z6', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.474755E+06, 1.118E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 8.0397, 8.0397/ 
'Z7', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.474748E+06, 1.118E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 8.0415, 8.0415/ 
'ZONE1','BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.464067E+06, 1.119E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 7.9848, 7.9848/ 
10.449291E+06, 1.123E+06, 266, .00000E+00, 7.9985, 7.9985/ 
10.434477E+06, 1.129E+06, 267, .00000E+00, 8.0212, 8.0212/ 
10.419614E+06, 1.137E+06, 269, .00000E+00, 8.0526, 8.0526/ 
10.404692E+06, 1.147E+06, 271, .00000E+00, 8.0925, 8.0925/ 
10.389700E+06, 1.160E+06, 274, .00000E+00, 8.1403, 8.1403/ 
10.374629E+06, 1.173E+06, 277, .00000E+00, 8.1957, 8.1957/ 
10.359470E+06, 1.188E+06, 280, .00000E+00, 8.2578, 8.2578/ 
10.344215E+06, 1.204E+06, 283, .00000E+00, 8.3259, 8.3259/ 
10.328855E+06, 1.221E+06, 286, .00000E+00, 8.3989, 8.3989/ 
10.313387E+06, 1.237E+06, 289, .00000E+00, 8.4755, 8.4755/ 
10.297806E+06, 1.254E+06, 293, .00000E+00, 8.5542, 8.5542/ 
10.282112E+06, 1.270E+06, 296, .00000E+00, 8.6330, 8.6330/ 
10.266308E+06, 1.285E+06, 298, .00000E+00, 8.7102, 8.7102/ 
10.250399E+06, 1.299E+06, 301, .00000E+00, 8.7835, 8.7835/ 
10.234396E+06, 1.310E+06, 303, .00000E+00, 8.8509, 8.8509/ 
10.218310E+06, 1.321E+06, 305, .00000E+00, 8.9100, 8.9100/ 
  
206 
10.202161E+06, 1.329E+06, 307, .00000E+00, 8.9588, 8.9588/ 
10.185967E+06, 1.336E+06, 308, .00000E+00, 8.9952, 8.9952/ 
10.169752E+06, 1.339E+06, 308, .00000E+00, 9.0178, 9.0178/ 
10.153540E+06, 1.340E+06, 308, .00000E+00, 9.0258, 9.0258/ 
'ZONE2','BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.464056E+06, 1.119E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 7.9870, 7.9870/ 
10.449273E+06, 1.123E+06, 266, .00000E+00, 8.0006, 8.0006/ 
10.434452E+06, 1.129E+06, 267, .00000E+00, 8.0231, 8.0231/ 
10.419582E+06, 1.137E+06, 269, .00000E+00, 8.0543, 8.0543/ 
10.404654E+06, 1.147E+06, 271, .00000E+00, 8.0939, 8.0939/ 
10.389656E+06, 1.159E+06, 274, .00000E+00, 8.1414, 8.1414/ 
10.374580E+06, 1.173E+06, 276, .00000E+00, 8.1963, 8.1963/ 
10.359417E+06, 1.188E+06, 279, .00000E+00, 8.2580, 8.2580/ 
10.344158E+06, 1.203E+06, 283, .00000E+00, 8.3256, 8.3256/ 
10.328795E+06, 1.220E+06, 286, .00000E+00, 8.3981, 8.3981/ 
10.313325E+06, 1.236E+06, 289, .00000E+00, 8.4740, 8.4740/ 
10.297743E+06, 1.253E+06, 292, .00000E+00, 8.5520, 8.5520/ 
10.282049E+06, 1.268E+06, 295, .00000E+00, 8.6302, 8.6302/ 
10.266246E+06, 1.283E+06, 298, .00000E+00, 8.7067, 8.7067/ 
10.250340E+06, 1.297E+06, 301, .00000E+00, 8.7793, 8.7793/ 
10.234340E+06, 1.309E+06, 303, .00000E+00, 8.8460, 8.8460/ 
10.218259E+06, 1.319E+06, 305, .00000E+00, 8.9045, 8.9045/ 
10.202115E+06, 1.327E+06, 306, .00000E+00, 8.9528, 8.9528/ 
10.185927E+06, 1.333E+06, 307, .00000E+00, 8.9888, 8.9888/ 
10.169718E+06, 1.337E+06, 308, .00000E+00, 9.0112, 9.0112/ 
10.153512E+06, 1.338E+06, 308, .00000E+00, 9.0191, 9.0191/ 
'ZONE3','BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.500004E+06, 1.119E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 8.9882, 8.9882/ 
10.481718E+06, 1.122E+06, 266, .00000E+00, 9.0030, 9.0030/ 
10.463385E+06, 1.128E+06, 267, .00000E+00, 9.0275, 9.0275/ 
10.444993E+06, 1.136E+06, 269, .00000E+00, 9.0613, 9.0613/ 
10.426530E+06, 1.146E+06, 271, .00000E+00, 9.1041, 9.1041/ 
10.407985E+06, 1.158E+06, 273, .00000E+00, 9.1555, 9.1555/ 
10.389345E+06, 1.171E+06, 276, .00000E+00, 9.2148, 9.2148/ 
10.370602E+06, 1.185E+06, 279, .00000E+00, 9.2814, 9.2814/ 
10.351745E+06, 1.200E+06, 282, .00000E+00, 9.3542, 9.3542/ 
10.332766E+06, 1.216E+06, 285, .00000E+00, 9.4321, 9.4321/ 
10.313659E+06, 1.232E+06, 288, .00000E+00, 9.5137, 9.5137/ 
10.294421E+06, 1.248E+06, 291, .00000E+00, 9.5973, 9.5973/ 
10.275052E+06, 1.263E+06, 294, .00000E+00, 9.6811, 9.6811/ 
10.255555E+06, 1.277E+06, 297, .00000E+00, 9.7628, 9.7628/ 
10.235938E+06, 1.291E+06, 299, .00000E+00, 9.8404, 9.8404/ 
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10.216213E+06, 1.302E+06, 302, .00000E+00, 9.9115, 9.9115/ 
10.196395E+06, 1.312E+06, 303, .00000E+00, 9.9738, 9.9738/ 
10.176503E+06, 1.320E+06, 305, .00000E+00, 10.0251, 10.0251/ 
10.159563E+06, 1.326E+06, 306, .00000E+00, 10.0634, 10.0634/ 
10.136599E+06, 1.329E+06, 306, .00000E+00, 10.0873, 10.0873/ 
10.116640E+06, 1.331E+06, 307, .00000E+00, 10.0958, 10.0958/ 
'ZONE4','BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.469929E+06, 1.119E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 7.8065, 7.8065/ 
10.455762E+06, 1.124E+06, 266, .00000E+00, 7.8223, 7.8223/ 
10.441533E+06, 1.131E+06, 268, .00000E+00, 7.8485, 7.8485/ 
10.427248E+06, 1.141E+06, 270, .00000E+00, 7.8849, 7.8849/ 
10.412896E+06, 1.153E+06, 272, .00000E+00, 7.9312, 7.9312/ 
10.398464E+06, 1.167E+06, 275, .00000E+00, 7.9871, 7.9871/ 
10.383940E+06, 1.183E+06, 279, .00000E+00, 8.0520, 8.0520/ 
10.369314E+06, 1.201E+06, 282, .00000E+00, 8.1254, 8.1254/ 
10.354573E+06, 1.220E+06, 286, .00000E+00, 8.2064, 8.2064/ 
10.339709E+06, 1.239E+06, 290, .00000E+00, 8.2938, 8.2938/ 
10.324712E+06, 1.259E+06, 294, .00000E+00, 8.3861, 8.3861/ 
10.309579E+06, 1.278E+06, 297, .00000E+00, 8.4817, 8.4817/ 
10.294306E+06, 1.297E+06, 301, .00000E+00, 8.5785, 8.5785/ 
10.278894E+06, 1.315E+06, 304, .00000E+00, 8.6740, 8.6740/ 
10.263351E+06, 1.331E+06, 307, .00000E+00, 8.7657, 8.7657/ 
10.247685E+06, 1.345E+06, 309, .00000E+00, 9.3398, 8.8507/ 
10.231985E+06, 2.525E+06, 311, .01198E+00, 9.5670, 9.0164/ 
10.215744E+06, 2.525E+06, 313, .03100E+00, 9.7855, 9.2275/ 
10.199223E+06, 2.526E+06, 313, .07205E+00, 10.1871, 9.6138/ 
10.181687E+06, 2.526E+06, 313, .11929E+00, 10.6534, 10.0678/ 
10.163305E+06, 2.526E+06, 312, .15333E+00, 10.9313, 10.4112/ 
'ZONE5','BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.469062E+06, 1.119E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 7.9802, 7.9802/ 
10.454300E+06, 1.123E+06, 266, .00000E+00, 7.9952, 7.9952/ 
10.439498E+06, 1.130E+06, 268, .00000E+00, 8.0200, 8.0200/ 
10.424643E+06, 1.139E+06, 269, .00000E+00, 8.0546, 8.0546/ 
10.409722E+06, 1.150E+06, 272, .00000E+00, 8.0984, 8.0984/ 
10.394725E+06, 1.164E+06, 275, .00000E+00, 8.1513, 8.1513/ 
10.379639E+06, 1.179E+06, 278, .00000E+00, 8.2125, 8.2125/ 
10.364456E+06, 1.195E+06, 281, .00000E+00, 8.2815, 8.2815/ 
10.349164E+06, 1.213E+06, 284, .00000E+00, 8.3574, 8.3574/ 
10.333755E+06, 1.231E+06, 288, .00000E+00, 8.4391, 8.4391/ 
10.318222E+06, 1.249E+06, 292, .00000E+00, 8.5251, 8.5251/ 
10.302561E+06, 1.267E+06, 295, .00000E+00, 8.6138, 8.6138/ 
10.286770E+06, 1.285E+06, 298, .00000E+00, 8.7032, 8.7032/ 
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10.270851E+06, 1.301E+06, 301, .00000E+00, 8.7911, 8.7911/ 
10.254811E+06, 1.316E+06, 304, .00000E+00, 8.8750, 8.8750/ 
10.238659E+06, 1.330E+06, 307, .00000E+00, 8.9525, 8.9525/ 
10.222411E+06, 1.341E+06, 309, .00000E+00, 9.0208, 9.0208/ 
10.206087E+06, 1.350E+06, 310, .00000E+00, 9.4878, 9.0773/ 
10.189696E+06, 2.526E+06, 311, .00355E+00, 9.6475, 9.1470/ 
10.173143E+06, 2.526E+06, 312, .00598E+00, 9.7378, 9.1922/ 
10.156601E+06, 2.526E+06, 312, .00852E+00, 9.7340, 9.2213/ 
'ZONE6','BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.467256E+06, 1.119E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 8.0443, 8.0443/ 
10.452281E+06, 1.123E+06, 266, .00000E+00, 8.0580, 8.0580/ 
10.437268E+06, 1.129E+06, 267, .00000E+00, 8.0807, 8.0807/ 
10.422206E+06, 1.137E+06, 269, .00000E+00, 8.1121, 8.1121/ 
10.407083E+06, 1.147E+06, 271, .00000E+00, 8.1519, 8.1519/ 
10.391891E+06, 1.159E+06, 274, .00000E+00, 8.1997, 8.1997/ 
10.376620E+06, 1.173E+06, 276, .00000E+00, 8.2549, 8.2549/ 
10.361260E+06, 1.188E+06, 279, .00000E+00, 8.3170, 8.3170/ 
10.345803E+06, 1.204E+06, 283, .00000E+00, 8.3849, 8.3849/ 
10.330242E+06, 1.220E+06, 286, .00000E+00, 8.4578, 8.4578/ 
10.314572E+06, 1.236E+06, 289, .00000E+00, 8.5341, 8.5341/ 
10.298789E+06, 1.253E+06, 292, .00000E+00, 8.6125, 8.6125/ 
10.282893E+06, 1.269E+06, 295, .00000E+00, 8.6912, 8.6912/ 
10.266886E+06, 1.283E+06, 298, .00000E+00, 8.7680, 8.7680/ 
10.250775E+06, 1.297E+06, 301, .00000E+00, 8.8411, 8.8411/ 
10.234569E+06, 1.309E+06, 303, .00000E+00, 8.9081, 8.9081/ 
10.218282E+06, 1.319E+06, 305, .00000E+00, 8.9669, 8.9669/ 
10.201930E+06, 1.328E+06, 306, .00000E+00, 9.0154, 9.0154/ 
10.185535E+06, 1.334E+06, 307, .00000E+00, 9.0517, 9.0517/ 
10.169118E+06, 1.337E+06, 308, .00000E+00, 9.0742, 9.0742/ 
10.152704E+06, 1.339E+06, 308, .00000E+00, 9.0821, 9.0821/ 
'ZONE7','BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.467247E+06, 1.119E+06, 265, .00000E+00, 8.0461, 8.0461/ 
10.452266E+06, 1.123E+06, 266, .00000E+00, 8.0597, 8.0597/ 
10.437247E+06, 1.129E+06, 267, .00000E+00, 8.0823, 8.0823/ 
10.422179E+06, 1.137E+06, 269, .00000E+00, 8.1135, 8.1135/ 
10.407051E+06, 1.147E+06, 271, .00000E+00, 8.1530, 8.1530/ 
10.391855E+06, 1.159E+06, 274, .00000E+00, 8.2006, 8.2006/ 
10.376579E+06, 1.173E+06, 276, .00000E+00, 8.2555, 8.2555/ 
10.361215E+06, 1.187E+06, 279, .00000E+00, 8.3171, 8.3171/ 
10.345755E+06, 1.203E+06, 283, .00000E+00, 8.3847, 8.3847/ 
10.330192E+06, 1.219E+06, 286, .00000E+00, 8.4571, 8.4571/ 
10.314520E+06, 1.236E+06, 289, .00000E+00, 8.5329, 8.5329/ 
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10.298736E+06, 1.252E+06, 292, .00000E+00, 8.6107, 8.6107/ 
10.282840E+06, 1.268E+06, 295, .00000E+00, 8.6888, 8.6888/ 
10.266835E+06, 1.282E+06, 298, .00000E+00, 8.7651, 8.7651/ 
10.250726E+06, 1.296E+06, 300, .00000E+00, 8.8375, 8.8375/ 
10.234523E+06, 1.308E+06, 303, .00000E+00, 8.9040, 8.9040/ 
10.218239E+06, 1.318E+06, 305, .00000E+00, 8.9623, 8.9623/ 
10.201892E+06, 1.327E+06, 306, .00000E+00, 9.0104, 9.0104/ 
10.185501E+06, 1.333E+06, 307, .00000E+00, 9.0463, 9.0463/ 
10.169089E+06, 1.336E+06, 308, .00000E+00, 9.0687, 9.0687/ 
10.152680E+06, 1.337E+06, 308, .00000E+00, 9.0765, 9.0765/ 
'N1', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.145426E+06, 1.340E+06, 307, .00000E+00, 9.0256, 9.0256/ 
'N2', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.145401E+06, 1.339E+06, 308, .00000E+00, 9.0197, 9.0197/ 
'N3', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.106654E+06, 1.331E+06, 307, .00000E+00, 10.0998, 10.0998/ 
'N4', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.154589E+06, 2.526E+06, 312, .16830E+00, 10.6411, 10.5778/ 
'N5', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.148292E+06, 2.526E+06, 312, .00992E+00, 9.2865, 9.2328/ 
'N6', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.144489E+06, 1.339E+06, 308, .00000E+00, 9.0821, 9.0821/ 
'N7', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.144468E+06, 1.337E+06, 308, .00000E+00, 9.0772, 9.0772/ 
'W1', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.016686E+06, 2.528E+06, 309, .002765E+00, 9120.0391/ 
'W2', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.067423E+06, 1.336E+06, 308, .00000E+00, 4090.9122/ 
'W3', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.066126E+06, 2.527E+06, 310, .04875E+00, 5029.1249/ 
'W4', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.114225E+06, 1.340E+06, 308, .00000E+00, 2448.1312/ 
'W5', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.117391E+06, 2.526E+06, 312, .08480E+00, 2562.7811/ 
'W6', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.112862E+06, 1.338E+06, 308, .00000E+00, 2466.3420/ 
'M0', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.000006E+06, 2.529E+06, 310, .02765E+00, 9.5140, 9.4830/ 
'M1', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.050371E+06, 1.338E+06, 308, .00000E+00, 9.4775, 9.4373/ 
'M2', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 




10.098624E+06, 1.339E+06, 308, .00000E+00, 9.0209, 9.0209/ 
'M4', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 
10.100619E+06, 2.527E+06, 312, .09083E+00, 9.9140, 9.8682/ 
'M5', 'BY-NODE','HG-BY-SAT','HF-BY-TEMP'/ 



















































































APPENDIX B  
Altera Stratix FPGA Platform  
&  
National Instruments PXI-7811R FPGA Platform 
Two FPGA platforms have been utilized in the current work for platform diversity. The 
Altera Stratix FPGA platform is used to implement the “SG low level” trip logic and 
evaluate the system response time. The National Instruments PXI-7811R FPGA platform, 
with neutron overpower trip logic implemented, is connected to the HIL simulation 
environment to verify the safety margin improvement in a large LOCA case. 
 
Altera Stratix FPGA Platform  
The Altera Stratix FPGA platform is originally designed as an embedded system 
development board. It features an onboard Stratix EP1S40F780C5 FPGA chip with 
supporting I/O ports, interacting switches, and LED displays. The layout of all the 
components on the development board is shown in Figure B.1.  A block diagram showing 
the interaction between the Stratix FPGA chip and other onboard components is 
presented in Figure B.2. Detailed features of the Stratix FPGA chip are listed in Table 
B.1 below. 
The configuration of the onboard Stratix FPGA is through an EDA tool from Altera 
called Quartus II running on a host computer. Quartus II is capable of hardware coding, 
function simulation, and onboard signal monitoring. The synthesized design is also 
compiled and downloaded to the Stratix FPGA by Quartus II through a data cable 
connecting the board and the host computer. 
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Table B.1 Stratix FPGA features 
Logic Elements 41,250 
M512 RAM blocks (32 x 18 bits) 384 
M4K RAM blocks (128 x 36 bits) 183 
M-RAM blocks (4K x 144 bits) 4 
Total RAM bits 3,423,744 
DSP blocks 14 
Embedded multipliers 112 
PLLs 12 
Maximum user I/O pins 822 
 
 





Figure B.2 – Block diagram of Stratix FPGA development board  
The input and output signals are directed to the onboard prototype connectors as 
illustrated in Figure B.1. More specifically, J11 and J16 are used to take the four 
incoming 12-bit SG level signals while J15 is responsible for pass the trip signal issued 
by FPGA to the simulation environment.  
The schematic overview of the implemented “SG low level” logic is shown in Figure B.3. 
Although the Stratix FPGA board is capable of realizing the “SG low level” trip logic, its 
insufficient I/O pins limit the application for systems that have more I/O request. 
Therefore, to explore FPGA application for CANDU SDS1 with more I/O requests, the 
National Instruments PXI-based FPGA platform is applied for the investigation of FPGA 





























































































































































VHDL source code for the top-level design shown in Figure B.3 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- 
-- Title       : SDS1 Steam Generator Low Level  Trip Logic 
-- Design      : SDS1_SG_LL_trip 
-- Author      : Jingke She 
-- Company     : UWO 
-- 





entity SG_LL_TRIP is 
  port( 
       CLK : in STD_LOGIC; 
       DATA_READY1 : in STD_LOGIC; 
       DATA_READY2 : in STD_LOGIC; 
       DATA_READY3 : in STD_LOGIC; 
       DATA_READY4 : in STD_LOGIC; 
       RSTB : in STD_LOGIC; 
       SG_LEVEL1 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       SG_LEVEL2 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       SG_LEVEL3 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       SG_LEVEL4 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       Trip : out STD_LOGIC; 
       bIndicator : out STD_LOGIC; 
       mIndicator : out STD_LOGIC 
  ); 
end SG_LL_TRIP; 
 
architecture structure of SG_LL_TRIP is 
---- Component declarations ----- 
component neutron_register 
  port ( 
       CLK : in STD_LOGIC; 
       ENABLE : in STD_LOGIC; 
       RSTB : in STD_LOGIC; 
       DONE : out STD_LOGIC; 
       NSR0 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       NSR1 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       NSR10 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       NSR11 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       NSR12 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       NSR13 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       NSR14 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       NSR15 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       NSR16 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       NSR17 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       NSR2 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       NSR3 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       NSR4 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       NSR5 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       NSR6 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       NSR7 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       NSR8 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       NSR9 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0) 





  port ( 
       CLK : in STD_LOGIC; 
       DATA_IN1 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       DATA_IN2 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       DATA_IN3 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       DATA_IN4 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       RSTB : in STD_LOGIC; 
       SP : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       SP_PLUS : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       B1_INDICATOR : out STD_LOGIC; 
       M1_INDICATOR : out STD_LOGIC; 
       TRIP : out STD_LOGIC 
  ); 
end component; 
component range_check_four 
  port ( 
       CLK : in STD_LOGIC; 
       DATA_IN1 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       DATA_IN2 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       DATA_IN3 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       DATA_IN4 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       ENABLE1 : in STD_LOGIC; 
       ENABLE2 : in STD_LOGIC; 
       ENABLE3 : in STD_LOGIC; 
       ENABLE4 : in STD_LOGIC; 
       RSTB : in STD_LOGIC; 
       DATA_OUT1 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       DATA_OUT2 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       DATA_OUT3 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       DATA_OUT4 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       DONE1 : out STD_LOGIC; 
       DONE2 : out STD_LOGIC; 
       DONE3 : out STD_LOGIC; 
       DONE4 : out STD_LOGIC 
  ); 
end component; 
component SG_level_register 
  port ( 
       CLK : in STD_LOGIC; 
       ENABLE : in STD_LOGIC; 
       REG : in STD_LOGIC; 
       RSTB : in STD_LOGIC; 
       SG_LEVEL_IN1 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       SG_LEVEL_IN2 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       SG_LEVEL_IN3 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       SG_LEVEL_IN4 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       SG_LEVEL_OUT1 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       SG_LEVEL_OUT2 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       SG_LEVEL_OUT3 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       SG_LEVEL_OUT4 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0) 
  ); 
end component; 
component sp_plus_register 
  port ( 
       clk : in STD_LOGIC; 
       enable : in STD_LOGIC; 
       rstb : in STD_LOGIC; 
       sp_plus : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0) 
  ); 
end component; 
component sp_register 
  port ( 
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       clk : in STD_LOGIC; 
       enable : in STD_LOGIC; 
       rstb : in STD_LOGIC; 
       sp : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0) 
  ); 
end component; 
component \18_sorting\ 
  port ( 
       CLK : in STD_LOGIC; 
       ENABLE : in STD_LOGIC; 
       INPUT_0 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       INPUT_1 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       INPUT_10 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       INPUT_11 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       INPUT_12 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       INPUT_13 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       INPUT_14 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       INPUT_15 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       INPUT_16 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       INPUT_17 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       INPUT_2 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       INPUT_3 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       INPUT_4 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       INPUT_5 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       INPUT_6 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       INPUT_7 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       INPUT_8 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       INPUT_9 : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       RSTB : in STD_LOGIC; 
       DONE : out STD_LOGIC; 
       OUTPUT_0 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       OUTPUT_1 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       OUTPUT_10 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       OUTPUT_11 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       OUTPUT_12 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       OUTPUT_13 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       OUTPUT_14 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       OUTPUT_15 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       OUTPUT_2 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       OUTPUT_3 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       OUTPUT_4 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       OUTPUT_5 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       OUTPUT_6 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       OUTPUT_7 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       OUTPUT_8 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0); 
       OUTPUT_9 : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(11 downto 0) 
  ); 
end component; 
 
---- Signal declarations used on the diagram ---- 
signal NET174 : STD_LOGIC; 
signal NET2748 : STD_LOGIC; 
signal NET2754 : STD_LOGIC; 
signal NET2758 : STD_LOGIC; 
signal NET2762 : STD_LOGIC; 
signal NET3590 : STD_LOGIC; 
signal NET4878 : STD_LOGIC; 
signal NET4938 : STD_LOGIC; 
signal BUS134 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS138 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS142 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS146 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
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signal BUS150 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS154 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS158 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS162 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS166 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS170 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS178 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS182 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS186 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS190 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS194 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS198 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS202 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS206 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS210 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS214 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS218 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS222 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS226 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS230 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS234 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS238 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS242 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
signal BUS4820 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (11 downto 0); 
 
begin 
----  Component instantiations  ---- 
U1 : \18_sorting\ 
  port map( 
       CLK => CLK, 
       DONE => NET4878, 
       ENABLE => NET174, 
       INPUT_0 => BUS170, 
       INPUT_1 => BUS178, 
       INPUT_10 => BUS182, 
       INPUT_11 => BUS186, 
       INPUT_12 => BUS190, 
       INPUT_13 => BUS194, 
       INPUT_14 => BUS198, 
       INPUT_15 => BUS202, 
       INPUT_16 => BUS206, 
       INPUT_17 => BUS210, 
       INPUT_2 => BUS214, 
       INPUT_3 => BUS218, 
       INPUT_4 => BUS222, 
       INPUT_5 => BUS226, 
       INPUT_6 => BUS230, 
       INPUT_7 => BUS234, 
       INPUT_8 => BUS238, 
       INPUT_9 => BUS242, 
       RSTB => RSTB 
  ); 
U2 : range_check_four 
  port map( 
       CLK => CLK, 
       DATA_IN1 => SG_LEVEL1, 
       DATA_IN2 => SG_LEVEL2, 
       DATA_IN3 => SG_LEVEL3, 
       DATA_IN4 => SG_LEVEL4, 
       DATA_OUT1 => BUS4820, 
       DATA_OUT2 => BUS134, 
       DATA_OUT3 => BUS138, 
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       DATA_OUT4 => BUS142, 
       DONE1 => NET2748, 
       DONE2 => NET2762, 
       DONE3 => NET2758, 
       DONE4 => NET2754, 
       ENABLE1 => DATA_READY1, 
       ENABLE2 => DATA_READY2, 
       ENABLE3 => DATA_READY3, 
       ENABLE4 => DATA_READY4, 
       RSTB => RSTB 
  ); 
U3 : neutron_register 
  port map( 
       CLK => CLK, 
       DONE => NET174, 
       ENABLE => NET3590, 
       NSR0 => BUS170, 
       NSR1 => BUS178, 
       NSR10 => BUS182, 
       NSR11 => BUS186, 
       NSR12 => BUS190, 
       NSR13 => BUS194, 
       NSR14 => BUS198, 
       NSR15 => BUS202, 
       NSR16 => BUS206, 
       NSR17 => BUS210, 
       NSR2 => BUS214, 
       NSR3 => BUS218, 
       NSR4 => BUS222, 
       NSR5 => BUS226, 
       NSR6 => BUS230, 
       NSR7 => BUS234, 
       NSR8 => BUS238, 
       NSR9 => BUS242, 
       RSTB => RSTB 
  ); 
U4 : SG_level_register 
  port map( 
       CLK => CLK, 
       ENABLE => NET4878, 
       REG => NET4938, 
       RSTB => RSTB, 
       SG_LEVEL_IN1 => BUS4820, 
       SG_LEVEL_IN2 => BUS134, 
       SG_LEVEL_IN3 => BUS138, 
       SG_LEVEL_IN4 => BUS142, 
       SG_LEVEL_OUT1 => BUS146, 
       SG_LEVEL_OUT2 => BUS150, 
       SG_LEVEL_OUT3 => BUS154, 
       SG_LEVEL_OUT4 => BUS158 
  ); 
U5 : sp_plus_register 
  port map( 
       clk => CLK, 
       enable => NET4878, 
       rstb => RSTB, 
       sp_plus => BUS162 
  ); 
U6 : sp_register 
  port map( 
       clk => CLK, 
       enable => NET4878, 
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       rstb => RSTB, 
       sp => BUS166 
  ); 
U7 : processing_logic 
  port map( 
       B1_INDICATOR => mIndicator, 
       CLK => CLK, 
       DATA_IN1 => BUS146, 
       DATA_IN2 => BUS150, 
       DATA_IN3 => BUS154, 
       DATA_IN4 => BUS158, 
       M1_INDICATOR => bIndicator, 
       RSTB => RSTB, 
       SP => BUS166, 
       SP_PLUS => BUS162, 
       TRIP => Trip 
  ); 
NET4938 <= NET2754 or NET2758 or NET2762 or NET2748; 
 






National Instruments PXI-7811R FPGA platform  
The National Instruments PXI-7811R FPGA platform enables custom logic design with a 
Vertex-II FPGA chip and LabVIEW graphical development tools. It has expansion 
chassis that can be used to increase the analog inputs to as many as 64 ports, which is 
capable of implementing applications that require large number of I/O. The LabVIEW 
FPGA module is a powerful programming tool which enables both graphic development 
and VHDL coding for specific function blocks. These features make it possible to easily 
transfer other VHDL coded design to the LabVIEW development environment. 
The entire platform, as introduced in Chapter 6, consists of the PXI-FPGA, the expansion 
chassis, and the I/O modules housed in the chassis. Detailed technical specifications of 
these devices are presented in Table B.2, Table B.3, and Table B.4. 
Table B.2 NI 7811R FPGA features 
FPGA Type Virtex-II V1000 
No. of flip-flops 10,240 
No. of 4-input LUTs 10240 
No. of 18 x 18 multipliers 40 
Power requirement for +3.3V rail 500 mA 
Power requirement for +5V rail 5 mA 
Max clock rate 40 MHz 
Bidirectional digital channels 160 
Resolution  64 bits 
Minimum input pulse width  12.5 ns 




Table B.3 NI 9151 expansion chassis features 
No. of slots 4 
Resolution 25 ns 
Max sampling rate 40 MS/s 
Table B.4 NI 9203 analog current input module features 
Measurement type Current 
Signal conditioning 0-20 mA 
Channels  8 
Resolution  16 bits 
Sample rate 200 KS/s 
Maximum current range -20 mA, 20 mA 
Maximum current range accuracy 0.049 mA 
Minimum current range 0 mA, 20 mA 
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